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ABSTRACT
Stephanov, Darin Nikolaev. PhD. The University of Memphis. 05/2012.
Minorities, Majorities, and the Monarch: Nationalizing Effects of the Late Ottoman
Royal Public Ceremonies, 1808-1908. Major Professor: Kent F. Schull.

This dissertation traces the evolution of the modern public image of the late
Ottoman ruler through stages of elitist projection and popular reception between the
accession of sultan Mahmud II in 1808 and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. It does
so through the prism of the ever growing institutionalized annual celebrations of the
Sultan’s birthday and accession day in the Ottoman capital, the provinces and abroad.
This dissertation demonstrates that the escalating cycle of ceremonial intrusion
into the everyday lives of people across the empire had significant short- and long-term
effects. In the short term, it brought ordinary subjects into symbolic contact with the
center and forged vertical ties of loyalty to the monarch, which were quite successful. In
the long term, the rounds of royal celebration affected directly the creation of new,
modern/national types of horizontal ties and group consciousness, which then crystallized
in national movements and, after the empire’s demise, national monarchies.
The argument is based on techniques of close textual analysis and visibility
studies. The sources include a wide range of Ottoman archival documents (reports,
directives and internal communications), artistic production including architectural
designs of fountains and clock towers, poems, songs, prayers and eulogies, as well as
newspaper articles, memoirs and personal correspondence in Ottoman and modern
Turkish, Bulgarian, Hebrew, English, French, and German.
By weaving together elements of micro and macro history, subaltern studies and
elite history, this dissertation provides a template for studying the complex syncretic
iii

modernity of late imperial regimes, which engaged in fascinating acts of ceremonial
experimentation, but also exhibited many ominous sides of the looming modern state,
with its unparalleled abilities to censor, discipline and control.
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Introduction

The explosion of nationalist movements in the wake of the end of the Cold War
and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s,
made questions of identity and ethnicity newly salient and brought about a veritable
Renaissance in the study of nationalism as mindset and political movement. In truth, by
this time nationalist scholars, as divergent in their views as Ernest Gellner and Elie
Kedourie, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony Smith, had already prepared the ground. With
the exception of Gellner, their work increasingly challenged the near monopoly of
modernization theory on the subject.1 A brainchild of the bipolar world of the Cold War,
it largely viewed nationalism as an indelible part of a singular and inexorable linear
trajectory of progress from traditional to modern societies. Notions, such as Benedict
Anderson’s imagined communities and Eric Hobsbawm’s invented traditions, provided a
new framework for analyzing national society and mythology.2 Not only was the
previous model’s inherent Eurocentric bias increasingly challenged, but so also was the
monolithic notion of modernity itself as well as the monologic nature of its top-down,
core-to-periphery dissemination. The stakes were high, since in the view of many, with
whom I concur, the story of modernity was the story of nationalism itself.3 The school of
1

See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca, NY, 1983), Elie Kedourie, Nationalism in
Asia and Africa. (New York, 1970), E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme,
Myth, Reality, (Cambridge, UK, 1990), and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York,
1986).
2

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London, 1983), and E. J Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (Eds.) The Invention of Tradition
(Cambridge, UK, 1983).
3

John Breuilly and most of the above mentioned scholars (with the exception of Smith), viewed
the two phenomena as intimately related, even equivalent, despite variations in their interpretations.

1

subaltern studies, in particular, did much to splinter the established conceptions of
modernity and nationalism. It is a strain of ‘history from below,’ which aims to
reconstruct the voice of the ruled and endow them with agency (including a capacity for
resistance). Originally geared towards the colonization experience of South Asia, the
school eventually had a much more global impact, and substantially contributed to a field
of critiques of modernization theory, which included postcolonialism and
postmodernism.4 By the early twenty-first century, the concept of alternative modernities
appeared, demonstrating the need for a separation between social modernization and
cultural modernity, and the uniqueness of every instance of their intersection in a nation.5
The field of nationalism studies itself was revolutionized by Rogers Brubaker’s
Nationalism Reframed in the 1990s, but, after a quick florescence, reached a state of
intellectual exhaustion by the early twenty-first century.6
The field of Near Eastern studies followed a similar trajectory in the second half
of the twentieth century. The peoples of the Ottoman successor states, which at the end
of World War II were barely a few decades old, became favored subjects of
modernization theory proponents, as did the history of the Ottoman Empire itself. Much
as nationalists tend to, post factum, nationalize the past, social thinkers sought, with
hindsight, the signs of imminent imperial doom. Bernard Lewis and Niyazi Berkes,

4

For some examples, see Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1961), Homi Bhabha’s The Location
of Culture (1994), and Gayatri Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of The
Vanishing Present (1999). See also the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, among others.
5

Dilip Gaonkar, Alternative Modernities, (Durham, NC, 2001).

6

See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New
Europe (Cambridge, UK, 1996), and Alexei Miller and Alfred Rieber (Eds.) Imperial Rule (Budapest,
2004).
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among others, developed elaborate arguments for Ottoman decline in the decades and
even centuries prior to the Empire’s collapse.7 The last stages of the Empire were
presented as an inexorable march towards a singular, positive and unproblematic
modernity according to a Western blueprint and under Western tutelage. Narratives, such
as these, carefully preserved centuries-old Western (mis)conceptions of Islam as
uniformly decadent and stagnant, of the Ottoman sultans as Oriental despots, and of the
Ottoman Empire as a decaying body politic, most vividly captured by Emperor Nicholas
I’s famous quip – “the Sick Man of Europe.”8 Edward Said’s Orientalism – a polemical
literary exploration of the rigidity and viciousness of Western stereotypes of the East,
based on Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge – questioned the validity of such
stereotypes and spawned constructive debates in a number of academic disciplines on a
global scale.9
The combined effects of developments in the scholarship of nationalism and
subaltern studies on the field of Middle Eastern studies over the last two decades of the
twentieth century were multiple and profound. As a result, the postulation of a rigid
divide between the imperial and national periods came under fire. For the first time, both
rulers and ruled in the region began to be studied on their own terms, which led to more
balanced, dynamic and interactive accounts of the processes of change in the last
7

See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961), and Niyazi Berkes, The
Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964).
8

The concept of Oriental despotism had been reinforced by Max Weber, whose work later
underwrote modernization theory.
9

Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978). For a poignant critique of Orientalism from a
Southeast European perspective, see Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans, Oxford, 1997, pp. 3-20.
For an overview of the impact of Said’s book, see Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle
East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (Cambridge, UK, 2004).
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centuries of empire. For example, both Timothy Mitchell and Khaled Fahmy analyzed
local elite strategies for modernization and grassroots reactions for different periods in
Egypt, utilizing Foucault-inspired approach of discourse analysis and governmentality.10
Selim Deringil broached the topic of late imperial (Abdülhamidian) Ottoman ideology
and legitimation of power in a collection of essays. He was the first to illustrate the
Ottoman center’s defensive symbolic stance in response to foreign and domestic threats
to its authority. Hakan Karateke then broadened the time frame to the entire nineteenth
century and produced the most systematic inquiry into late Ottoman elite ceremonial
practices. This work is one of very few attempts to analyze central ceremonial matters in
continuity, albeit with a limited ability to connect them to historical realities on the
ground and thus appraise their symbolic effectiveness.11
Such endeavors in the symbolic field of the late Ottoman Empire paralleled
developments in other late empires, and signaled a new, truly global interest in the value
of ceremonies as indicators of shifting conceptions of central power in this period. It is
hardly a coincidence, in my view, that ceremonial studies came into focus at the precise
time when the dominant nationalist paradigm was coming under assault. If scholars
turned to late imperial ceremonies, it was because these offered a fertile ground for
tackling perennial unresolved questions about the nature and rise of nationalism. Various
studies on Meiji Japan, Britain, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire brought imperial and

10

See Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, (Cambridge, UK, 1988) and Khaled Fahmy, All the
Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt; (Cambridge, UK, 1997).
11

See Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in
the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London, 1998) and Hakan Karateke, Padişahım Çok Yaşa! Osmanlı
Devletinin Son Yüz Yılında Merasimler [Long Live the Sultan! Ceremonies in the Ottoman Empire’s Last
Century] (Istanbul, 2004).

4

national themes closer than ever and examined them jointly through the prism of royal
ritual.12
In the late Ottoman field, the paradigm shift prompted a re-evaluation of the
highly controversial reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, spearheaded by Deringil. What had
hitherto been conceived simply in terms of an oppressive reactionism, suddenly, upon
closer inspection, revealed a much more ambiguous set of political realities, intentions,
implementations and consequences. Moreover, some continuities of reform and longterm processes of power centralization became increasingly apparent. So a proliferation
of studies on Abdülhamid II ensued, much of it dealing, at least partially, with ceremony
as a code for reading power. For example, Francois Georgeon’s biography of
Abdülhamid II contained ceremonial sections, most notably on the Sultan’s twenty-fifth
accession anniversary celebrations in 1900.13 Likewise, Alpay Kabacali’s study brought
forth by far the richest trough of visual evidence on Abdülhamid II’s reign, mostly drawn
from ceremonial settings.14 Additionally, Edhem Eldem produced the definitive work on
Ottoman medals, decorations and orders, which drew attention to the very successful late

12

See Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, 1985),
Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy. Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1996), Donald
Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912 (New York, 2002), David Cannadine.
“Splendor out of Court: Royal Spectacle and Pageantry in Modern Britain, c. 1820-1977” in Sean Wilentz
(Ed.) Rites of Power. Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the Middle Ages (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 206243, Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, 19952000), and Daniel Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg
Austria, 1848-1916 (West Lafayette, IN, 2005).
13

Francois Georgeon. Abdülhamid II: Le Sultan Calife (1876-1909), Paris, 2003.

14

Alpay Kabacali. Tanzimat’tan II. Meşrutiyet’e imparatorluk ve nesnel tarihin prizmasından:
Abdülhamid, [Abdülhamid through the Prism of Imperial and Objective History from the Tanzimat to the
Second Constitutional Period] Istanbul, 2005.
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imperial system of symbolic co-optation they fostered.15 Important forays into
ceremonial matters also came from scholars investigating the use of charity as a political
tool.16 Different thinkers approached the subject of late imperial symbolism from
different vantage points. However, they overwhelmingly remained preoccupied with the
center.17 Thus, most scholars did not connect developments in the center to the
provinces, much less investigate local effects and responses for a more comprehensive
picture.
***
This dissertation is situated at the intersection of all of the above discourses and
bodies of scholarly work. First, it rests on the fundamental premise that nationalism and
modernity are intimately related and very recent phenomena. In terms of setting a massscale sociocultural precedent which permanently altered the notion of public space and
the discourse and practices of power, both nationalism and modernity can be traced no
earlier than the French Revolution. Within the Ottoman realm, these phenomena were
announced in a most lasting, implication-rich manner by the Greek Revolution of 18211829. Second, it rests on the assumption that the best starting point in the study of
nationalism and modernity, thus defined, in an imperial context, is the process of

15

Edhem Eldem. Pride and Privilege. A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations.
Istanbul, 2004.
16

See Nadir Özbek, The Politics of Welfare: Philanthropy, Voluntarism and Legitimacy in the
Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914, PhD Dissertation, SUNY-Binghamton, 2001, as well as his “Imperial Gifts
and Sultanic Legitimation during the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876 – 1909” in Michael Bonner, Mine Ener,
Amy Singer (Eds.) Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, Albany, NY, 2003.
17

A notable recent exception to this pattern is Julia Cohen’s Fashioning Imperial Citizens:
Sephardi Jews and the Ottoman State, 1856-1912, PhD Dissertation, Stanford, 2008.
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extension of long-standing localized micro forms of belonging and their linkage to the
center for a macro form of belonging. This is a universal process, which, by definition,
links imperial and national sociocultural realities and emphasizes continuity in the
construction of modern public space and, over time, the modern rules of politics. Third,
this dissertation identifies the annual secular pan-imperial ruler celebrations, a global
mass-scale nineteenth-century phenomenon, as a heavily underresearched and extremely
promising area of focus in the study of the above process of extension and linkage.
Within the Ottoman realm, these festivities commenced by order of Mahmud II in the
capital, the provinces, and abroad in 1836, a fact which remains almost completely
unknown and has until today received hardly any scholarly attention. Fourth, inspired by
Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus analysis,18 this dissertation identifies three conceptual
parties, whose symbolic interaction within the ceremonial field served as a major vehicle
for accelerating sociocultural change across the world in the nineteenth century. These
are minorities, majorities and the monarch. The relativistic minority and majority terms
are viewed as pluralities in each case in a generalizing, yet historically accurate sense.
After all, different groups fulfilled these relativistic functions in different locales across a
number of empires (the Ottoman included) based on local specificities. Fifth, clearly, this
dissertation does not focus exclusively on the imperial center and the elitist parameters of
the ceremonial equation. On the contrary, as it amply demonstrates, the list of salient
ceremonial settings includes a wide range of provincial locales scattered across the vast
imperial domains and the list of salient ceremonial actors includes ordinary imperial
subjects from all walks of life. Although the dissertation extensively documents and
18

See Brubaker’s Nationalism Reframed.

7

analyzes the trajectory of one Ottoman non-Muslim community in particular – the
Bulgarians – the conceptual principles it distills in the process allow for the composition
of similar studies of other communal paths not only in the Ottoman Empire but across the
globe.
In short, this dissertation offers a new model for studying, in minute detail, the
transformation of late imperial into early national mentalities. It argues that the cyclical
ceremonial intrusion into the everyday lives of people across the empire, which the
annual sultanic (birthday and accession day) celebrations constituted, had multiple, farreaching, and so far largely unexplored consequences. On the one hand, it brought
ordinary subjects into symbolic contact with the monarch and forged vertical ties of
loyalty to him, which were quite successful. On the other hand, the rounds of royal
celebration were a significant factor in the creation of new types of horizontal ties and
group consciousness that crystallized into national movements, and, after the empire’s
demise, national monarchies.
Methodologically, the dissertation combines elements of micro and macro
history, subaltern studies and elite history. The argument is based on techniques of close
textual analysis, spearheaded by Carlo Ginzburg.19 The source base includes a wide
range of Ottoman archival documents (reports, directives and internal communications),
artistic production including architectural designs of fountains and clock towers, poems,
songs, prayers and eulogies, as well as newspaper articles, memoirs and personal

19

See Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms. The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller,
London, 1976.
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correspondence in Ottoman and modern Turkish, Bulgarian, Hebrew, Russian, English,
French, and German.
Chapter I introduces and briefly traces the concept of ruler visibility, the focal
point of the entire dissertation, from the inception of the Ottoman imperial project to the
nineteenth century. This umbrella term facilitates two lines of subsequent analysis of the
sultan’s public image – visibility abroad vs. at home, and visibility to Muslim vs.
Christian target audiences. The chapter then focuses on the reign of Mahmud II (18081839), who engineered the first shift in modern ruler visibility in the Ottoman Empire.
On the basis of untapped Ottoman archival evidence, this chapter makes the claim that
the reform process began much earlier than the standard narrative claims [the Rose
Chamber Rescript (Gülhane Hatt-i Şerif) of 1839]. It also introduces some principles of
aggrandizement of the ruler in the eyes of his people, such as piety, devotion to duty, and
fatherly status (in a ‘father-children’ metaphor of society), which pertain to the entire
dissertation.
Chapters II and III focus on the reigns of Mahmud II’s sons, Abdülmecid (1839–
1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876), respectively. They brought Mahmud II’s policies of
increased visibility regarding the royal image to an apex. The trope of love for the ruler,
which flourished under Abdülmecid, broadened and intensified the terms of direct
engagement between sultan and subject. It also provided early indications for a trajectory
of abstraction in the terms of glorification of the sultan, which would gradually lead to a
personality cult by the end of the nineteenth century, under Abdülhamid II. Abdülaziz
maintained a remarkable continuity with his brother’s policies. This sultan standardized
and expanded the annual pan-imperial royal accession and birthday anniversary

9

celebrations, which persisted until 1908. Chapters II and III gradually shift the focus of
the inquiry away from elitist theoretical conceptions of power towards popular practical
celebrations thereof. They look at some channels for the localization of central policies
regarding monarchic celebration and the transformative effects on the Ottoman
(especially non-Muslim) populace in the period from 1839 to 1876.
Chapter IV analyzes the second shift in modern ruler visibility, along faith-based
lines, during the reign of Abdülmecid’s son, Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). It demonstrates
that the sultan strove to present himself as a pious Muslim to Muslims at home and
abroad, and as a Western ruler to non-Muslims at home and abroad. Therefore, the sultan
tended to deprive the former from his direct visibility (public appearances and public
display of royal portraits), while at the same time channeling and staging it selectively
towards the latter. Split chronologically into early-, middle- and late-reign sections, this
chapter places a special emphasis on the overall shift from direct to indirect sultanic
visibility over time by way of resorting to material objects and abstract metaphors as ruler
proxies. Chapter IV traces the escalation of celebration in the second half of Abdülhamid
II’s reign in an attempt to capture the deliberate personality cult, centered on the sultan.
At the same time, it also analyzes a range of alleged provocations and attempts at
subversion (ceremonial or otherwise) of symbolic central power in order to shed new
light on the later channels for group activation and increasingly ethnic group realization.
The conclusion recapitulates the multi-layered story of the evolution of group
consciousness and the ultimate rise of nationalism, which emerges from the foregoing
analysis. It emphasizes the integral connection between imperial policies, their fostering
of ‘minority-majority’ mindsets and the ultimate ethnonational political outcomes. This

10

connection is, in my view, inalienable from a comprehensive and historically accurate
understanding of the transition from imperial to national mind-frames, and ultimately, of
the constituent elements of modernity itself.

11

Chapter One: The First Shift in (Modern) Ruler Visibility. The Reign of Mahmud II

I.

Introduction.

In 1810, according to John Hobhouse, a British traveler, present, along with Lord
Byron, at the British ambassador’s farewell audience with Mahmud II, the sultan was an
aloof figure, who did not engage in any eye contact with his foreign guests. The whole
ceremonial setting in which the two sides met [the Reception Room in the Topkapı
Palace’s Third Court (Arz Odası)] was entirely non-Western, including the sultan’s attire,
made of yellow satin. The sultan’s hands were “glittering with diamond rings” and he
had an “air of indescribable majesty.” Foreigners were incorporated into this setting by
donning Ottoman clothes (“pelisses”) over their own. The audience was difficult to
arrange and brief, subject to the whims of the Janissaries. Not surprisingly, the treatment
of the visitors was anything but deferential. They were whisked in and out of the room in
short order.1
In 1829, according to Adolphus Slade, a British military officer, present at the
British ambassador’s audience with Mahmud II, the sultan received the visitors with
“great simplicity.” Personally, he was “divested of sultanic pomp.” Slade went on to
describe the sultan’s appearance in the following terms: “Instead of robes of golden
tissue, and a cashmere turban concealed by precious stones, he wore a plain blue military
cloak and trousers, with no other ornament than a diamond chelengk [aigrette] in his fez,
and steel spurs on his Wellington boots.” This encounter took place in an audience tent,

1

John C. Hobhouse, A Journey through Albania and Other Provinces of Turkey in Europe and
Asia, to Constantinople, during the Years 1809 and 1810 (London, 1813), pp. 367-371.
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in Büyükdere, on the outskirts of Istanbul, prior to a Western-style military review.
Büyükdere, in addition to having an open field conducive to military exercises, was also a
favored locale for ambassadorial summer retreats throughout the nineteenth century. The
ambassador’s arrival on this occasion, in Slade’s estimation, was “the most respectable
Frank show ever exhibited to the Osmanleys.”2
Though barely two decades apart, these two audiences seem vastly different. The
purpose of this chapter is to inquire into the causes and consequences, single events and
long-term processes of change in the notion and practice of Ottoman sultanic power
representation during the reign of Mahmud II. The main organizing principle, both in
this chapter and in the rest of the dissertation, is the concept of ruler visibility.
For the purposes of this paper, ruler visibility in the pre-modern period is a
combination of direct and indirect components. The former include the sultan’s physical
presence at public ceremonies and the degree of his personal exposure to the public gaze.
The latter consist of a set of symbolic markers of the ruler, such as his cypher (tuğra) on
the one hand and the architectural monuments, such as fountains, mosques, and tombs,
constructed or restored by him, on the other. In the absence of a consistent, genuine
effort on the part of the ruler in this period to reach out past elite circles and the confines
of the capital and due to the lack of a periodical press and mass culture to popularize his
‘good works’, both types of visibility are quite limited.3

2

“The British Ambassador’s reception by the Sultan [Mahmud II] at Büyükdere, opposite
Tarabya, in 1828;” from Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, and of a Cruise in the Black Sea by Captain
Adolphus Slade (London, 1833), quoted in Laurence Kelly, (Ed.) Istanbul: A Traveller’s Companion
(London, 1987), pp. 305-306.
3

One exception to the general rule of low ruler visibility in this period was the practice of subject
petitions to the sultan on his Friday prayer procession to an imperial mosque.
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Modern ruler visibility is a composite concept, combining projected traits of
personal character, with short-term and long-term imperatives of policy, both
domestically and abroad. It incorporates not only a physical aspect – a monarch’s more
active participation in public events and ceremonies – but also the more frequent
occurrence of references to and discussions of his person in the press.4
On the basis of a detailed study of the marked shift in ruler visibility during
Mahmud II’s late reign, this chapter disputes prevailing notions of the famous nineteenthcentury Tanzimat (‘Reordering’) reforms both in terms of their timing and nature. It does
so through the medium of cyclical pan-imperial royal ceremony, with a heightened
sensitivity to its target audiences, both at home and abroad, on the basis of untapped
Ottoman archival evidence, in combination with other, underutilized sources, such as
memoirs and newspapers. In the process, this chapter breaks new ground regarding the
relations between the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects and the Ottoman ruler in the 1830s,
and, by extension, the avenues of formation of group awareness in the Ottoman Empire
leading over time to ethnonational consciousness.5

4

In designing this concept for the first time, with sultan Abdülhamid II in mind, I was much
influenced by Selim Deringil’s work and what he called “vibrations of power without being seen.” See
Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains (London, 1998), p. 18.
5

The majority of existing scholarship on the late Ottoman relations between the Muslim ruler and
his non-Muslim subjects still treats them as a self-contained, mostly antagonistic set, taking non-Muslim
types of group consciousness, based on theorized proto-national (millet) institutions, for granted. In a
gesture typical of the ethnonational, temporally continuous mindset prevalent today, an equivalent of our
present-day concept of ‘nationality’ is sought after and, if not found, then sewn into the fabric of societies
past.
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II.

Ottoman Ruler Visibility before Mahmud II.

One of the main premises of this dissertation is that the evolution of royal
ceremonies is a barometer for important sociocultural and sociopolitical changes. As the
Ottoman state grew from a frontier principality in northwest Anatolia in the early
fourteenth century, its bureaucratic structures became more complex and so did its
ceremonial projections of power. At first, the Ottoman bey (chieftain) had a primusinter-pares (first-among-equals) status, fought side by side with his allies, and was
generally highly visible and accessible.
Over time, the gradual territorial expansion and administrative consolidation of
the Ottoman domains brought about conflicting visions of power distribution and the
future of the state. As the status of the Ottoman ruler grew so did his attempts at
centralization of power at the expense of the alliance of frontier ghazi warriors (uc
beğleri), who had made Osman and his descendants’ conquests possible in the first
place.6 These tensions surfaced for the first time in a major way during the reign of
sultan Bayezid I when at the 1402 Battle of Ankara, the allied, but disgruntled beys of
Aydın, Menteşe, Saruhan, and Germiyan, withdrew from his side, costing him the battle,
his throne and, ultimately, his life.7 The act initiated a ten-year interregnum, which
almost destroyed the entire Ottoman project.

6

In Islamic theory, the concept of ghaza refers to a conquest in the name of the faith. The
warriors of the faith (ghazi) in the early days of the Ottoman state came from various backgrounds and
more often than not had a dual military-spiritual function (ghazi dervish). See Cemal Kafadar, Between
Two Worlds, Berkeley, 1995.
7

For details of the battle and Bayezid I’s subsequent fate, see Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream.
The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923, London, 2005, pp. 28-30. Kafadar refers to Bayezid’s
policies as “an earlier centralization-cum-imperialization drive.” See Kafadar, p. 97.
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The conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453 brought back another wave of
centralizing—centrifugal tensions. That same day, sultan Mehmed II, considering
himself, by virtue of his achievement of this long attempted conquest, superior to his
ancestors, did not stand upon the call of ghazi music, as was dictated by ancient custom.8
Over the next two years, the sultan arrested and executed many frontier warriors, who
had fought under his command, but resented the imperial project correctly perceiving its
implications for them.9 In the words of Cemal Kafadar, the Ottoman sultans had over the
course of two centuries “transformed themselves, at least in their historical
consciousness, from recipients to granters of insignia of vassalage.”10 Not surprisingly,
the timing of the Ottoman acquisition of imperial status, with the conquest of
Constantinople, coincided with the drafting of an imperial order by Mehmed II, which
was codified into a book of ceremonies by the late 1470s.11 According to Gülru
Necipoğlu-Kafadar:

This rule book stipulated that the monarch remain aloof; he would no longer sit at banquets or
appear regularly at public audiences as he used to do. Except for the two religious holidays in
which he agreed to give public audiences, he would remain in seclusion, only receiving privileged
dignitaries and ambassadors in his private audience hall four times a week.12

8

Ibid., p. 146.

9

Ibid., p. 97.

10

Ibid, pp. 146-47.

11

See Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar. “Framing the Gaze in Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Palaces,”
Ars Orientalis, 23 (1993), p. 303.
12

Ibid. See also Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar. Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: the Topkapi
Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, New York, 1991, pp. 3-30.
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Thereafter, as the empire gained power and international prestige, the sultan’s title
became longer and more magnanimous whereas his visibility and accessibility, from the
standpoint of the general populace, gradually decreased. Descriptions of audiences and
processions of Suleyman I and Selim II in the second half of the sixteenth century
provide a window into “classic imperial” Ottoman conceptions of the ruler and the terms
of his interaction with his own and foreign subjects. His face showed little or no
emotion. He rarely spoke. When he did, he employed intermediaries.13 Audience halls
and processions were arranged in such a way as to preclude direct contact of any kind.14
The processions themselves were not aimed at the people, and were therefore not
publicized, whereas foreigners were more often than not excluded from them.
The accession of Selim II to the throne in 1566, upon the death of his father,
Suleyman I on campaign in Szigetvar (Hungary), marked another stage in the reduction
of direct Ottoman ruler visibility. Until then, Ottoman sultans had the habit of visiting
the tomb of Eyüp prior to embarking on a campaign in order to seek the saint’s
blessing.15 Selim II left his personal mark on this practice in two ways. First, the fact
that his visit occurred immediately following his accession, on his way to the front in
Hungary, set a key precedent for all subsequent sultans. Second, beginning with Selim II,
no Ottoman sultan led personally the Ottoman army on campaigns any longer.
13

See The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, London, 1881, vol. I, pp. 152-156, 158160, 281-285, and “The visit of Sultan Selim II in solemn state to the mosque of Sultan Beyazet (Beyazet
Aga Camii), in the sixteenth century;” from Le Voyage du Levant by Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, quoted in
Kelly, Laurence (Ed.) Istanbul: A Traveller’s Companion, London, 1987, pp. 179-182.
14

See Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar. Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power.
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Eyüp al-Ansari, a Companion of Muhammad who participated in one of the earliest Arab sieges
of Constantinople, was allegedly buried outside the city walls. After the fall of Constantinople, the site
where his remains had been laid to rest became a major funerary complex and one of the holiest Muslim
sites in all of the Ottoman Empire.
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Therefore, the practical purpose of the sultan’s visit gave way to an entirely symbolic act
signifying the sultan’s military leadership. As Ottoman sultans withdrew further from the
public gaze over the course of the seventeenth century, the accentuation of their
(increasingly theoretical) military leadership became only more pronounced with the
addition of a sword girding to the tomb visit. The earliest such sword girdings we can
reliably date took place in the mid-seventeenth century. It was at that time that the
identity of the sacred sword, employed in the ritual, began to be mentioned and the
ceremony took the definitive shape and unmistakable content of an investiture rite.
Whereas in the past such ceremonial visits to Eyüp had occurred as often as campaigns,
beginning with Selim II, they took place only once, upon accession. Only in this way,
can we explain the reading of fetih suresi (the sura of the Qu’ran invoking conquest)
during the sword girding ceremony, a practice which was invariably performed on
campaigns.16
One of the first sword girdings, for which there is sufficient evidence, was in fact
a double sword girding, a rare occurrence in all of Ottoman history.17 In 1623, upon his
accession, Murad IV was girded with the swords of the Prophet (Peygamber) and Selim I
(Yavuz Selim). The reason for such an extraordinary act, in my opinion, is clear – a quick
string of sultanic depositions preceding this sword girding produced a dynastic low
moment. Between February 1618 and September 1623 (a span of 5 years and 7 months),
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This entire section is based on Cemal Kafadar. “Eyüp'te Kılıç Kuşanma Törenleri” in Eyüp:
Dün/Bugün: Sempozyum, 11-12 Aralık 1993, Istanbul, 1994, and Hakan Karateke. Padişahım Çok Yaşa
[Long Live the Sultan!], Istanbul, 2004, pp. 51-52, with reference to Selaniki, Tarih, p. 43, and Evliya
Çelebi, Seyahatname, p. 160. See also Finkel, p. 153. Not surprisingly, she entitled her chapter, which
opens with Selim II, “The Sedentary Sultan.” See Finkel, pp. 152-196.
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The other two such occurrences – Mahmud II’s sword girding in 1808 and Abdülhamid II’s
sword girding in 1876 are also highly significant and will be analyzed later.
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three sultans were deposed in quick succession – Mustafa I, Osman II and Mustafa I
again.18 It is probably no coincidence that in the aftermath of such a destabilizing
episode, Murad IV chose to be girded with two swords – one of Islamic and one of
dynastic significance.19 I believe that even the choice of swords can be explained to the
benefit of our understanding of the contemporary workings of core Ottoman power.
Murad IV picked Selim I’s sword, as his choice of a dynastic sword, over Osman Ghazi’s
sword, one of the most popular swords in all of Ottoman history, probably in order to
avoid any association with Osman II (Genç Osman). Symbolic confusion and negative
association, with a sultan recently deposed and murdered by the Janissaries, could easily
cost him his throne and life.
After their heyday as a formidable military force in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the Janissaries, a professional standing infantry and artillery corps, made up of
non-Muslim child levies (devşirme), began by the beginning of the seventeenth century to
play a role in Ottoman politics very similar to the Pretorian Guards’ in the Roman Empire
and the Streltsys’ in the Russian Empire. With the deposition and subsequent
unprecedented murder of an Ottoman sultan (Osman II) in 1622, “the pattern was set for
the rest of the century.”20 At the outset, in the late fourteenth century, under Murad I, the
Janissaries were conceived as a slave (kul) corps, created by and loyal solely to the
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On the traumatic events surrounding the deposition of Osman II (Genç Osman), see Gabriel
Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy. History and Historiography at Play, Berkeley, 2003.
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Karateke made note of each sword’s significance. See Karateke, p. 54.
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Finkel, p. 202. Janissary revolts also took place in 1651, 1655, 1687, 1703, 1730, 1733, 1734,
1740, 1742, 1743, and 1783 (See Philip Mansel, Constantinople, New York, 1998, p. 224).
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sultan, without rights of marriage, land or property inheritance.21 Over the course of the
following centuries, however, their activities branched far outside warmaking.22 In 1632,
Murad IV provided them land grants with an obligation to campaign.23 Gradually, the
Janissaries became extensively engaged with trade and tax farming (iltizam).24 By the
eighteenth century, the Janissaries had infiltrated the imperial domains and more or less
dominated provincial household-based politics in areas as far flung from Istanbul as Syria
(Sham), Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.25 They also played a vital role in the life of the
guilds (esnaf, taife).26 In fact, before and throughout the eighteenth century, virtually all
Muslim guildsmen had become Janissaries.27 As the Janissaries thus began to lose their
cutting edge in military matters and the Empire’s expansion was arrested, they became a
rising reactionary force, the nucleus of opposition to any modernizing reform, which
threatened the status quo. One area in which the Janissaries avidly performed the role of
“enforcers” in the pre-modern period was the sultan’s conservative image and public
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On the Janissary foundation, see Kafadar, pp. 112-113.
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At their apex, the Janissaries instilled fear in Ottoman enemies with their superb
firearm/artillery expertise.
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conduct, on the one hand, and in a related fashion, his limited, subdued contact with
foreign agents.
While the sultan was gradually withdrawing from public view, as a reflection of
his enhanced status, restraining factors and for other reasons, including personal
security,28 he began to craft more carefully the symbolic signifiers of his personage. In
the period between the mid-fifteenth century and the late sixteenth century, dominated by
the reigns of Mehmed II and Suleyman I, the Ottoman sultans attained a position from
which they could credibly dispute with Western sovereigns the title to universal kingdom.
Understandably, some of them attempted to cast their images in the mold of Western
rulers, which entailed occasional departures from mainstream Ottoman (Muslim) thinking
regarding ruler representations. Thus, Mehmed II invited western artists to his court and
had portraits painted of him as a Renaissance prince, in contravention of Islamic
injunctions and previous sultanic practices. He also issued medals commemorating his
capture of Constantinople and bearing his august image.29 Suleyman I, who competed
with the Habsburg Emperor Charles V for the title of Holy Roman Emperor even had a
ceremonial helmet-crown made for him that displayed motifs clearly borrowed from the
papal tiara.30 This act was further remarkable for the fact that, unlike the Safavids – their
Muslim rivals to the East – the Ottomans did not have a crown among their regalia.
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In 1389, on his inspection of the battlefield of Kosovo Polje after his victory, Murad I was
assassinated.
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Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar “Dynastic Imprints on the Cityscape: the Collective Message of
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Both of these changes met with disapprobation at home and were reversed no
later than the next reign. Bayezid II went so far as to accuse his father Mehmed II of
apostasy after his death.31 There was more to this accusation than mere matters of visual
human representation or ceremony, however. As Cemal Kafadar points out, Bayezid II
also sought to ease the moral pressures of centralization and appease some of its
discontents, even though the process itself was not halted.32 In addition, Bayezid II’s
announcement probably had a purely generational dimension as well: it can be seen as a
natural filial reaction, the consequence of an incoming ruler’s desire to differentiate
himself from the outgoing one. Such reasoning in fact characterized most transitions
between reigns, and, as we will see later, by way of the rising capacities of the media in
the modern period, it would come to play an ever larger role in royal image making.
The practice of painted royal portraits, however, outlived Mehmed II and, in the
form of dynastic albums, lasted until the end of the Empire. These were made for the
royal household alone, however. They were never exhibited in public. Suleyman I, on
the other hand, employed the helmet-crown very briefly, in the course of just a few
processions, modeled after those of his nemesis, the Habsburg Emperor Charles V, and
targeting an overwhelmingly Western audience.33 Afterwards, the helmet-crown was
blamed on a superfluous and whimsical Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Paşa, whose death, by
execution, brought an end to such visual experimentation regarding the sultan. Both of
these episodes, however, were exceptions rather than the rule. The general trend was for
31
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sultans to partake rarely of public ceremonies. When they did, they engaged in restrained
and strongly ritualized behavior, usually sharing ceremonial space with few outside the
capital’s elite.
The ruler’s direct visibility was so low in the seventeenth and most of the
eighteenth century that the sultan could leave the palace in disguise (tebdil-i kıyafet),
without much fear of being recognized. Most people simply had no way of knowing
what the sultan looked like. Foreign diplomats, on the other hand, could not move freely
through the capital – they needed special permits to proceed from one point to the next
and were accompanied by a Janissary guard at all times. As late as the turn of the
nineteenth century, foreign emissaries had to make special provisions prior to staging
any, more or less, public event or celebration in the Ottoman capital. For example, in
preparation for a fete and public promenade (temaşa) at the Russian legation in Istanbul
on the occasion of the Russian Emperor Paul I’s accession in 1796, the legation’s chief
interpreter, Joseph Fonton, had to request security arrangements from the Ottoman
authorities in order to avoid the occurrence of “quarrels and disputes (kavga ve niza).”34
Not only the Janissaries, but the population of the capital as a whole was at that time still
largely unaccustomed and hostile to acts of celebration of foreign sovereignty on
Ottoman soil. The memoirs of Western travelers, well into the nineteenth century,
corroborate this state of affairs.35
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The seventeenth36 and eighteenth centuries were on the whole quite uniform in
terms of the Ottoman ruler’s limited direct visibility, despite some periodic peaks. For
example, Ahmed III, whose reign (1703-1730) became known as “the Tulip Period (Lale
Devri)” encouraged a more ostentatious style of elite entertainment, including large openair parties with poetry, music, and frequent royal promenades along the shores of the
Bosphorus. This age opened new possibilities in terms of indirect visibility. It
inaugurated the passion for lavish fountains with poetic inscriptions eulogizing the ruler
and it also made the open format of waterfront palaces highly appealing and
fashionable.37 The emergent Ottoman Rococo architecture captured the exuberance of
this age and left a lasting mark on the Ottoman capital, to which I will return later. At
this time, the ruler’s monogram (tuğra) began to appear on the facades of public
buildings, a public statement which also enhanced his indirect visibility.38 Yet the
changes, some more lasting than others, affected neither the ruler’s direct visibility in the
long run, nor his connection to public spaces outside the capital.
It was Selim III (1789-1807) who took change and the ruler’s indirect visibility a
step further. Upon conclusion of the Iaşi Treaty, which ended the war with Russia in
1792, the sultan approached twenty-two prominent men and asked them to pen
memoranda on the new order to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire. The resulting
36
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papers which, Şükrü Hanioğlu likens to the French Cahiers of 1789, focused on
proposals for military and fiscal reform.39 The sultan invited foreign officers to serve as
advisers to the Ottoman army and established colleges to teach European military
sciences in imitation of French academies. Unlike previous such instructors like Baron
Francois de Tott or the Comte de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha), the new advisers
came as formal emissaries of the French government and retained their French rank and
loyalty to France. The sultan insisted, that, contrary to their long-standing habits, the
Janissaries should drill and train on a regular basis. 40
Selim III also broke new ground with the establishment of Ottoman legations
abroad in the early 1790s.41 Inspired by Napoleon I’s gift in the shape of his little
portrait, which was conveyed by the French ambassador in Istanbul, Selim III procured
his own version and sent it back as a token of his appreciation of Napoleon’s friendship.42
In terms of ruler visibility, Selim III, who also engaged in the type of elite entertainment,
introduced by Ahmed III, was both the last representative of the pre-modern age and the
harbinger of the modern one.43 This should come hardly as a surprise given that his reign
39
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began in the fateful year of 1789, which left no part of the European continent
unchanged. Selim III’s attempt to make a lasting mark at home, however, with the
establishment of a new military corps, the “new order” (nizam-i cedid) troops, which
would be directly associated with and loyal to the ruler, was short-lived. The Janissaries
rebelled and deposed the sultan in 1807.

III.

Mahmud II’s early reign and the Janissary constraint.

The period of this dissertation opens with the year 1808 for a number of reasons.
First, at this time, the Ottoman Empire endured one of its most unstable episodes.
Between May 1807 and July 1808 (a span of 1 year and 2 months), two sultans were
deposed – Selim III and Mustafa IV. Both were subsequently murdered. As it will be
demonstrated shortly, the circustances of Mahmud II’s rise to the throne in 1808 played
an important role in the timing and nature of his eventual reform efforts. The volatile
conditions in the Ottoman capital coincided with provincial disturbances and centrifugal
moves by powerful local notables (ayan). Center and periphery were brought together,
albeit temporarily, in a “Deed of Agreement” (sened-i ittifaq), concluded in the same year
of 1808.44
The details of Mahmud II’s rise to power – his hiding in the chimney of a bath,
and thus narrowly escaping the Janissary assassins sent for him – probably brought home
the point that any significant reforms could only be implemented after the Janissary
Corps had been completely removed from the political scene. The fate of Osman II in
1622 and Selim III in 1807, both of whom had intentions to reform the Janissary corps, in
addition to the fate of other deposed Ottoman sultans over the intervening centuries,
44
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certainly favored such a conclusion. Therefore, a durable grip on power necessitated
caution and dissimulation on the part of the ruler for as long as the Janissary Corps
existed. It makes little difference whether Selim III had an actual influence over his
younger cousin, and impressed upon his receptive mind ideas of reform early on or not.
The mere fact of Mahmud II’s rise to power on the strength of the loyalist Bayraktar
Mustafa Pasha, a powerful Rumelian notable, and his Albanian troops, who reined in the
Istanbul Janissaries, said much about the new ruler’s potential personal disposition
regarding the latter. Moreover, it was the provincial Albanians and not the Janissaries of
the capital, who marched beside the new sultan along Divan Yolu following his sword
girding procession.45 In return for his vital support, Bayraktar Mustafa became Grand
Vizier. In other words, from the outset of his reign, Mahmud II chose to draw his
legitimacy from sources other than the Janissaries.
On the surface, little had changed in the way the sultan acted in public. The 1810
account by Hobhouse, discussed above, cast Mahmud II’s image in light similar to his
predecessors going back at least to the early seventeenth century. There is evidence to
suggest, however, that even with the Janissary constraint on what he could and could not
do, Mahmud II had some exposure to Western practices of ruler celebration. An imperial
decree (HAT) dating roughly from the time of Hobhouse’s visit to Istanbul contains a
brief summary of the story of English royal accession celebrations: “In the English state
some time around 180 years ago, the things handed down by tradition changed, and it
became customary for the English House at that time to celebrate the day on which the
45
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kings sat on the royal throne …”46 Apparently, the occasion for this explanation was the
annual practice of the two British Navy squadrons in the Golden Horn to fire 20 [sic]
ceremonial cannon salvos on the King’s accession day. This act always remained
unreciprocated (muqabelesiz). In fact, as a way of protesting the lack of any Ottoman
reciprocity whatsoever, the British Ambassador announced his intention to send a notice
to the staff of the Ottoman Chief Artilleryman (Topçubaşı Ağa) to the effect that they
“did not inadvertently reciprocate (sehven muqabele etmemek için).“47 It remains unclear
whether the Ottomans caught the intended irony in the Ambassador’s protestations.
More importantly, this act of diplomatic exasperation clearly demonstrates that the longstanding Ottoman policy of ceremonial non-engagement with the West on its terms was
still in force in 1810.
The growing Greek revolt of 1821 made it plain to see that by the mid-1820s this
policy was no longer tenable. It demonstrated convincingly the urgent need for active
positive Ottoman image making abroad, in light of the West’s vital support for the
insurgents. The revolt also contributed in large part to the closing of Selim III’s
experiment – the Ottoman legations abroad – as their largely Phanariot staff’s loyalty to
the Ottoman state came under question.48 This closure reduced the indirect sultanic
visibility abroad for more than a decade.
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IV.

Wars, political crises and the changing image of the ruler.

Drastic change came on the heels of a protracted period of foreign wars and
internal instability. Between 1768 and 1829, the Ottomans were on the losing end of a
series of wars with Russia, which did not conceal its grand designs on core Ottoman
territories, including Istanbul and the Dardanelles. These wars initiated the so-called
“Eastern Question” and led to the Ottoman loss of the Crimea (1783), weakened control
of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the formation of
autonomous Serbia (1829) and independent Greece (1832).49 At this time, the Ottoman
center also fought powerful warlords at home, such as Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin,
Tepedelenli Ali of Yanya, and above all, Mehmed Ali of Egypt, who had grown to be
more powerful and independent than any provincial governor in Ottoman history.50 What
all of these external and internal crises called for was a profound reorientation in Ottoman
48
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foreign policy and the establishment of a plane of diplomatic reciprocity with and
acceptance by the increasingly powerful West. Until recently, this process was uniformly
and rather indiscriminately referred to as ‘Westernization,’ with its inevitable corollary of
‘secularization’ in most standard narratives of the period.51 Despite the universal
acknowledgement of the role of Mahmud II as the first successful initiator of this reform
process after the destruction of the Janissaries [known as “the Auspicious Event (Vaqa-i
Hayriye)”] in 1826, the majority of established historical accounts today still point to the
Gülhane Rescript of 1839 at the outset of Abdülmecid’s reign as the starting date of
Ottoman modernity. Clearly, the yardstick of modernity in this context is the central
Ottoman attempt to establish and safeguard the equality of Christian and Muslim
Ottoman subjects before the law, announced with the above-mentioned decree.
While adopting this as its central premise, this chapter shows that the Tanzimat
process was in fact well under way by 1839. Moreover, its central engine was not a
Western agent, but the sultan himself, who with the help of his advisers, Mustafa Reshid
Pasha featuring prominently among them, designed new celebrations with a view yet
again of centralization, only this time of subject loyalties. Finally, regardless of longterm implications, the immediate contemporary context of the ruler’s reformed image
was secular only if viewed from abroad. At home, Mahmud II strove to present himself
in strictly Muslim terms to Muslims, and universal kingly terms to non-Muslims. In
doing so, he initiated two momentous long-term trends, which have been
underappreciated by period Ottoman scholars, but which are indispensable to a realistic
understanding of the history of communal ethos in the late Ottoman Empire. The first is
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the direct active engagement with non-Muslims and the monarch-initiated split in the
manner of relation of the ruler to his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, which
accordingly conditioned reverse attitudes and modes of attachment. The second is the
creation and fostering of an integrative, universalist conception of faith as a binding
factor between the Muslim ruler and his non-Muslim subjects, which in more or less
credible format lasted for almost a century thereafter and gave Ottomanism its most
viable form in the mid-nineteenth century.

V.
The explosion in direct ruler visibility after the destruction of the
Janissaries.

Barely a few weeks following the destruction of the Janissaries on June 16, 1826,
Mahmud II had two thousand soldiers “arranged in European order and going through the
new form of exercise” in the outer court of the Topkapı Palace. Even more striking was
Mahmud II’s openness to the public gaze: “the sultan, who was at first stationed at the
window within sight, descended after a time and passed the men in review.” It is no
coincidence that the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, who meticulously related
the scene, felt obliged to point out – “within sight.” The remark reflects the unusual
nature of the sultan’s act. Just as striking was the sultan’s outer appearance – “dressed in
the Egyptian fashion [i.e. in a modern military uniform] armed with pistols and saber and
on his head, in place of the Imperial turban was a sort of Egyptian bonnet.”52 Equally
unusual was the fact that non-Muslims could watch the new troops parade through the
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city with equanimity, whereas at the beginning of previous campaigns they were often
attacked by the Janissaries for desecrating the sacred banner, among other supposed
offenses.53
The sultan’s “Egyptian” transformation in the immediate aftermath of the
“Auspicious Event” deserves a closer look, especially if we keep in mind that he had
already invited an Egyptian military instructor to teach the newly founded Eşkinciyan
(Mounted Yeomen).54 It was the drilling exercise of these new troops wearing modern
uniforms, in the European fashion, conducted by the Egyptian instructor and three of
Selim III’s veterans on the large drilling groud near the Janissary barracks at Etmeydanı
on June 11, 1826, that precipitated “the Auspicious Event” in the first place.55 That
Mehmed Ali, the reformer of Egypt, was after all a Muslim probably made his blueprint
of innovation much more palatable to Mahmud II’s own Muslim public than any outright
acknowledgement of a direct Western importation. After all, prior to 1831, Mehmed Ali
was acting as a perfectly obliging, if powerful provincial governor. His defeat of the
Wahhabis and re-taking of Mecca in 1813, upon Mahmud II’s request, had led to the
renewed trumpeting of the sultan’s ghazi title.56
As the ruler’s visibility increased, so did the militarization of his image. In fact,
the two trends were mutually reinforcing. This occurred in a context of profound
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Ottoman weakness, both at home and abroad, in the aftermath of the destruction of the
Janissaries, followed by the 1827 debacle at the Battle of Navarino, where the Ottoman
fleet was annihilated, and the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. The process of
change had multiple dimensions and implications. First, it was a matter of clothing. The
bright colors and luxurious materials of former centuries were quickly phased out in
favor of dull colors (blue, brown and grey) and coarse materials (wool and cotton).
In 1829, a British military officer still noted a few vestiges of the past in Mahmud
II’s procession to a military camp and audience given to the British ambassador. For
example, the sultan was accompanied by “pages walking on either side with huge
peacock plumes to conceal his resplendent visage from profane eyes.” In addition,
foreigners still had to “be conducted to another tent to be clothed”, although – in contrast
to the 1810 account by Hobhouse – with “Spanish mantles, made of inferior cloth.”57
By the early 1830s, Mahmud II could only be distinguished from a regular
military officer by a collar of diamonds, emeralds and rubies and a diamond clasp on his
cloak.58 Simplicity and accessibility became key motifs in Mahmud II’s reformed image
of the 1830s in his bid for much needed direct vertical ties of subject allegiance. Thus,
Mahmud II became the first sultan in recorded Ottoman history to walk to Friday prayers
through crowded bazaars (this occurred on a tour of the Straits in 1831, another novel
sultanic practice). The sultan even spent a night on a ship, preferring to have a simple

57

“The British Ambassador’s reception by the Sultan [Mahmud II] at Büyükdere, opposite
Tarabya, in 1828;” from Slade, quoted in Kelly, pp. 305-306.
58

John Auldjo, Journal of a visit to Constantinople, and some of the Greek islands, in the spring
and summer of 1833. London, 1835, pp. 97-98.

33

dinner with sailors instead of the splendid banquet given in his honor by Salih Paşa, the
commander of the town of Kal’a-i Sultaniye (Çanakkale).59
From 1826 to 1839, Mahmud II clearly chose a course of high (in some cases,
extreme) visibility in order to impose a drastic departure from Ottoman norms in most
spheres of life under the duress of a prolonged crisis. Like Nicholas I, the parade ground
allowed him to express a convincing autocratic vision for the Empire. Mahmud II
learned to ride a horse in the European fashion and initiated joint military reviews (with,
notably, the Russians) for the first time in Ottoman history.60 Similar to Emperor Peter I,
Mahmud II established the practice of forming various elite military units, such as the
Lancers (Mızraklı), which continued under the next three sultans. His Friday prayer
processions became much more accessible to foreigners than ever before. They signaled
the type of spectacle and source of publicity that would only grow in size in the future.
An 1833 account by John Auldjo, a British traveler, relating one of Mahmud II’s
Friday prayer processions, already reveals the lack of any visual barriers between the
sultan and common people on the street. Moreover, during this procession, an Ottoman
officer politely addressed foreign ladies in fluent French and provided refreshments for
them. Most strikingly, when the foreigners took off their hats, the sultan looked
“earnestly” at them, “without turning his head,” and went so far as to acknowledge the
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to thank Prof. Virginia Aksan for bringing Cengiz Kırlı’s work to my attention.
60

“The British Ambassador’s reception by the Sultan [Mahmud II] at Buyukdere, opposite
Tarabya, in 1828”; from Slade, quoted in Kelly, p. 306; Auldjo, pp. 172-174.

34

salute “by a slight inclination of his body.”61 The fact that the sultan should initiate eye
contact with foreigners, and, moreover, respond to their greeting, is indicative of the
speed of Ottoman integration into the Western system of signs and symbols after the
“Auspicious Event.” What makes this instance even more remarkable is the fact that the
visual exchange occurred in the context of a public procession, which by its nature carries
lower eye-contact expectations than a personal audience of the type described at the
beginning of this paper.
After a lapse of about two decades, following Selim III’s deposition, Mahmud II
returned to the theme of the ruler’s visage as a diplomatic tool, only this time he much
broadened both its purpose and target audience. After reportedly examining with great
care the portraits of the Tsar and the Tsarina on the walls of one of the cabins of a
Russian ship he visited in 1829, the sultan created a medallion bearing his portrait – a
depiction of him in a Western-style uniform. This became known as “the Imperial
Portrait” (tasvir-i hümayun) and it quickly became a most coveted domestic award as
well, demonstrating its holder’s rare proximity and high loyalty to the sultan.62
Internationally, the Ottomans maintained such gift exchange at least until the accession of
Abdülaziz in 1861, at which point he bestowed upon the French Ambassador, Marquis de
Lavalette, a portrait of his recently deceased brother Abdülmecid, “decorated with rich
diamonds” (s bogati brillanti ukrashen).63
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Even more radical was the public display of royal portraits. In the early 1830s,
Mahmud II commissioned portraits of himself wearing the new military uniform. In
1835, the sultan began to distribute his portraits to schools and official buildings.64 They
were hung in army barracks and saluted by the troops as if he were present.65 Various
sheikhs would bless them before they were placed in government offices and other public
places. A twenty-one gun salute greeted them as a guard of honor marched past.66 In
flagrant violation of Ottoman Muslim mores proscribing human depiction of any kind,
Mahmud II even gave away his portrait to the Şeyhülislam, Yazıncızade Abdülvehab
Efendi.67 This was an act of deliberate provocation on the part of the sultan, followed by
an exercise of blunt authoritarian force. The top cleric’s staunch opposition to portraits
soon led to his dismissal as well as the appointment of a permanent portrait artist in the
palace service.68
The early 1830s also witnessed the appearance of a modern domestic press in the
Ottoman language. Not surprisingly, the first Ottoman newspaper, Taqvim-i Veqa’yi,
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which also appeared in French, as Le Moniteur Ottomane, aided the cause of the sultan’s
visibility by describing the sultan’s daily activities. Its appearance in 1831 was probably
in response to Mehmed Ali’s initiation of his own publication, Vaqa’-i Mısriyye in
1828.69 In fact, the earlier cooperation between the sultan and his powerful governor
gave way to a vicious rivalry by the early 1830s, which posed a serious threat to Mahmud
II’s personal power and the Empire’s integrity for the rest of the sultan’s life. The
temporary diffusion of the crisis, with the assistance of the Great Powers in the mid1830s, afforded Mahmud II the opportunity to press with some of his most sweeping
economic, bureaucratic-administrative, legal, and, as the following pages will show,
ceremonial reforms.

VI.
The rising importance of Ottoman non-Muslims from the sultan’s
perspective. Further gains in sultanic visibility.

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which concluded the Russo-Ottoman war of
1768-1774, humiliated the Ottomans by forcing them to accept, among other indignities,
Russian protectorship over Ottoman Christians and the effective ceding of the Muslimpopulated Crimea to Russia.70 In return, the Ottomans received the symbolic
compensation of claiming protectorship over non-Ottoman Muslims. This amounted to a
69
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claim to caliphal authority, which the Ottoman sultans had not asserted, consistently and
prominently, since the mid-sixteenth century, the time of Kanuni Süleyman (Süleyman
the Magnificent) and his chief jurist, Ebu’suud. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca altered
the symbolic power equation between the two sides permanently at a time when
Catherine II’s designs on Istanbul and the Straits presented a very credible threat to the
Ottomans. One of its clauses – article 16 – explicitly afforded Russia the right to make
representations on behalf of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia
before the Sublime Porte.71 As Russia thus encroached more than ever before on long
held Ottoman territories, it became increasingly clear that Ottoman Christians, densely
populating some of the new borderlands with Russia, could be used as a ‘fifth column,’ a
powerful tool in diplomacy as well as war making. For example, the 1804 Serbian revolt
led to the 1806-12 Russo-Ottoman War. Similarly, the 1821 Greek revolt concluded with
the 1828-29 Russo-Ottoman War. As Stanford Shaw and others have shown, the
relations between Ottoman Christians and the sultan formed a credible link between
most, if not all, Russo-Ottoman Wars after 1774.72
In 1791, in a memorandum (layiha) to Selim III, Rumelia’s Chief Military Judge
(kadıasker) Tatarcik Abdullah Efendi first expressed the need to better address the
Ottoman Christians’ needs in order to avoid the occurrence of revolts.73 An early
indication of the Ottoman integrative efforts with respect to Ottoman Christians comes
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from an unlikely source – Vestnik Evropyi [Europe’s Newspaper] – a St. Petersburg
newspaper. In 1809, it claimed that the late Ottoman reformer, Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa
“has ordered that Muslims should stop using the word giaour (infidel), as any Christian,
of any confession serves the same God that Muslims believe in.”74 The Greek
Revolution of the 1820s, which began precisely in the increasingly contested borderlands
of Wallachia and Moldavia, before it spread to the southern Balkan Peninsula, only
accentuated the Ottoman center’s concerns. Thus, in 1827, with a special decree
(ferman) addressed to the local administration of Rumelia, the Sublime Porte set the task
of providing the Christians with security and the inviolability of their property.75 The
Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29, followed by a wave of immigration of Ottoman
Christians to Russian held borderlands (Bessarabia) further helped place the issue in stark
perspective. In 1828, the well known poet and custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina, Keçecizade Izzet Molla, and the defterdar katibi (clerk to the financial section of
the Ottoman government) Vecih Efendi presented another memorandum (layiha) to
Mahmud II. In it, they demonstrated that certain concessions should be made to the
insurgent Christians, pointing out that the state could not afford to be at war with Russia.
They went so far as raising a rhetorical question: “Is it not better for us to try and
preserve even a part of what we might completely lose at war?”76
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In July 1829, towards the end of the Greek Revolution, Mahmud II addressed the
Greeks (Rum) of Morea in a ferman in the following terms: “There will be in the future
no distinctions made between Muslims and re’aya and everybody will be ensured the
inviolability of his property, life and honor by a sacred law (Şeriat) and my sublime
patronage.”77 The recurring motif of Ottoman non-Muslims’ inviolability of property
shows more than a passing concern of the sultan’s. The clothing law of that same year
eliminated headgear as the chief marker of class and confessional identity. According to
Donald Quataert, Mahmud II thus legally “offered non-Muslims and Muslims a common
subjecthood/citizenry.”78
The sultan’s closer interaction with his own subjects went much further than the
flowery language of fermans. Over a period of seven years (1830-1837), he made no less
than five country trips (memleket gezileri) to the provinces.79 The first trip was to
Tekfurdağ, in the vicinity of Istanbul, and it lasted a day. The sultan went there by
steamship on January 28, 1830 and personally supervised the transportation of a shipload
of cargo waiting in the port to be sent to Şumnu (in today’s Bulgaria). The sultan’s next
trip, starting on June 3 1831 and lasting for 33 days, was to Edirne and the provinces
around the Dardanelles. As Cengiz Kırlı insightfully points out, each trip went farther
away from the capital, and the majority of them were clearly designed with the Empire’s
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non-Muslim population in mind.80 Despite the official purpose of the trips – to examine
the living conditions of his subjects and provide charity to the poor – Kırlı convincingly
argues that Mahmud II’s real purpose was “to be seen rather than to see his subjects.”81
During these trips, Mahmud II indeed consistently provided funding for churches,
synagogues and other historic sacred sites. His attitude set an example for high ranking
Ottoman officials to follow.82 The sultan also distributed monetary payments along the
way (51 guruş to each Muslim and 31 guruş to each non-Muslim). He even went to small
villages and distributed gifts to their inhabitants. While not unprecedented, such
benevolent treatment of Ottoman non-Muslims was certainly rare, especially over a
period of just a few years. It was clearly outside the norm of previous Ottoman
practices.83 According to Kırlı, “in an attempt to captivate the sentiments of his subjects
Mahmud constantly downplayed his godlike figure and presented the image of an
invincible yet human and earthly ruler.”84 True to the clothing regulation he had issued
only two years earlier, the sultan wore the new style headgear and trousers as he was
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walking among his subjects. Mahmud II continued to reproduce the new image of the
Ottoman ruler on his third and fourth trips to Istanbul’s neighboring town of Izmit, in
1833 and 1836, respectively. The former lasted a week and the latter – two weeks.85
The last trip was the longest and best documented. It commenced on April 29,
1837 at Varna (in today’s Bulgaria) on the Black Sea coast of Ottoman Rumelia. Over
the course of 39 days, Mahmud II visited more than a dozen towns on or near the
Danube. Helmuth von Moltke, a Prussian officer who accompanied the sultan on this trip
noted how the people who did not believe that the sultan was visiting their town crowded
town squares to see him.86 In a speech Mahmud II had Vassaf Efendi read87 at Şumnu (in
today’s Bulgaria), the sultan declared: “I distinguish the Muslims among my subjects
only in the mosque, the Christians – in the church, the Jews – in the synagogue; there is
no other difference among them. My love and justice are strong for all, and all are my
true sons.”88 Clearly, this statement continued the theme of equality between religious
groups in the Empire, first touched upon in the 1829 statement, discussed above. It also
presented the relations between ruler and subjects through a universalizing fatherchildren metaphor of society, common to all contemporary empires. Such a metaphor
had been employed by Ottoman rulers in the past, but in Mahmud II’s time it gained a
new meaning and urgency to it. Its use reflected a central elitist attempt to pre-empt the
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rise of ethnoreligious claims, inspired by novel notions of popular sovereignty, maintain
unity irrespective of cultural affinities, and re-orient weakened subject loyalties back to
the center in the aftermath of the disastrous 1828-29 Russo-Ottoman War. In fact the
whole 1837 trip was timed around the Russian withdrawal from the fortress of Silistre in
late 1836. The familial metaphor and its mutations would play a key role later under a
number of Mahmud II’s successors as a symbolic buffer against all attempts to invoke
principles of constitutionalism and self-determination. The trope of love expressed
towards a ruler’s subjects, regardless of their faith, predated by about two decades a
similar development in the Russian Empire.89 The speech further announced: “You
Greeks, Armenians, Jews, you are all servants of God, and you are all my subjects -- just
as good as the Muslims. Your beliefs are different, but you all obey the laws and my
imperial orders.” Apparently, at the end of the speech the sultan inquired whether
anybody among the non-Muslims had any complaints or whether their churches needed
repairs. In another village he actually donated money for church repairs.90 In another
speech during the same trip, the sultan addressed the leaders of non-Muslim communities
directly:

It is our wish to ensure the peace and security of all inhabitants of our God-protected great state,
both Muslim and reaya. In spite of all difficulties we are determined to secure the flourishing of
the state and the population under our protection. You [the leaders of non-Muslim communities]
bearing in mind our wish, ought to believe us in this deed.91
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The repeated invocation of God and faith in all of the above passages, with the
stress falling on their universal and authority-upholding, rather than specific and
potentially divisive functions, constituted the single most important thread in the sultan’s
legitimating strategies throughout his late reign. It was religion, in the form of a carefully
composed set of integrative messages and practices, which underwrote Mahmud II’s
attempts at ceremonial penetration, consolidation and centralization of his domains,
already under way by the time of this trip. The symbolic integrative process of the
annual sultanic birthday and accession day celebrations had already commenced and
some of the very same leaders of non-Muslim communities Mahmud II met with in early
1837 were already directly involved in the popularization of his image.

VII.

Ruler celebrations at home and abroad.

A report, dated May 8, 1836, by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the Ottoman Ambasador to
Paris, announced a decision made recently (khususi qarargir olaraq) to initiate annual
celebrations of the sultan’s birthday (veladet) and accession day (cülus). In this context,
worthy of note are both the Ottoman center’s intention to universally enforce this
decision and the profoundly religious terms framing it. Thus, the report declared that
“the eternal performance of this comprehensive auspicious procedure is most beautiful
and desirable” and added that “as it went into effect in Istanbul and the other imperial
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domains so it should in the Embassies of the Sublime State, located in Europe.”92
Needless to say, there was no mention whatsoever of the foreign origins of these annual
ritual practices. On the contrary, this innovation was carefully enveloped in Muslim
rhetoric. The sultan’s birthday and accession day were “bestowed solely by the grace of
God to the entire Islamic community and Muslim people (bilcümle millet-i islamiye ve
ümmet-i muhammediye haqqinda mehza lutuf-i ilah olan).” In addition, “God’s sublime
will” (maşaallah-i teali) and “acts of divine favor” (inayat-i samadaniye) were also
invoked with reference to the planned sultanic celebrations.
That the sultan should order these celebrations as soon as he set up the Ottoman
Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti) which re-established the Ottoman foreign legations
(first in Paris and London, followed by Vienna and Berlin), is a testament to their
perceived importance. The immediate issue of the calendar for these new official
holidays – lunar (Muslim) or solar (Christian) – raises questions regarding the target
audience Mahmud II had in mind and the frame he envisioned for the entire endeavor.
A document most likely dating from the early 1836 provides a glimpse at the
tortuous path of these reforms in terms of the sultan’s domestic legitimating strategies. It
contains a lengthy description of the elaborate ceremonies performed in the Ottoman
capital on the birthday of the Prophet (mevlid) each year. Decorations and illuminations,
public recitations of the life of the Prophet and cannon salvos from specially placed land
batteries and the fleet in the Bosphorus at the five prayer times during the day completed
the list of “necessities of veneration” (levazım-i ihtiramiye). The Prophet’s birthday
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“bu usul-i meyamen-i shümulun daima icrası pek ahsen ve mergub olup asitane-i
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(Rebiülevvel 12) was always celebrated according to the Arab lunar calendar (şühur-i
qameriye-i arabiye). Therefore, “as an act of piety and gratitude” (teyemmünen ve
teşekküren), it was firmly decided (tasmim) to celebrate the sultan’s own birthday and
accession day, according to the solar calendar (şühur-i şemsiye). On this matter, a special
sultanic decree was forthcoming.93
The choice of the solar calendar was clearly dictated by the sultan’s need to gain a
following with the non-Muslims at home and the foreigners abroad. Indeed, the first
reports of sultanic celebrations come from the volatile Danubian Principalities of
Wallachia (Eflaq) and Moldavia (Boğdan) the following year.94 The documents are quite
succinct, but they shed some light on the initial terms of interaction between center and
periphery in the organization and execution of these newly minted official holidays.

For

example, the hospodar (voyvoda) of Wallachia duly reported to the center that
preparations were under way there for the celebration of the sultan’s accession day.95
This act was apparently brought to the Sultan’s attention and “a response with
appropriate kindness” (iltifatlıca münasibi vechle cevabname) was being prepared in
return.96 Based on the evidence, the royal birthday seems to have been much more
important at this early stage. This was probably due to the fact that such a celebration
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had a local Muslim precedent in the birthday of the Prophet, unlike the royal accession.
Therefore, the birthday had more resonance at home.
It was on “the auspicious eve (leyle-i mübarekesinde)” of the royal birthday that
the hospodar of Wallachia sent to Istanbul two circulars “regarding what was done in
preparation of the necessary acts of illumination and rejoicing in Bucharest with a view to
expressing the requisites of devotion (ubudiyet) and submission (rıkkiyet) [lit.
servitude].”97 Despite the undeniable rhetorical qualities of this statement, it did also
touch on several important aspects of these celebrations, as they were intended by the
center.
First, this passage clearly conveyed the importance of the undertaking. In two
lines of text, words denoting ‘necessity’ appeared twice – ‘necessary acts’ (icra-i
levazım) and ‘requisites’ (muqtaza). Interestingly, these Ottoman synonyms referred to
both the outer (illumination and rejoicing) and inner (devotion and submission)
manifestations of attachment to the sultan. In other words, from the outset, there were
clear indications of the centralizing purposes of these events. What is just as impressive
is the subtle innovative use of faith in this process of loyalty creation and cultivation.
The full primary meaning of the Ottoman word ubudiyet, rendered as ‘devotion’ here,
was purely religious – “devotion to God with faith and obedience.”98 That the majority
of subjects in question were Christian mattered little. Instead the emphasis fell on the
integrative function of faith, its marriage to the concept of central authority (i.e. purposes
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“. . . Bukreş’te dakhi muqtaza-i ubudiyet ve rıkkiyet tasavvuratla icra-i levazım-i şehrayin ve
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of state), and the immediate implication of loyalty by way of submission. This seems to
be the next step in the sultan’s changing attitude towards Ottoman Christians, discussed
above.
The importance of this undertaking can be also gleaned from the explicit
recognition of the preparations for it. In fact, another decree reveals the actual scale of
activity and direct involvement of the center in the provincial celebrations. Apparently,
the Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet (Kapudan Paşa) personally appointed an agent with the
task of transporting a portion of previously purchased wooden material from the Imperial
Dockyards (tersane-i amire) in Istanbul to the Danubian port of Braila (Ibrail). In
Wallachia, a high ranking provincial Ottoman bureaucrat (eflaq kapukahyası)
acknowledged their receipt by way of two circulars back to the capital.
The longest, by far most florescent, but also most telling account of the way these
new celebrations reconfigured the center-periphery and sultan–subject relations was
written by the hospodar of Wallachia, Alexander Ghika.99 It was dated – November 12,
1837, i.e. about six months after his personal audience with Mahmud II in Silistre (in
present-day Bulgaria), while the sultan was touring Rumelia.
The letter contains the attempt of a high Christian dignitary with vested interests
to accommodate the anxieties of the center regarding subject loyalty.100 It shows a
different perspective on the nature and purposes of the new celebrations. The theme of a
people, bound by faith and duty to the sultan captures the essence of the entire project.
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According to Ghika, “the public perseverance in congratulating and felicitating [the
sovereign] is a public duty for all men” (tehniyet ve tebrikete müsaberet-i amme ibad
uzere resm-i vücubiyet olmayi).101 Once again, “the duty of devotion” (vacibe-i
ubudiyetleri)102 resurfaces, only this time from the multiplied perspective of the populace.
Interestingly, vücub is a term from canon law, which indicates “incumbency as a
religious duty not directly ordained of God.”103 The word for men (ibad) also means
“servants of God” and is probably the same word the sultan employed in the tour speech
analyzed above. Not surprisingly, the motif of popular prayer for the ruler figures
prominently in the letter. What is most surprising, however, is that the supplicants in
question are Christians. This is the earliest such instance I have come across. An
element of totality and unity invariably accompanied these prayers. For example, “all
joined together in prayer and supplication by all for the long life of His Majesty,”104 and
again – “all” (cümle) took part in “benediction prayers (da’vat-i khayriye).”
Finally, Ghika took the liberty to improvise on the trope of love and even
employed a Muslim metaphor in his narrative. According to him, “in this way, with hope
and excitement, [Wallachians] shared in the public rejoicing” (bu güne umumi sürurdan
behredar olmaq ümid ile iqa’). Their “gratitude and praise fell like tulip flowers”
(laleendaz şükr ve sena olduqları). The mention of this flower (lale), which could be
rendered calligraphically the same way as ‘Allah,’ would surely and instantly resonate
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with any Muslim reader, much less the Ottoman sultans who had held it close to heart for
centuries.
It seems that at the time of Alexander Ghika’s letter to Istanbul, royal birthday
celebrations were already commencing throughout the neighboring Ottoman province of
Rumelia. A report from Rumelia’s governor (vali) indicates the mechanics of
centralization and coordination of these efforts. According to it,

. . . with the purpose of performing [these celebrations] in most places, elders (muhtarlar) were
elected and appointed in all townships (nahiye) of Rumelia’s districts (kaza), and from now on this
comprehensive meritorious procedure was extended to the district of Premed, as a forerunner for
Albania . . .105

The governor’s report indicated further that a letter from the same high ranking
provincial Ottoman bureaucrat (kapukahyası efendi) as in Wallachia – apparently, the
usual go-between – requested from the center individual seals to back up the authority of
each elder. As a result, an imperial order was duly forwarded to the Imperial Mint
(darbkhane-i amire) to produce the seals in question.106
In the capital, the celebrations in late 1837 occasioned the first signs of
recognition by the West. According to a report from the center, even before the edict
announcing the royal birthday celebrations had been distributed, official greetings
(tebrikname) on behalf of the English and other ambassadors began to arrive in large
numbers. The list included the Ambassador of Iran, Hudadad Khan, and his Chief Scribe
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(serkatibi) Mirza Ja’fer, a fact which stood out and called for “a special display of
gratitude and manifest satisfaction” (makhsusca ibraz-i teşekkur ve izhar-i memnuniyet
eylemesi).107
Since in late 1837 the Ottoman Ambassador to France, Nuri Efendi, was also the
acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (umur-ı hariciye nazırı), it was only fitting that the
first celebrations abroad should be held in Paris. A report confirmed the decoration of the
Embassy on the occasion of the accession anniversary that year.108 Curiously, the novel
sultanic celebrations were felt even in faraway Erzurum where a zealous governor by the
name of Esad Paşa had a special poem recited and a chronogram composed in honor of
the sultan’s birthday.109 Both were sent to the center, as proof of the locals’ “show of
gratitude and joy (izhar-i teşekkür ve meserreti).”110
By 1838, the sultanic celebrations abroad really gained momentum. Two of the
reports, from the Ottoman legations in Vienna and Berlin, and a clipping from a British
newspaper regarding the Ottoman festivities in London, deserve particular attention.
They synthesize all celebration motifs, discussed above and best delineate the
experimental nature of modern Ottoman ruler visibility, including the fascinating
hybridity between Western form and Ottoman content, and vice versa, all harnessed for
the cause of state. The report from Vienna is unique not only in its length and elaborate
detail, but also in the fact that a marker of the sultan’s direct visibility served as the
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deliberate epicenter of both the actual ceremonial event at the embassy and the narrative
thereof.111 The description of the royal birthday celebration began (1) and ended (2) with
a reference to the royal portrait:

(1) . . . the circle of manifest majesty around the virtuous portrait of his imperial majesty was
decorated fittingly and at that circle, under the graceful auspices of his majesty the sultan, a
ceremonial social gathering in the European style, a soiree (suvare) was prepared with serious
attention, and the three hundred greatest Austrian ladies and gentlemen as well as all
ambassadors of friendly states were invited. 112

(2) … and the portrait was entered into a place of fitting superiority, with the awe-inspiring
virtues of his majesty, the show of sublime praise for the padishah, the remembrance and
reminiscence of his glorious exploits, and after an hour or two the invitees took leave,
delighted and honored.113

Based on these descriptions, we can conclude that the Vienna ceremony was quite
directly centered on the royal portrait. At the embassy in Berlin, the imperial portrait was
also placed prominently – in the “most presentable room (en mu’teber odasina)” – but it
was clearly not the focal point of the entire banquet. That the royal portrait and the
classic sultanic title –“the shadow of Allah” – should coexist in the same phrase is jarring
and ironic, but such indeed was the scope of change and the paradoxes it occasionally
entailed.114 In a vein of religious symbolic continuity, in Vienna the sultan’s exploits
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were referred to by the same word (menaqıb) as the Prophet’s own. The Berlin account
went a step further and described a recitation of the names and titles of the sultan, not
unlike the readings of the Prophet’s exploits on his birthday every year, to which all
Ottomans would have been accustomed since early childhood. In Berlin, these readings
were punctured by enthusiastic cries of “May the Sultan Live a Thousand Years!” The
sultan’s name was “sanctified (müteqaddis);” he was “a holy personage (zat-i qudsiyet).”
Unlike Vienna, the apex (zirve) of the Berlin event was the drawing and ceremonious
attachment of the sultan’s traditional cypher (tuğra).115 In London, the Ottoman
ambassador Sarım Efendi also chose to display the tuğra at the heart of an elaborate gas
illumination set in front of the embassy building, which included a crescent and star, and
a stylized Ottoman sun on top. Each of the tuğra’s sides, however, was graced by the
sultan’s initials in English – S. M.116 This was very likely the first such instance in
Ottoman history.

VIII. Conclusion.

The fascinating details of these first annual Ottoman ruler celebrations and the
dissonance between their flows and accents from locale to locale reveal the creative
heterogeneity of an extremely formative, but still little understood epoch of late Ottoman
history. What Mahmud II began in the last years of his reign for strategic and
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geopolitical reasons, grew during the reigns of his children and grandchildren. As the
following chapters demonstrate, over time, the sultanic ceremonies created increasing and
more regularized opportunities for imperial populations, near and far, to experience the
center, and consciously or not, situate themselves in relation to it, within the fabric of a
rapidly changing Ottoman society. As a result, these ceremonies forged a gradual
revolution in thinking, creating, for the first time, an imperial public space in the modern
(macro) sense of the term and a playing field for communal alignments, which had never
been necessary or possible on a macro scale before.
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Chapter Two: The Trope of Love, Its Variations, and Manifestations. The Reign of
Abdülmecid (1839-1861).

I.

Introduction.

On July 1, 1839 Sultan Mahmud II died and the throne passed to his eldest son,
Abdülmecid. A few months later, on November 3, 1839, the new sultan signed the socalled Gülhane Rescript, ushering in the reforms known as the Tanzimat (‘Reordering’).1
The purpose of the following two chapters is to trace and analyze some (intended and
unintended) modernizing effects of the discourse of reform, in tandem with the older
policy of modern ruler visibility, on the public (esp. non-Muslim) mind, observable from
the peculiar vantage point of royal public ceremony. These effects include the process of
naming (oneself and ‘the other’), motifs of sacred and secular time and space, evolving
notions of a social pact and social (organic and familial) metaphors, innovative concepts
of necessity and duty, as well as the importance of group unity and loyalty. In their
totality, these effects contain the essence of a novel, modernizing project, especially in
the sense of connecting and familiarizing the people (ruled) with the center (ruler), and
establishing a legitimate sphere for mutually beneficial symbolic interaction between the
two, both on the individual and the group level. Over time, as the following chapters
demonstrate, under the guise of commemorating the ruler, the celebrations provided a
fertile ground for the expression of communal interests and the advancement of intercommunal rivalries leading to gradual group mobilization and resultant hardening of
previously porous group boundaries. In the end, all of these effects inscribed the fields of
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modern public space and modern politics in the Ottoman Empire, which the celebrations
had forged. Ironically, they were entirely appropriated for a newly realized ethnonational mental universe, which rather than unite, did indeed splinter, first the imperial
public, and then, with a certain, irreducible measure of historical contingency, the empire
itself.
The reigns of Abdülmecid (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876) constitute the
most formative period for the above-mentioned transformations. Following in the
footsteps of their father, Mahmud II, both of these rulers enjoyed high levels of visibility
and accessibility vis-à-vis their subjects from the 1840s to the 1860s, a time when
autocracy still had no viable domestic alternative. Therefore, they share many of the
same parameters of the symbolic ruler-ruled interaction. This period is critical for our
understanding of the practical, lived dimensions of abstract communal concepts such as
‘millet (a community of co-religionists),’ and, by extension, the gradual formation of
national consciousness in the Ottoman Empire.2
At the same time, there are also some differences between the two sultans, based
on areas of individual preference and accentuation in their policies of image management
on the one hand, and adaptive expectations in the escalating give-and-take of popular
ceremonial involvement, on the other. The differences justify the treatment of these, in
many respects similar, reigns in separate chapters. Though primarily focused on the
Bulgar Rum community, these chapters also shed light on the activities of both Muslim
2

I have deliberately rendered the controversial term ‘millet’ as “community of co-religionists” –
its historically accurate meaning. Today, needless to say, ‘millet’ means ‘nation,’ but such a translation,
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and other non-Muslim [Hellene-minded Rum, Armenian (Ermeni), and Jewish (Yehudi)]
celebratory groupings.3
This chapter proceeds in the following order. First, it analyzes Abdülmecid’s
visibility upon coming to power, its target audiences and policy objectives, against the
background of Mahmud II’s precedents. Second, it reviews the new Ottoman practice of
cyclical bestowal of medals and orders as tokens of subject loyalty in conjunction with
the sultanic celebrations, themselves cloaked in rhetoric of antiquity. Third, this chapter
initiates a systematic discussion of the trope of love for the ruler, from its inception in the
late 1830s to its elitist formulation in the early 1840s. Fourth, it analyzes Abdülmecid’s
public image on the eve of and during the sultan’s 1846 tour of Rumelia.4 Fifth, it reveals
the important connection between the discourse of reform and the songs of praise and
prayer for the sultan, arguably the tour’s most influential legacy. Sixth, the chapter then
traces some other lasting effects of this underresearched sultanic event and evaluates the
beginnings of a mass Bulgar consciousness. The final section explores new avenues for
macro-communal identification and macro-territorial attachment.

3

In my subsequent analysis, I purposefully avoid present-day ethno-national markers, as these
were not used in a consistent, standardized manner during the period under consideration here. In the case
of the Bulgar(ians), with the creation of the Principality of Bulgaria by the Congress of Berlin in the
aftermath of the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War, what had previously been a loose religious (mainly Eastern
Orthodox), linguistic (South Slavic) and cultural marker, became firmly ethnic and national. Therefore, for
purposes of historical accuracy, I prefer to use the term ‘Bulgar’ (the Ottoman designation) and ‘Bulgarian’
(the modern nation-state designation) with the dividing mark being the year 1878. In this vein of thought, I
use the terms Rum and Greek to denote group identifications before- and after- modern nation-state
formation, as well as without- and within- state borders where the frame of reference is centered on the
modern Greek nation-state, officially founded in 1832.
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II.

Abdülmecid’s Visibility and Its Target Audiences. Continuities and
Discontinuities from Mahmud II’s Reign.

The rise of Abdülmecid to power re-affirmed and expanded Mahmud II’s policy
of direct ruler visibility. Whereas Mahmud II could only gain control over the terms of
his own public appearance in 1826, eighteen years into his reign, his son could do so
immediately upon coming to the throne. Therefore, the customary sultanic procession
through the streets of Istanbul, following the secluded rite of Abdülmecid’s sword girding
in 1839 looked and felt worlds away from his father’s back in 1808. Not only were the
Janissaries replaced by elite military units wearing bright colored Western uniforms, but
the sultan took measures which turned the procession into an interactive spectacle for the
foreign diplomatic corps in the Ottoman capital.
The leading article on the cover of the first official Ottoman newspaper (Taqvim-i
Vekayi), founded by Mahmud II only eight years earlier, provides a window on the
intended terms of engagement between Abdülmecid and the foreign powers only eleven
days after he became sultan. As the sword girding procession filtered through the Eğri
Gate, “the ambassadors of powers on terms of mutual friendship with the Ottoman
Empire (düvel-i mütehabbe süferası)” were accommodated with specially erected tents
nearby. This was not the only departure from precedence. Just as striking was the
invention of a special messenger, who upon the sultan’s passage should greet the
privileged spectators on his sovereign’s behalf. Both of these innovations survived until
the end of the empire and will be the object of analysis in subsequent chapters.
According to the same article, it was a certain Tevfiq Bey, a scribe in the imperial
chancellery, who performed the messenger’s role in this case. Tevfiq Bey’s greeting was
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“with the purpose of commanding [the foreigners’] esteem and zeal with respect to the
act of his majesty’s courtesy and favor.”5 The article’s author went to great lengths to
justify this innovation and reveal in stages its profound effects on the diplomats. First, it
elicited “a show of perfect joy and just pride”6 from them. Strikingly, these terms are
identical to the ones normally describing the sultan’s rapport with his own subjects. The
logic of this choice becomes clear with the next stage, whereby the writer placed in no
uncertain terms the foreign rulers under the sultan’s sovereignty (haq-i alisinde
metbu’ları olan hükümdaran). This state of affairs in turn demanded “good thoughts and
desirable intentions (efkar-i hasene ve niyat-i mergubeleri iqtizasınca)” from them, “a
sign of pure affection (safvetnişan)”. The article then culminated with an open-ended
inquiry into the proper format – written or oral – of the foreign diplomats’ homage to the
sultan. In the process, it spelled out painstakingly the contents of the foreign ceremonial
gestures:
•
•
•
•
•

expressing and displaying well wishes and mutual, sincere friendship (ibraz ve ifa-i khayrkhahi ve
musadaqat);
carrying out the requisites of respect and mutual, sincere friendship (icra-i levazim-i riayetkari ve
mukhalasat);
manifesting the requisite of pure affection and mutual friendship (izhar-i muqtaza-i safvet ve
mukhadenet);
performing the ceremony of loving friendship and mutual peace/reconciliation (icra-i merasim-i
vidd ve musalemet);
expressing the requisites of gratitude and praise (ifa-i levazim-i teşekkür ve mahmedet).

These behavioral modes were listed in consecutive lines of text and represent a curious
intertwining of bonds of vertical attachment normally demanded from the sultan’s own
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Taqvim-i Veqayi [Chronicle of Events], issue 182, Ca.16.1255 (27.07.1839): “icra-i nevaziş ve
iltifat-i şahane’ye rağbet ve himmet buyurulmaq hasebiyle”
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subjects on the one hand, and bonds of horizontal, reciprocal nature reserved for the
sultan’s interaction with Western powers, on the other. An example of the former is the
repeated reference to “requisites/needs (levazim/muqtaza), an indication of asymmetric
power, which, as we already saw in the previous chapter, began to be invoked in sultanic
celebrations across the empire, beginning in 1836. In addition, the last of these five
expressions was usually employed, verbatim, with reference to the sultan’s own subjects.
However, this sequence is in the end dominated by an abundance of synonymic terms
(musadaqat-mukhalasat-mukhadenet-musalemet), which, in addition to revealing the
richness of the Ottoman language, emphasize strongly the mutuality of an Ottomanintended friendship between the sultan and Western rulers.7 Most remarkably, this
friendship is bordering on and at times flowing into love. The terms ‘vidd’ (“loving
friendship”) and ‘safvet’ (“pure affection”) reflect these two emotional states,
respectively.
This passage has multiple dimensions, centered on the overarching domestic
political need to create a momentum for the new ruler and anchor the legitimacy of
novelty in the (elite) public mind. Yet even if many of these statements remain
rhetorical, not backed by hard realities, they provide important clues as to the direction in
which this reign is headed from the outset – towards openness and reciprocity with the
West in the manner enforced by Mahmud II. This first impression also echoed in the
foreign press. Here is how the Times of London described the new sultan’s physical
appearance at an audience with Prince de Joinville only a few months into his reign: “He
wore the same costume as that adopted by his father. He wore, like the rest of the Turks
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who were present, a little black coat . . .”8 In order for him to still stand out in his retinue,
the sultan deliberately retained some rather archaic marks of distinction – a diamond
clasp, a diamond aigrette (celenk) on his fez and a similarly executed decoration round
his neck.9 The overall course towards simplicity in personal outlook, initiated by
Mahmud II, would be a lasting feature of sultanic policies until the end of the Empire.
The journalist also noted that the sultan had “a weak appearance” but projected “an air of
great benevolence.”10 For better or worse, both of these characteristics would soon
become firmly embedded into Abdülmecid’s public image. As it turned out, the new
sultan, still a boy of sixteen upon his rise to the throne, was the antithesis of his strongwilled, authoritarian father. Instead, he made a name for himself as being quite irresolute
as a person and inconsistent as a policy maker, with a penchant for delegating power to
his ministers rather than ruling directly.
Some of Mahmud II’s advisers, with Mustafa Reşid and Sadıq Rifat assuming
prominent positions among them, largely retained their power and gradually gained the
confidence of the new ruler, even as they were shuffled from one position to the next,
according to long-standing Ottoman bureaucratic practice. Therefore, as Mahmud II had
carried out reforms in ceremony, taxation, administration, the army, and other fields
simultaneously, so did Abdülmecid. There is evidence to suggest that the tax collectors
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The Times of London, 14.12.1839. Francois d’Orleans, prince de Joinville (1818-1900) was the
third son of Louis Philippe, duc d’Orleans (1773-1850) who became King of France (1830-1848). The
prince was an admiral of the French navy.
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(muhassıl) were serving as agents for not only fiscal but also spiritual centralization
across the empire. For example, a royal decree (HAT), which can be dated with
sufficient reliability to the beginning of Abdülmecid’s reign conveys the greetings of a
number of high ranking provincial administrators, including the chief tax collector of
Işkodra (Albania), on the occasion of the sultan’s accession.11 Conditioned by Mahmud
II’s later-year annual ruler celebrations, they all related what had transpired locally, in the
words of the center, “with a view to the expression and performance of a ceremony of
congratulation and the requisites of devotion.”12 What matters most is not the act of
congratulating a new sultan, which was customary, but the innovative ceremonies, held
locally, and the further development of the stock phraseology, inherited from Mahmud II,
which framed these events.
Apparently, the provincial tax collectors’ involvement with the centrally
mandated process of nurturing direct popular loyalties to the sultan was transformed
immediately upon Abdülmecid’s rise to power as was the tax extraction process itself.
What had been heretofore muhassıl trial periods in places, such as Albania, as well as
Hüdavendigar and Gelibolu, grew into a pan-imperial phenomenon in April 1840.13
Another decree, approximately dating from the same time explicitly mentioned the fact
that these tax collectors were “designated and appointed in the manner of the founding
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See HAT 1622/66.
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Ibid: “merasim-i tehniyet ve levazim-i ubudiyetin ifa ve icrasına vechle.”
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Hüdavendigar and Gelibolu experiments (p. 43).
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and executing orders of the Auspicious Tanzimat.”14 The decree provided a long list of
locales, which had already reported, by way of special messengers back to the capital, the
arrival of their appointees.15 The assumption of their duties was allegedly cause for
“prayer with gratitude and praise, joy and just pride”16 as well as inquiries from the
population “as to the manner of demonstrating perseverance (ne suretle muvazebet
etmekte)” to the center thereafter. In response, the center confirmed the mode established
with the accession congratulations a few months earlier – “circulars containing
declarations of the requisites of gratitude and devotion” – as the correct mode of
submitting communications and other reports to “the imperial attention (manzurat-i
şehriyari).” Finally, the decree prescribed that the provincial messengers “be sent back
to their regions with a delivery of words of appreciation.”17 It is important to note that,
contrary to expectation, the groundbreaking use of the term ‘millet’ in the Gülhane
Rescript to indicate faith-based (including, non-Muslim) communities of the Ottoman
Empire, did not re-appear in this decree. Instead, the document simply referred to “native
population and subjects and tribute-paying community (ahali-i memleket ve teb’a ve
raiyet).” The word ‘teb’a (“all subjects without distinction of religion”)’ was indeed a
neologism, first used in the Gülhane Rescript.18 However, it clearly did not have much of
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“vaz ve icra buyurulmuş olan tanzimat-i khayriye usulünce muhassıl nasb ve ta’yin qılınan …”
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a disruptive potential domestically. Perhaps in this, as in other respects, the sweeping but
ambiguous Gülhane Rescript was meant to appease foreign (especially British) demands
and the unappealing power implications of ‘millet’ at home were avoided simply by
avoiding the term itself.19 This may be yet another indication that we should not take this
decree’s stipulations literally, as has been done most of the time by many of its analysts.20
Within a few years of the Gülhane Rescript’s issue, however, the term ‘millet’ was indeed
taken up locally in financial dealings with the Ottoman state. As Andreas Lyberatos has
shown, in 1841 the Orthodox Christian community of Filibe (Plovdiv) signed a document
of fiscal responsibility (in Greek), whose title included an explicit mention of ‘ethnos’, a
literal translation of ‘millet.’21 Two years later, the term ‘millet vekili,’ (“agent of the
community of co-religionists”) also gained currency, supplanting the older, ‘memleket
vekili’ (“home district agent”) in a trusteeship for the management of the community’s
finances and its economic relations to the state, which had been set up under Mahmud II
back in 1833.22 Thus, the term ‘millet’ was beginning to strike root locally; the trajectory
of its proliferation and perpetuation was launched.23
18
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III.

Abdülmecid’s Visibility and Its Domestic Objectives.

The same article which narrated Abdülmecid’s sword girding procession through
the streets of Istanbul, and mapped his intended mutual friendship (and love) with the
foreign powers, also carried clues about the sultan’s expectations from his own subjects.
The text directly preceding the excerpt, which was analyzed above, mentioned “troops of
a pledged fidelity (asakir-i sadaqatrehin)” who uttered “prayers for His Majesty’s long
life, good fortune, and grace of victory through divine guidance, repeatedly graced by the
expression of a purity of heart/love and devotion.”24 Here is the logic then of the
psychological process of tying a soldier’s mind and heart to the ruler. The sultan
displayed a ‘grace (hüsn, zib)’ which was ‘victorious through divine guidance
(muvafaqqıyet)’ and in return obtained a ‘pledge (rehin)’ of ‘fidelity/devotion (sadaqat,
ubudiyet).’ This is a symbolic pact between sultan and soldier, but as subsequent analysis
will demonstrate, it can be credibly conceived as a much wider type of social pact. Even
though most of these abstract terms have multiple, layered meanings, none is more
complex than ‘ikhlas.’ Rendered as “heart/love” in the above passage, it also carries
denotations of ‘duty’ and ‘worship/belief.’ In fact, the full translation of its figurative
meaning reads as follows: “a being or becoming sincere, free from guile or afterthought

23

The above-mentioned document already contains the following organic metaphor of the
community – "… we are all in common obliged, as one body in one soul (hreostoumen oloi koinos, os en
soma en mia psyhi)…We are all obliged as a Body to sympathize and care for the other, as the body cares
for its parts; likewise, the parts shall help and protect the Body.” I am thankful to Dr. Lyberatos for sharing
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zibzeban ikhlas ve ubudiyet.” Taqvim-i Veqayi, issue 182, Ca.16.1255 (27.07.1839).
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in duty, love, or friendship; pure sincerity of heart; sincere worship or belief.”25 In a
sense, ‘ikhlas’ alludes to a strong attachment with both positive and normative, sensual
and rational, individual and totalizing dimensions. Interestingly, even though both
foreigners and Ottomans were symbolically being drawn to the sultan via notions of
friendship, love, and devotion, the words of bonding for each type of audience are
completely different. Whereas the ‘musadaqat-mukhalasat-mukhadenet-musalemet’
sequence, along with ‘vidd’ and ‘safvet’ were exclusively used with reference to
foreigners, the same is true of ‘ikhlas,’ ‘sadaqat,’ and ‘ubudiyet’ vis-à-vis Ottomans. As
a result, each set of references unmistakably tipped the scales of relative weight (in terms
of a respective amalgamated attitude to the sultan) in a different direction: the former
towards friendship and reciprocity, the latter – towards love, fidelity, and devotion.

IV.

The Growing Use of Medals and Orders as Monarchic Moorings.

One of the very effective practical strategies for drawing both foreign and
domestic audiences more firmly into the sultan’s orbit was the royal bestowal of medals
and orders. The Ottoman use of Western-style decorations was initiated by sultan Selim
III in 1798. In gratitude for Admiral Nelson’s 1798 naval victory over Napoleon in
Egypt, Selim III bestowed a çelenk (a bejeweled aigrette, normally worn on a turban)
upon him.26 As with Selim III’s other reform efforts, this practice remained ad hoc,
which prevented reciprocation. It was only in Mahmud II’s later reign that this aspect of
25
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the Ottoman integration into the Western system of signs and symbols became more
systematic, part of a wider, concerted Ottoman quest for reciprocity with the West, as
well as visibility at home.27 The precedent for a regularized royal distribution of medals
and orders, however, took place on the eve of Abdülmecid’s birthday anniversary, less
than a year into his reign. A decree of the Interior Ministry explicitly tied forthcoming
promotions in rank and “a lavish bestowal of gems of favor and kindness (isar-i cevher-i
inayet ve atufet)” with the royal public holiday.28 Significantly, among the designated
recipients there were not only government officers from the capital, including War and
Finance Ministry officials, but also “some appointed to provincial tax collecting positions
(bazı taşra muhassıllıqlarında müstahdem olub).”29 Such attention confirms yet again
the centrality of tax collectors in the government’s push for cultural indoctrination of
provincial populations, a fact which has never been recognized, much less studied by
Ottoman scholars.30 Already, at this early stage, the decree noted the high number of
“wishes and requests (niyaz ve iltimas)” of government officers for decorations which
had to be dealt with in an organized manner. Therefore, the decree announced the
creation of a register (defter) with the names of outstanding government employees,
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along with their accomplishments (şöhretleri). Before being presented to the sultan, the
successful petitions were to be marked in red.
The most significant aspects of the decoration procedure are two – the “eager
anticipation (muntazır olan)” it was supposed to create among candidates, and the
indication that “from now on (bundan böyle)” it was to be repeated at other royal
birthday anniversaries. As it turned out, unlike the muhassıls, this was a lasting measure
which fostered a vigorous competition for visible markings of royal favor which cut
across socioeconomic, sociocultural and even state boundaries. In doing so, it defined
and reinforced elite attachments to the monarch, at home as well as abroad, and helped
perpetuate the imperial order.

V.

The Uneven Expansion and Artificial ‘Aging’ of the New Royal Holidays
under Abdülmecid.

As the royal celebrations grew from a base consisting of the elite’s upper echelon,
whose members had enjoyed a near monopoly on access to the royal personage for
centuries, they engaged wider strata of the population, both in the capital and beyond.
Yet the process was neither as vigorous, nor as straightforward as it had been under
Mahmud II. With the coming of Abdülmecid to the throne, members of the ulema, many
of whom were directly or indirectly antagonized by the previous sultan, sought an
enhanced role at the court.31 Perhaps through ulema intercession, under the new sultan,
the royal accession anniversaries (cülus) were neglected in favor of the royal birthdays
(veladet). After all, the latter had an Islamic precedent in the Prophet’s birthday
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(mevlud), whereas the former did not. Moreover, the experiment with sultanic
celebrations in the solar calendar, a key component of Mahmud II’s drive for ceremonial
reciprocity with Western rulers, was apparently also abandoned at the outset of
Abdülmecid’s reign in favor of strictly lunar festivities. Nonetheless, the size of the
spectacle grew, both at home and abroad.
In the late 1830s, each of Mahmud II’s two annual sultanic celebrations in
Istanbul entailed one day of five-time32 canon salvos from the royal fleet in the
Bosphorus and specially placed land batteries, and one night of candle illuminations of
mosques, private houses and shops.33 By contrast, already in 1841, Abdülmecid’s
birthday anniversary in the capital was marked with a three-night illumination of the
above kind.34 By 1844 or so, the royal birthday salvos of the imperial fleet echoed in
recently independent Athens, an act which allegedly called for “requisites of respect
(lazime-i riayetkari)” in return.35 By 1848, the same five-time-a-day salvos in Istanbul
lasted for seven days.36
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In a clear demonstration of Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented traditions,’37 the
language of the annual decrees announcing the festivities abruptly shifted from
describing them as novelty to describing them as custom. For example, in 1841, the
decree of the Interior Ministry, regarding the royal birthday anniversary, brought up
issues which needed further clarification, thus conveying a sense of a holiday which was
still in the making. The very next year, however, the decree of the same ministry already
referred to the sultan’s audience held on the occasion of his birthday anniversary, as
“issuing from a good custom of the sublime state (qa’ide-yi hasene-yi devlet-i aliyeden
olaraq).” In fact, the first five lines of text contained no less than four such references to
‘custom’ for a ritual, which was barely six years old.38 Nor was such language limited to
circulars of the Interior Ministry. In a document dated just five days after the one
discussed above, the Ottoman ambassador to London, Sarım Efendi, twice referred to
‘custom’ in just four lines of text.39
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VI.

The Trope of Love for the Ruler and Its Slow Initial Reception.

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the trope of love for the ruler was the
connection established openly early on between the visible individual behavior at the
annual sultanic festivities and the invisible (mystic) personal attitude towards the sultan.
This connection manifested itself in a language with strong visualizing tendencies and
intense symbolic capacities, contained in official newspaper articles and decrees, right
from the start of the celebrations in 1836. An article in Taqvim-i Veqayi, dated from
October 1, 1836, which related Mahmud II’s commencement of accession anniversary
celebrations in Istanbul, equated “the ceremonial manifestation of joy (izhar-i merasim-i
şadumani)” with “the illumination of the eye of the heart and the soul (tenvir-i basıra-i
dil ve can).”40 The reign of Abdülmecid then took this relationship to new levels both in
terms of the theoretical conception of the top-down message, and, as the next section will
demonstrate, in terms of the enthusiastic outpouring of popular responses it elicited.
The same 1841/42 Interior Ministry decree, mentioned above in the context of
illuminations, provides a fascinating picture of the symbolic meaning of ceremonial
actions and the visualized terms on which they brought sovereign and subject closer
together than ever before. This document established quite literally a two-way operating
system of (outward behavioral) ‘signs’ whereby the sultan manifested “signs of royal
mercy/compassion (merahimayat-i hazret-i mülukane)” on the one hand, and the elite
office holders exhibited “a sign of devotion (şiar-i ubudiyet)” on the other. Even more
striking is the visual imperative, which constitutes the ultimate criterion for the validity of
this exchange. Thus, it was only when the cream of the elite came to the palace to
40
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congratulate the sultan on his birthday anniversary and prepare a three-day banquet in his
honor that “the sign of devotion was suitably seen (şiar-i ubudiyet muvafıq görünmüş).”
Similarly, this banquet, put together by the Admiral of the Navy (qapudan paşa), who
had exerted himself on behalf of the elite, was “seen as the eye of our [elite’s] devotion
(meşhud basıra-i ubudiyetimiz olan).”41
Clearly, the exchange of declarations of commitment between the two parties is
unequal. There are nine separate usages of terms of group bonding to the ruler in just
four consecutive lines of text. However, there is also a subtle intimation in the text that
the ruler may be less than completely aloof, as his image had been conceived and
perpetuated for centuries. Towards the end of the decree, there is an explicit indication
that “the performance of the ceremony of gratitude and rejoicing (icra-i resm-i teşekkur
ve şadumani olunmasi) serves as “the object of the sublime heart’s desire (madde-i
dilkhah–i ali).” This reference to the ruler’s emotional engagement with his people, and
the use of the same term to denote the sultan’s and his subjects’ private emotions –
namely ‘heart (dil)’ – point to a subtle tendency towards cutting the distance between
ruler and ruled, and placing them on the same mental plane, even as the former was being
elevated in the eyes of the latter. There is still a prevailing sense, however, of the chasm
between the elite and ordinary people, and a lingering unease with the crowd’s potential
capacity for disorder, probably stemming at least to some degree from centuries of
cyclical Ottoman urban unrest. The word ‘millet’ does not appear in this document.
Instead, the words for a mass of subjects, a faceless malleable group, include the
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traditional ‘bendegan’ (slaves, servants of the ruler, subjects) and the nelogisms – ‘khalq’
(the common people, crowd, mob) and ‘tebaa’ (subjects).42
In contrast to the florescent government documents, analyzed above, the earliest
accounts of provincial celebrations of the sultan as seen from below, many fewer of
which have survived, come through as much more restrained, almost dry. One such
example is an undated report (mahzar) from the town of Tırnova (Turnovo) in Rumelia,
containing the response of the local (town and district) inhabitants to the new sultan’s
accession (July 1, 1839).43 The report was signed and sealed by an astonishing number
(118) of local notables, both Muslim and Christian, a literal “who’s who” of the district.
It relates in detail the content of the local ceremonies on the occasion of Abdülmecid’s
accession. The report deploys standard metaphors of the ruler rather than engage in the
abstract, risky business of metaphoric invention. It conveys an austere notion of the new
sovereign – “a holy personage (taqaddüs hazretleri), “a padishah of the Islamic faith
(padişah-i din-i islam).” It also makes a reference to prayers for the crushing defeat of
the enemies of the faith. In terms of the terminology denoting in some sense or another
‘the people’, this report may have well been written centuries earlier. It refers to
Muslims as “population (ahali)”, non-Muslims as “tax-paying subjects (reaya)”, and both
as “slaves (qul).” The only exception to the generally subdued tone of the report is the
unique expression, which describes the provincials’ potential reaction should they hear
back from the Grand Vizier regarding “the royal joy (mahzuziyet-i mülukane)” on
account of their actions – “the requisite of our inner exhilaration [lit., “a heart’s being
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dilated and cheered”] and perfect joy would overwhelm all of us, Muslim and nonMuslim subjects”44 Notably, the words for the joy of the sovereign (mahzuziyet) and his
subjects (mesruriyet) differ. The two sides yet remain very far apart.

VII.

The Trope of Love, the Social Pact, and the Cosmic Order. A Close Look
at Two Letters to the Sultan.

Two letters, written by the voyvoda (prince) of Moldavia, Mihail Sturdza (Mihal
Isturzazade)45 to sultan Abdülmecid in 1840 and 1844 already paint the relationship
between ruler and ruled in very different colors. This correspondence was occasioned by
the births of the sultan’s first and third sons – Mehmed Murad Efendi in 1840, and
Mehmed Reşad Efendi in 1844, respectively.
According to the first letter, dated December 19, 1840, the birthday of Mehmed
Murad Efendi was marked with ceremonious (resmi) cannon salvos, firework
illuminations, and benediction prayers in the town of Iaşi (Yaş) and the other towns of
Moldavia (Boğdan), as was the case in Istanbul (Dersaadet) and the rest of the imperial
domains.46 Specifically, five-cannon salvos were performed five times a day for seven
days and nights. Moreover, the dissemination of an exact copy of the imperial decree
(ferman), carrying the news of the prince’s birth, in Iaşi, the main port of Galati (Qalas)
and other places, was accompanied by “the ceremonious performance of cannon salvos
44
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and fusillades, and artistically fashioned firework illuminations at the necessary sites.”47
The list of “necessary sites” included road stations (menzil) and business places
(maslahat yerleri), the houses of boyars and officers (boyaran ve zabitan qulları
khaneleri), market squares (esvaq) and shops (dükkan). Illumination and music were
common, both on the level of the individual property owner, who employed “candle light
(iqad-i qınadil)” and “chords of saz48 (aheng-i saz),” and on the group level, whereby
“town illuminations with saz (saz ile icra-i şehrayin)” were set up. Finally, there was
“the ritual slaughter of sacrificial sheep and the distribution of coins and dinars [gold
pieces] to the poor and the needy for the imperial good fortune.”49
According to the second letter, dated November 22, 1844, the birthday of
Mehmed Reşad Efendi was communicated to the boyars and inhabitants of Moldavia by
way of circular (ta’mim), setting off similar festivities: “For several nights, the entire
town of Yaşi and the houses of boyars, and the market squares, and the shops (?), and the
business places had been skillfully and … decked and colored, illuminated with tapers
and candles …”50
At the outset of his first letter, Mihail Sturdza draws the contours of a kind of
social pact between sovereign and subjects on which all of the Ottoman imperial order
seems to rest. He does so by creating an elaborate organic and grand spatial metaphor of
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Ottoman society: “Under the large tree (with spreading branches) of justice of the
sublime eternally lasting state, supported by the spear of god, fixed and high in the sky,
as the original saying goes, various communities and peoples (of the same faith) seek
shade …”51 This sweeping sentence introduces two related motifs, which permeate the
entire letter, defining the image of the ruler and the terms of his veneration by the people.
The first is the imperative of piety. “Supported by the spear of God (Müeyyid min atr-i
Allah)” is the opening phrase of the first letter. The incantatory exclamation – “Praise!
and again Praise! and again Praise be to God (Hamden sümme hamden sümme hamden)!”
– introduces the second one. Religious imagery is an omnipresent, continuously
improvised accompaniment of imperial power, in sync with all of its metaphoric
reincarnations within the text. For example, the mention of “the throne of the AllBounteous (dergyah-i mennan)” in the context of the popular prayers and emotional
buildup leading up to the birth of the prince leads, several lines down, to the natural
conclusion that the newborn prince is “honoring the throne of existence (teşrifnümud
erike-i vücud).” Thus, from a metonymy of celestial power, ‘throne’ becomes a
metonymy of its earthly equivalent.
Closely related to piety is the notion of the ruler’s personal sanctity. According to
the first letter, the sultan’s first born son hailed “from his Majesty’s holy garden of roses
(gülistan-i pak-i şahaneden).” The same motif of ‘holiness’ reappeared under identical
circumstances in the text of the second letter where the sultan’s third son came “from the
loins of his holy Majesty the shadow of Allah (sulb-i pak-i hazret-i zil-i allahiden).” As
51

“müeyyid min atr-i Allah olan devlet-i aliye-i ebedi ed-devamın bir fehva-i asaleten sabit ve
fer’a fi’s-sema devhat-i adalet sayesinde müstazıl ümem ve milel-i mütenevvi …” The underlining is mine
(D.S.).
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the next section will demonstrate in greater detail, faith-imbued phraseology provides
both the frame and the texture of sultanic claims to legitimate authority and, by extension,
subject submission, humility, and devotion. Yet there are also literal, hard-fact
dimensions of religious rhetoric. The choice of the number ‘five’ for the size and
frequency of daily cannon salvos, mentioned above, was clearly dictated by the number
of daily prayers in Islam.
The second motif is the imperative of justice, a ubiquitous rigid demand levied on
Muslim and Christian rulers alike, and figuring prominently in Muslim and Christian
doctrines of state. If the Ottoman state can be visually represented by a tree of justice,
then it follows that its monarch’s rise to power is tantamount to “the accession of current
imperial justice (cülus-i adalet-i me’nus-i hümayun).” There is also a reference to “the
justice-commanding padishah (padişah-i adaletferma)” in this letter. Not surprisingly,
the second letter contains two more references to ‘justice,’ one of them going to the
Grand Vizier, the sultan’s proxy in terms of secular power.
A third, related motif, lacking in the above passage, but otherwise observable
throughout the letters and at least as important for the social pact, is “grace (inayet).”
Clearly, this is yet again a case of a divine attribute extended down to the ruler. The
second letter explicitly acknowledges this by wishing the newborn prince “the divine
guidance and assistance of the grace of blessed divine companionship (tevfiq-i inayet-i
refiq-i samadani-i berekatiye). As with ‘justice’ in the second letter, ‘grace’ in the first
one is extended further down to the sultan’s subjects by way of his “grace-giving
(inayetbakhş)” decree, carrying “the contents of deposited exalted grace (mazamin-i
inayetrehin-i münifesi).”

77

Curiously, mercy, another key traditional attribute of the ruler, and, as it turned
out, in the case of Abdülmecid, a central and lasting characteristic of his public image,
does not appear at all in a direct link to the sultan in the two letters. Its only appearance
is by way of “the Grand Vizier’s clement and benign flagstaff (mahatalem-i re’fette’vemi asafaneleri)” in the second letter. It could be that the voyvoda of Moldavia was simply
not willing to take any risks in this respect, barely a year into Abdülmecid’s reign, with
the sultan’s scenario of power not yet fully shaped.52 Words for the ruler’s benevolence
and generosity are also notably lacking, save for the standard, formulaic, and therefore
somewhat dry “kindness and favor (lutuf ve ihsan)” at the end of the first letter.
What the voyvoda did not hesitate to do was place the Ottoman royal house firmly
within the fundamental cosmic order by interspersing his letters with an extravagant
panoply of natural and grand spatial metaphors. In addition to the above-mentioned ‘sky
(sema),’ these include ‘wind (rüzgar)’, and ‘the horizon (ufuq).’ In this vein of thought,
the Ottoman princes are “stars (encüm).” More precisely, each of the two newborn
princes is “a resplendent star, a pleasant moon (kavkab-i zahire qamer-i ta’lat).” In the
first letter, the newborn is “embellishing the world (cihanara).” In both, he is “honoring
the throne of existence, and embellishing the love of the living (teşrifnümud erike-i vücud
ve arayişresan mihr-i şühud).” In what amounts to perhaps the most exuberant symbolic
gesture of all, each newborn is placed at “the cradle of the universe [lit. ‘all creation’]
(kehvare-i kainatta).”
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For the definition of this concept, see Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power. Myth and
Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995-2000.
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These outbursts of extreme verbal florescence could hardly fail to ingratiate the
sovereign. Moreover, by way of analogy, they pointed to yet another characteristic of the
dynasty – its alleged eternity. For this much cherished attribute, the texts contain quite
literal expressions as well – “the perpetual royal household (dudman-i khuludiqtiran-i
khusrevane)” in the first letter and “the eternal throne of the caliphate (serir-i ebedqıyami khilafet)” in the second one, not to mention “the sublime eternally lasting state (devlet-i
aliye-yi ebedi ed-devam)” of the metaphor of Ottoman society discussed above. By the
1840s, however, this Ottoman claim had been substantially undermined and there was an
increasingly acute need to strengthen the foundations of dynastic sovereignty and
legitimacy. Mahmud II had already pointed the way towards a radically new solution by
seeking to captivate the hearts and minds of the subject population, especially nonMuslims. At the time of the writing of these letters, the challenges ahead could only have
been compounded by the ongoing uncertainty of the power consolidation process under
the young Abdülmecid. For all of these reasons perhaps Mihail Sturdza felt obliged to a)
confirm and lay out early on his conservative view of the essence of the role of the ruler –
“the procurement and perfection of safety, public order and circumstances in the shining
direction of affluence, joy and tranquility”53 – and b) go to great lengths to demonstrate
his subordinate population’s exemplary conduct in fulfilling their part of the social pact.
The two relatively short54 letters contain an unusually large number of terms and
phrases characterizing the attitudes of the Modavian people, including the voyvoda
himself, towards their distant overlord. Among them, by far the strongest emphasis falls
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I.HR. 7/365 (1) “emn ve asayiş ve ezher cihet-i refah, hal ve aramiş halati istihsal ve istikmalı.”
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Each letter was written on a single sheet of paper.
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on the many shades of joy the population experienced and, above all, on the emotional
and devotional attachments to the sultan, channeled through the medium of prayer.55 The
range of these attitudes can be best analyzed based on a juxtaposition of the individual
and the group level before and after the royal birth.
According to Mihail Sturdza, since the moment of the sultan’s accession, his
subjects were “putting forth their hands (as beggars) in assiduous prayer … [for the birth
of a son].” They did so “with all their heart and soul, expectant and awaiting the
realization of the hope for benediction.”56 Apparently, when the imperial decree
announcing the royal birth finally arrived, it became the object of Sturdza’s intense
adulation “… in accordance with devotion, with perfect reverence and joy, [it was] kissed
by a lip, humbled in prayer, and laid down, after being enfolded with submissive joy,
befitting of the contents of deposited exalted grace …57 This statement encapsulates an
elaborate presentable staging of the voyvoda’s personal reception of the much awaited
news. Its value lies not in describing what may have actually transpired, which would be
hard to ascertain independently, but in reflecting what was acceptable within the
contemporary discourse of power, both conceptually and linguistically. Also worthy of
note is the voyvoda’s remark in passing that the imperial decree was “this time addressing
your most humble servant [i.e. the voyvoda himself] (bu defa abd-i ahqarlarına
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Other popular attitudes towards the sultan, such as submission, humility and reverence are also
tinged with joy and piety.
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I.HR. 7/365 (1) “destkeşa … da’vatına muvazebet ile can ü gönülden husul-i umniyye-i
khayriyeye muntazır ve nigeran.”
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Ibid. “hasbel’ubudiyet kemal-i ta’zim ve behcet ile buside leb-i ibtihal ve nihade sürr-i inqıyad
iştimal qılındıqtan sonra mazamin-i inayetrehin-i münifesi ala mayeliq.”
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khitaben).” This observation seems to register a novelty in the style of correspondence
between the Ottoman center and its appointed ruler of the principality. If so, it points in
the direction of a more personal style of engagement of regional magnates in tune with
the new objectives of bringing peripheries more closely in line with the center. As if to
confirm this hypothesis, the voyvoda expatiates on his measures for the wide
dissemination of an exact copy of this imperial decree “as an outward expression of
gratitude on the wings of happiness (şükran ala telek an-na’m).”
The second letter allows for a telling comparison of the same links in the
respective chains of the processes of public notification regarding the royal births in 1840
and 1844. Thus, in 1844, on receiving the news, the voyvoda felt obliged to spread “this
public rejoicing (bu feyz-i meserret-i amme)” to the boyars and inhabitants of the
Moldavian province, according to his “entrusted duty of sincerity and devotion
(müterettib-i zimmet-i sıdq ve ubudiyetim).” In other words, whereas in 1840, there was
still some spontaneity and personal leeway regarding the voyvoda’s response, by 1844
these had already been subsumed by an overarching ‘duty (zimmet),’ a term which had
not been mentioned before. A quick look at the summaries of the two letters, probably
prepared by scribes at the Sublime Porte for internal bureaucratic purposes, reinforces
this impression of the direction of change over the four-year span. Whereas the first
summary contains no references to any duties the voyvoda may have to fulfill under such
circumstances,58 the second summary explicitly states that Mihail Sturdza’s 1844 letter is
about “carrying out the requisite of greeting and felicitation and performing the
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See I.HR. 7/365 (3).
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incumbent duty of devotion.”59 Significantly, this view from the center contains yet
another term for individual ‘duty’ – vacibet.
As for the group duty of ordinary people, it was explicitly laid out in the two
letters in an identical and quite convoluted manner. In each instance, they had to see to
“the performance of the pomp of their requisites of dignity and majesty.”60 In other
words, an appropriate expression of the sultan’s dignity and majesty was required of his
subjects during these festivities. In each document, this phrase closely accompanies the
list of activities on the ground. A feeling of joy, expressed through no fewer than ten
different terms in the two letters, permeates the celebrating population. The dominant
mode of popular engagement is invariably prayer for the sultan’s and his progeny’s
health and prosperity. It comes through as a supreme unifier of the body politic along
three main axes. The first is spatial. In his first letter, Sturdza continuously emphasizes
the fact that “the totality (kaffe; qatıbe)” of subjects partakes of prayer services. Thus,
upon the arrival of the news of the prince’s birth, “benediction prayers from young and
old were promptly evoked.”61 The second axis is temporal. Not only does the first letter
contain multiple references to separate prayer services, but their repetitive nature and
habituating purpose with respect to the population cannot escape the reader’s attention.
Adverbs, such as “continuously (aleddevam)” and “over and over again (tekrar
alettekrar)” describe the manner of communal praying. The third, most intriguing axis is
emotional-cum-spiritual. Towards the end of the first letter, the variations of subject joy
59

I.HR. 28/1301 (2) “icra-i lazime-i tebrik ve tehniyet ve ifa-i vacibet-i ubudiyet.”
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“hunna levazim-i şan ve şükuh saltanatı ifaye …” I.HR. 7/365 (1) vs. “levazim-i şan ve şükuh
saltanatı icraya” I.HR. 28/1301 (1).
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I.HR. 7/365 (1). “sagir ü kebirden isticlab-i da’vat-i khayriyeye müsaraat qılındığı.”

82

escalate into “a yearning with love and compassion (henn)” for God’s blessing of the
Ottoman house with many more princes in the future. With it, “the eyes and hearts of the
faithful subjects are continuously enjoined to action and joy.”62 Despite being dated four
years apart, the two letters reach remarkably similar culminations:

The obligatory [lit. ‘ordained by God’] prayers, were performed over and over again, with
tenderness of heart and tears of joy from the bottom of the heart, an exalted site of acceptance by
His Majesty God the Transcendent …63

and
As the benediction prayers were adopted as foremost among the sacred obligations of devotion,
they were performed from the bottom of the heart and with a perfection of submission and humble
supplication, an exalted site of acceptance by His Majesty God the Transcendent …64

The fact that Sturdza employed different terms in otherwise equivalent sections – ‘merfu’
vs. ‘berdaşte’ to signify exaltedness, ‘icabetgah’ vs. ‘qabulgah’ to signify the site of
God’s acceptance of prayers – may be an indication that these were more than strictly
formulaic phrases. Behind these words, there was probably a real common contemporary
practice of praying for the ruler and his family, informed by a common and stable
conceptual framework.
Based on language alone, there is no way of distinguishing in these letters
between Christians and Muslims celebrating sultan and dynasty, and no way of telling
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Ibid. “uyun ve qulub-i ibad-i sadaqat-i i’tiyad aleddevam reviş ve mesrur buyurulmaq.”
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icabetgah-i cenab-i rab el-müteal qılındıgı.”
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that a predominantly Christian body of subjects was in fact praying to God for a Muslim
ruler. This may seem incredible to a reader today, yet it entirely conforms to the
spiritually accommodating and integrating policies initiated by Mahmud II in the
aftermath of the Greek Revolution for the purpose of forestalling future splintering of the
Ottoman imperial populace along religious lines. The inclusive notion of God and likeminded practices of faith and prayer have both literal and symbolic dimensions in the
letters. As mentioned above, the predominantly Christian Moldavian subjects are said to
have put forth their hands in prayer for sultan and dynasty, a gesture typical of Muslim
prayer services. Moreover, the term ‘icabet,’ discussed above, which in standard
Ottoman parlance referred to Muslim believers, whose prayers God answered favorably,
in the 1840 letter clearly signified a majority of Christian believers. This deliberate
universalist trajectory clearly afforded the monarch a new range of strategies for both
personal popularization and regime perpetuation.

VIII. Abdülmecid’s Public Image on the Eve of His 1846 Tour of Rumelia.

The trope of love for the ruler, which grew out of public manifestations of joy and
communal prayer sessions, was spelled out and immensely popularized by Abdülmecid
himself during his tour of Rumelia in 1846, only two years after the writing of Sturdza’s
second letter. A year before that tour, an imperial decree (hatt-i şerif) announced a few
key features of the sultan’s intended public image, which were lacking from the letters,
analyzed above. A translation of this decree, along with an address-commentary,
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inspired by it, were printed side by side in Bulgar Slavic65 on a leaflet meant for domestic
distribution. This decree reveals what soon became the two cornerstones of
Abdülmecid’s scenario of power – education and public health.66 In its penultimate
paragraph, the edict specifically addressed the need for more schools and “popular
Enlightenment (narodno prosveshtenie).” In addition, it envisioned the opening of a
large hospital for poor people and strangers, “as a pious creation (kato edno
blagochestivo sozidanie).” Significantly, the decree presented both policies, as
originating from the sultan. The text portrayed him as intimately involved and
emotionally invested in their success. Abdülmecid was concerned about institutions
“useful to the common good (polezni za obshtoto dobro) (1);” he cared about “the well
being of Our subjects (dobroto byitie na Nashyite poddannyi) (3).”67 Apparently, the
alleged failure of his subordinates to turn these intentions into realities filled the sultan’s
heart with “pity and grief” leaving him in peace “neither during the day nor at night (ne
denya ni noshtya).” This is a major departure from the aloof image of the ruler, which
had been the norm, according to the evidence previously examined. Moreover, this edict,
dated January 1, 1845 (O.S.),68 contains the earliest evidence I have encountered to date
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This is a loose umbrella term for the various dialects, spoken and written before the creation and
codification of a formal Bulgarian literary language following the creation of a modern Bulgarian nationstate.

66

I have not been able to locate the Ottoman original, but in this case, the translation seems to be
even more important, since it was the chief medium for direct impact on the target subject audience.
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Numbers in parentheses hereafter refer to the frequency with which certain words and phrases
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January 13, 1845 (N.S.). The edict’s and address-commentary’s texts can be found in Ivan
Georgov, Sbornik za Narodni Umotvoreniya [A Collection of Popular Adages], kn. 24, ch. I, Sofia, 1908.
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of the sultan’s title of ‘tsar,’ deployed with respect to his Bulgar Slavic subjects.69 In
fact, this title is invoked, in some fashion or other, no fewer than eight times in the space
of a single page of text, whereas ‘sultan’ does not appear even once. Paradoxically, just
when it creates the impression upon the reader of this being a Christian monarch, the
tsarist reference is paired with a reference to “the intercession of our St. Prophet
(hodataystvoto na nashego sv. Proroka) (2).”70 This stunning choice is an early
indication of what quickly unfolded as a consistent policy of presenting the sultan as a
rightful ruler to various non-Muslim communities along lines and with symbols familiar
to them. Even though this chapter and the next focus on a particular (Bulgar Slavic)
subset of the largest (Christian) such grouping, there is evidence to suggest that this
deliberate strategy cut across all non-Muslim faith-based communities of the empire.
The theme of the caring ruler, with his priorities in education and public health is
much expanded and complicated in the address-commentary attached to it. This rich and
strongly suggestive text, entitled “Dear Bulgars of the same kin (Lyubeznii mi edinorodtsi
Bulgare)!,”71 opens as follows:

The generous and most merciful love, which today His Majesty, our Brightest Tsar, Sultan Abdul
Medzhid [sic] pours fatherly on his faithful subjects through this beneficient Hatti Sherif [sic]72
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Andreas Lyberatos has demonstrated the use of a very similar sultanic title – ‘anax gen. anaktos
(king)’ – in the case of the Hellene-minded Rum of Filibe (Plovdiv) as early as 1841. See Lyberatos, “The
Application of the Tanzimat,” pp. 7-8.
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of his hand, awoke my zeal (revnost) to popularize its translation in Bulgarian so that you may not
remain without merriment and gladness of the universal joy, which this Tsarist course produces;
you, I mean, who have dedicated your faithful hearts to His Tsarist love.

This programmatic sentence opens and closes with the earliest direct reference to the
trope of the sultan’s love for his subjects. In doing so, it also picks up the thread of the
fatherly metaphor Mahmud II deployed on his 1837 tour of Rumelia. There are further
traits of Abdülmecid’s moral portrait, such as generosity and mercy, which did not appear
in the earlier sources. In addition, this sentence and the text it belongs to draw the
reader’s attention to the terms of engagement between ruler and ruled, adding in the
process new details to the picture derived from the Taqvim-i Vekayi issue and Mihail
Sturdza’s letters. The mention of the subjects’ hearts, filled with a joy, expressed via a
repetitive, typically Ottoman phrasing is not new, but the strength and trajectory of
enhancement of their bond to the object of their love – the ruler – is. So is the complexity
of paternal-filial exchange between the two parties, which casts the social pact in a new
light. The author reiterates the constancy (“day and night”) of the sultan’s interaction
with and care for his subjects, comparing it to that of “a natural father for his progeny
(kato edin prirodnyiy otets za svoyata rozhba).” This organic metaphor functions
bilaterally. On the one hand, the father aims to give his progeny “good upbringing, a
development of the mental faculties, a moral education;” on the other, the child is thus
“good and useful, not only to itself, but capable of every aid to its father.” Therefore, if
at the start of this address the subjects’ hearts are “dedicated” to the sultan’s love, by its
conclusion, they are “perfectly dedicated” as well as being encouraged to “strive in order
72

Worthy of note is the larger font of the decree’s title, which is superior to any other in the text,
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to become already more deserving of His most generous mercy.” Several aspects of the
relationship between the people and the ruler are particularly worthy of note. First, this
call for a popular exertion in the name of the sultan is unequivocally a matter of duty (niy
sme dluzhni). So is the act of prayer to God for the sultan’s long life, prosperity, and a
peaceful “tsardom.” Interestingly, this duty of supplication is invoked by way of an
injunction to “always pray to the almighty God with compassionate hands (vinagi s rutse
blagoserdnyi da molim vsevyishnyago Boga).” This vivid image is strikingly similar to
the hand, outstretched in prayer (as a beggar’s) from the first of Sturdza’s letters. It gives
further credence to the earlier hypothesis regarding the existence of a prescribed physical
posture of praying for the sultan, regardless of the supplicant’s personal faith. In return,
the subjects would have the hope of living quietly and prosperously “under His mighty
wing.” This metaphor would become permanently etched onto the public mind, reappearing time and again over the years in various texts of similarly emotional,
propagandizing and mass mobilizing nature.
The close textual analysis of this address-commentary, composed by Ivan
Stoyanov,73 and published with the financial support of Nikola Tupchileshtov,74 would be
much less relevant and telling, if this text remained an isolated act, the expression of a
subjective individual attitude. However, there are a number of thematic links and striking
similarities with another, formal text of state, which undeniably contains the sultan’s own
position. The text in question is the speech, read by Mustafa Reshid Pasha in the sultan’s
73
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presence to representatives of the various Ottoman local communities in the courtyard of
the government building in Edirne on May 6/18, 1846.75 This speech officially opened
Abdülmecid’s 1846 tour of Rumelia. It explains early on the sultan’s motif for the trip –
“to see with his own eyes and get to know the important needs of his various peoples, and
thus complement all that is necessary for their happiness.”76 This clarification comes on
the heels of a fatherly metaphor laid out at the very beginning of the text – “as a good
father constantly caring for the well being of his children.” The text then lists a number
of immediate economic improvements, based on the royal inspection in and around
Edirne, before returning to familiar topics, such as the social pact, the trope of love, and
the importance of duty. In most of these subjects, the speech starts off with concepts,
already expounded by Stoyanov, before charting new territory. For example, the
recognition of the sultan’s constant and extensive care for his subjects leads to the
observation that “such signs of magnanimity are very rare in the annals of the State.” In
return, the popular end of the social pact reads as follows:

Let all of us, subjects of all ranks, dedicated to our Venerable Tsar get to know them [the signs of
magnanimity]! Let us thank God for having the best and most righteous Monarch, and let us work
to show ourselves grateful and worthy of such superior abundance (of goodness)! Let us unite our
hearts with love for the fatherland, and let us hasten, in accordance with the will of our most kind
Tsar in the development and prosperity of our fatherly place (otechestvennoto ni mesto) where we
first saw the sun.
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This highly charged appeal reiterates the subjects’ dedication to their ruler before taking
their commitment to a higher level in a number of ways. First, there is a quick
progression in the sultan’s moral outlook. From a starting point of generosity and mercy
[here, ‘most kind (preblag)’], traits noted before – the sultan is portrayed as ‘venerable
(pochitaem),’ ‘most righteous (nay-pravednyiat),’ and a source of ‘superior abundance of
goodness (prevoshodna blagodat).’ All of these divine/saintly attributes and prerogatives
add an air of sanctity to the sultan’s persona. As a result, the previously stated
importance of duty to the ruler is here transformed into an imperative; the striving to
please him is accelerated (“let us hasten”) and intensified (“let us work to show ourselves
grateful and worthy”). This escalating sense of urgency culminates in a profoundly new
and quintessentially modern call for unification (“let us unite our hearts”) and totalization
(“all of us”; “all ranks”). Unlike Stoyanov’s address to the Bulgars, this call is much
wider: it targets Muslims, Christians and Jews, as subsequent passages explicitly point
out. The decree goes even further, however, in stating that “the difference of faith and its
law is a matter of everyone’s simple conscience.” Perhaps even more astonishing is the
re-arrangement of the metaphors of ‘love’ and ‘father’ – what had heretofore been the
sultan’s fatherly love for his subjects – into the subjects’ “love for the fatherland” – a
newly found basis for subject mobilization. Paradoxically, the notion of fatherland in this
text has not one, but two meanings. The above passage contains a clear definition of the
first, micro sense, which must have had an instant resonance with the decree’s target
listeners in Edirne or elsewhere – “our fatherly place where we first saw the sun.” The
second, macro meaning, as well as the final articulation of the relationship between ruler
and subjects can be found in the following passage near the decree’s end:
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All of us are subjects of the same State (istata Derzhava), compatriots (sootechestvennitsyi), and
children of the one and same fatherland! When this is so, it does not become us at all to scorn each
other! But let us follow the same path which our Tsar has drawn for us. Let us imitate His
respectable example! As you see, H.M. does not discriminate among any of his subjects in the
distribution of his acts of mercy. Is it not then a sacred duty for us (sveshtenna za nas dolzhnost)
to live in accord and to hasten with all our strength to everything which serves the well being of
our common fatherland (obshtoto nashe otechestvo)?

Here, finally, we have the complete transformation of the father-children metaphor of
Ottoman society and the trope of love for the ruler into an appeal for a mass popular
territorial bond to and love for an abstract macropatria. Since this conceptual novelty is
far removed from the everyday lives of most people, however, it needs to be qualified.
Therefore, it is constructed on the basis of the instantly recognizable and emotionally
binding micropatria, the primary contemporary meaning of ‘fatherland.’ By a process of
magnification capped by the boundaries of the Ottoman state, the new concept becomes
“a common fatherland.” The principles of uniformity (“the same path”, “let us imitate”)
and totality (“all of us,” all our strength”) get further confirmation and elaboration. As a
result, this passage takes the imperative of duty a step further – to the realm of a sacred
obligation.
In conclusion, the speech expressed a hope that the sultan’s subjects would rely
on help from “the Divine providence (Bozhiy promisal)” to be able to reckon with “His
[the sultan’s] Autocratic will (Negovata Samoderzhavna volya).” The first reference
comes through as a clear concession, compared to the Prophet’s intercession of the
previous year’s decree, to the non-Muslim populace. This is a step in the direction of a
composite heterogeneous image of the ruler in conjunction with the multiplicity of
different religio-communal angles of viewing him. So is his title of “autocrat
(samoderzhets)” whose derivative forms appear no fewer than six times throughout the
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speech. Given that this text is shorter than the decree its saturation with tsarist references
(8) is even higher.

IX.

The Sultan’s 1846 Tour of Rumelia.

From Edirne, Abdülmecid proceeded to Eski Zağra (Stara Zagora), Kızanlık
(Kazanluk), Gabrova (Gabrovo), Tırnova (Turnovo), Rusçuk (Ruse), Silistre (Silistra),
and Varna.77 The route of the 1846 tour followed closely, except in reverse order,
Mahmud II’s tour of 1837. According to witness accounts, along the way, the sultan was
greeted everywhere with poetic recitations and songs of praise and prayer, both in
Ottoman and Bulgar.78 The pride of place among welcoming parties invariably fell on
students, of all creeds, most clad in white uniforms, some in solemn church-going attire,
with flowers and green branches in their hands. At every stop, ceremonial cannon salvos
were fired during the day and elaborate firework illuminations were performed at night.
In the town of Kızanlık, known then as now, as the producer of the most fragrant roses
and the best rose oil, the sultan’s visit coincided, possibly by design, with the rose
harvesting season. So the locals sprinkled rose water and poured rose oil before the
sultan’s cavalcade. According to Hristo Stambolski,79 for the three days of the sultan’s
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In Gabrova, the rehearsals, led by the Metropolitan of Tırnova’s chief cantor, lasted for several
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Imperial Medical School in Istanbul, as well as an important figure in the affairs of the Bulgar community
of Istanbul. After 1878, he settled in Eastern Rumelia (present-day South Bulgaria), where he was a
successful politician.
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stay in town, no one harvested roses so that the whole area would be exquisitely
scented.80
For his part, the sultan had doctors vaccinate all children against smallpox in
public before sending each off with a small gift of money.81 Even people with rare
diseases were, on occasion, summoned to the sultan’s presence so his doctors could cure
them.82 Needless to say, the sublime visit caused the locals, who were unaccustomed to
direct contact with the center of power, quite a stir. The fact that they were completely
unaware of the sultan’s looks produced at least in one instance, a comic episode. In
Gabrova, where the twelve-year-old Todor Burmov83 was in the welcoming party of
students lined up along the road several miles outside of town, the children once
commenced their solemn singing upon cue that the sultan was in the group passing by
them, only to abruptly cut it after being told it was not him. In the end, Burmov sang
without knowing who, within the group of passing dignitaries, the sultan actually was.
Apparently, the sultan’s departing ceremony the following day did not help resolve the
issue either.84 Such ignorance of the sultan’s visage would soon be radically ameliorated,
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with the officially condoned wide proliferation of royal portraits across the imperial
domains, as well as abroad.
The most detailed account, albeit from a hostile source, relates the sultan’s visit to
Rusçuk, which, at four days, may have also been the longest. According to Nayden
Gerov,85 the greeting ceremonies proceeded on a communal basis, with the Jews being
placed closest to the town walls, next to them the Armenians, then the Bulgars, and
finally, the Muslims, situated the farthest from town, yet being the first to see and
welcome the sultan. The front of each non-Muslim group consisted of school children,
with candles and willow twigs, and priests in liturgical attire. Behind them stood other
townsmen, some holding placards with words of praise for the sultan. The Muslim
school children were also dressed in white, the difference being that some of them held
green flags with white writing on them. A dervish presided over the Muslim group,
holding a large green flag with a text in gold. Apparently, there was also a spatial
separation by gender with women remaining behind the town walls, while men formed
two lines stretching for over a mile along the road outside. As the sultan approached,
each group of youngsters would in turn sing for him, everyone else bowing profusely.
Based on Gerov’s description, it seems that Abdülmecid was dressed in a slightly more
luxurious fashion than during state ceremonies in Istanbul, his military coat sewn with
gold, and diamonds around his neck hearkening back to olden times. If so, this may have
been an attempt to meet provincial expectations, which were yet much less in tune with
the fast changing realities of sultanic power. As the sultan proceeded quietly, however,
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Nayden Gerov (1823-1900) was a Bulgar teacher, ethnographer, writer, book publisher, and
later, Bulgarian lexicographer.
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he showed none of his ancestors’ restrained head movements and fixed sideway gaze,
avoiding eye contact, instead opting to constantly turn his head around.86
Regardless of the memoirists’ personal dispositions towards the unfolding
sultanic spectacle – be it solemn (Stambolski), enthusiastic (Burmov) or sardonic
(Gerov), all of them employed in their accounts the same titles of ‘autocrat
(samodurzhets)’ and ‘tsar,’ contained in the period documents analyzed above.87 In
Rusçuk, the Bulgar students even sang to the sultan an anthem, entitled “The Most
Autocratic tsar of ours (Samoderzhavneyshiy tsar nash).”88 This is a testament to the
wider relevance and popularity, which these titles must have quickly gained among the
non-Muslim Ottomans.

X.

The Discourse of Reform and (Bulgar) Songs of Praise and Prayer for the
Sultan.

What provincial non-Muslim populations very quickly embraced, enriched, and
employed to their own advantage was the discourse of the Tanzimat. Even though in
substance, the Tanzimat reforms began at least a decade prior to November 3, 1839, the
phrase ‘tanzimat-i khayriye (the Auspicious Tanzimat)’ promoted widely, both at home
and abroad, after this date found resonance with the population, and created a substance
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of its own. Based on a Bulgar songbook, published in 1851 in Serbia, this process seems
already well under way during Abdülmecid’s 1846 tour of Rumelia. This book opens
with the texts of two prayers, recited by Bulgar school children to the sultan on his arrival
at Tırnova on May 14/26, 1846. The first prayer appears in a highly formulaic
cyrillicized Ottoman, a rare and fascinating occurrence in print. It seems identical to the
one read at Kızanlık.89 This may have been a standard reading at all schools across the
imperial domains at the time, regardless of faith and denomination. Such was indeed the
case with the second prayer, in Bulgar. Its title – “A Hymn for many years
(Mnogoletstvenno vospevanie)” – unmistakably points to its Orthodox liturgical origins –
a familiar and comfortable zone for Orthodox Christian believers; hence, an ideal
platform for appealing to their sensitivities and directing their praises to the ruler. The
author, Hadzhi Nayden Yoannovich,90 who witnessed the event, explicitly indicated that
the hymn was “used in the Turnovo school (supotreblaemoe v Ternovskoto uchilishte).”91
This hymn, as well as the author’s lengthy dedication to the sultan printed on the book’s
first page, contains an unusually high number of references to the ongoing reform process
in the empire. The dedication summarizes in substantial detail, according to the author’s
understanding, the reform measures, broached by the Gülhane Rescript, twice mentioning
it by name (hattişerif).92 This seems an unusual subject matter for a songbook, especially
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for its opening lines. It must reflect the decree’s profound impression on and popularity
among Ottoman non-Muslims. Judging by the hymn’s text, this was indeed so. In it, the
Bulgars collectively thank the sultan for the “acts of goodness (dobrini)” they received
and continue to “incessantly (neprestanno)” receive, as well as for the persistent service
of justice in “the time of the most resplendent, most serene, most peace-loving and most
merciful … Tsar and Autocrat.” The latter titular phrase bears uncanny resemblance to
medieval Bulgar and broader Slavic formulae. So does the prayer’s repetitive,
incantatory solicitation of peaceful and prosperous “many years (mnogaya leta).” It
seems that the whole set of such notions was recently dusted off old books and brought
back to public usage in the Ottoman Empire of the mid-nineteenth century.93 It was then
married to the discourse of reform. As a curious 1849 newspaper announcement shows,
on the interface of these two main narratives, there was substantial room for
improvisation, the expression of local sentiment and the advancement of local objectives.
In this posting, the townspeople of Tırnova expressed their gratitude to the sultan for the
dispatch of a certain Cemaali Paşa to govern the affairs of their town. The text starts off
with an exact reproduction of the hymn discussed above, before launching a praise of the
above-mentioned bureaucrat’s beneficial actions in Tırnova. Through him, the posting
focuses on the ruler’s upholding of justice, in line with “divine justice (bozhya pravda).”
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In the process, it twice refers to the Tanzimat and once to the decree itself.94 This posting
helps place Yoannovich’s book in perspective. It serves as a preliminary indication that
prayer texts, such as this one were influential in a number of ways, going beyond the
direct, short-term encounter with the ruler, into the realm of the long-term symbolic, with
profound inculcating effects on the populace. Among them, the trope of love was central.
The above-mentioned hymn calls the sultan “the most peace-loving
(mirolyubiveyshago).” Yoannovich’s book dedication reiterates this assessment and
expands it to incorporate the sultan’s subjects by referring to Abdülmecid’s motivation
for reform in the following terms – “out of affection and a burning [literally, ‘hot’] desire
for peace and the good livelihood of his subjects.”95
What is most remarkable about this book is that it also contains songs, which
Yoannovich, inspired by the sultan’s visit, composed in its aftermath for the purpose of
creatively re-enacting and symbolically framing the encounter. Three of them merit
closer attention and add important new dimensions to the symbolic interaction between
the ruler and the ruled. Two of these songs appeared shortly after Abdülmecid’s
Rumelian tour in the 1847 Almanac also composed and published by Yoannovich in
Wallachia.96 They contain what seems a largely factual account (with occasional
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metaphoric touches) of the sultan’s visit. The first song explains to the people the
purpose of the sultan’s tour in the following terms:

May there be peace and love
And no violence
Whoever has a need
May tell him
Give him a complaint
And hope
That somehow he will receive [it]
In his time
Whatever one begs
The tsar carries in his pocket
Ready to bestow
And to make good
For this reason
He passed here [Tırnova] too
To see his reaya
To go around his land97

These poetic lines reveal a close direct emotional connection between the (Muslim) ruler
and the (non-Muslim) ruled, a radically new phenomenon in Ottoman history. This
excerpt focuses on the top-down part of the relationship, painting the picture of a
sensitive, highly accessible, benevolent, and generous ruler, who is also omnipotent. The
song continues with first-hand account particulars of the sultan’s visit to Tırnova, which
largely fall in line with the memoirs covering other such visits from the tour. In the
process, the motif of the sultan’s larger-than-life stature gets a new dimension with the
reverence Christian clergymen display for him. With a gospel in hand, they bow to the
ground and stretch their hands up in a prayer to God for “[his] long life (mnogaya leta).”
The clergymen then accompany the sultan into town singing “a song for many years
(mnogoletna pesen)” along the way. Their enthusiasm infects the popular masses. That
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evening, everyone prays to God and performs animal sacrifice for the sultan’s health.98
In gratitude, the sultan bestows money gifts to all, ranging in value from five piasters (to
boys) to twenty piasters (to clergymen).
The second song paints the whole encounter with the brush of folk fairy tales:

We reached golden years
We saw Sultan Midzhit [sic]
Our fathers have not seen
Our grandfathers have not heard
Such a serene tsar (hrisimo tsarche)99
Such a merciful Sultan (milostivno Sultanche)

The choice of such expressive medium, the mythic tone of the narrator’s voice may
perhaps be attributed to a combination of, on the one hand, the improbability of the above
sequence of occurrences and, on the other, the high degree of common fervor it
generated. Along these lines, the shift from third person singular to first person plural
seems highly significant. So is the introduction of a temporal component via the blood
connection to fathers (bashti) and grandfathers/ancestors (dedi), and the exponential
hyperbolizing deep into the past – the length of time during which the fathers have not
seen anything like this pales in comparison to the length of time the
grandfathers/ancestors have not heard anything like it. In its natural flow, this extreme
98
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popular excitement bridges divides based on strict interpretations of faith, and leads to
paradoxical, from our present-day point of view, results. The indications for a trajectory
of religious and cultural syncretism, more or less subtle, are interspersed throughout the
song.100 At its very outset, the sultan is compared with a serene newborn lamb as well as
a mighty lion.101 Then in the above passage, another word for ‘serene’ is used (hrisim).
However, neither these, nor the outbursts of ecclesiastic reverence for the sultan, detailed
above, seem to adequately prepare the reader for the song’s closing lines. They convey a
popular rapture which can be qualified as nothing less than a personality cult:

Wherever he stepped and sat
And whichever way he looked
We kiss that place
And commemorate him
With joy we were all weeping
And on the trees we were climbing
And for the sultan we watch
Whence will we see him again
Oh, will we prove worthy
For him to twice appear to us
In the year of 1846,
He passed through Ternovo [Tırnova]
Most merciful he appeared to us
Inaugurated the land customs
God [gave to] us to lord over.

The theme of visibility, the act of visual exchange between the ruler and the ruled,
unobtrusively present in all of the above excerpts from this song and elsewhere, carries
the gradually unfolding stages of popular embrace of the ruler as the people’s own to
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Strong as an aslant [a profanation of the Ottoman Turkish word ‘aslan’ = lion.]
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such an intense conclusion.102 As the poem makes clear, the cult of the monarch is
centered on the space inscribed by the sultan’s movement and vision. Perhaps most
indicative of a cult is the shift from past to present tense in tune with the shift from the
account of the sultan’s visit to an account of popular behavior afterwards. Whereas the
visit is a one-time event, the response is a repetitive occurrence, unbounded in time – “we
kiss that place and commemorate him.” Based on this evidence, poetically enhanced, yet
largely grounded in reality, it may not be far fetched to state that the people treat the
sultan as they would a saint. This impression is only made stronger by the use of the verb
“da se yavya (to appear)” with reference to the sultan. This verb has a mystic,
otherworldly connotation, and is often employed in relating supernatural, dream- or
vision-like experiences. Thus, this song ends on a high point of ruler sanctity.
The same two songs appeared in Yoannovich’s 1851 songbook, with some highly
suggestive changes, including an entirely new segment. The changes concerned several
aspects of the relationship between the sultan and his subjects. Whereas in the 1846
version of the first song the sultan carried that which his subjects needed in his pocket, in
1851 he held it in his ‘bosom (pazva).” Thus, the ruler seems to be holding his subjects’
needs in greater esteem in 1851. After all, the bosom is next to one’s heart, where one
would also carry a love letter. This sultanic gesture is then matched by a concession on
the part of people – “Only we should beg and implore him” – another novel addition.
The subtle evolution of the social pact towards a shorter distance between the two parties
and a more pronounced popular reverence for the ruler is manifested in other ways as
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well. For example, the students welcoming the sultan in the 1851 text “were sitting
dutifully (chinno sedyaha),” a remark absent from the earlier version. Whereas the
clergymen “were bowing to the ground” in 1846, in 1851 they were “all falling to the
ground (vsi na zemla padat).” The list of animals sacrificed for the ruler’s health is
longer in 1851. In addition to oxen, cows, lambs, kids, and calves, it includes “birds and
sparrows, little pigeons.” That such an extensive description (a total of six poetic lines)
should be included attests not only to the reality of the event of animal sacrifice (kurban),
but possibly also to the wide range of social strata involved, with everyone contributing
what they could afford. Perhaps in recognition of such a broad spectrum of devotion, an
1846 line – “[the tsar] Bestowed gifts on all of them (Sichkite dari)” – was sung twice in
the 1851 version. More importantly, the first song received an entirely new ending,
consisting of two parts. The first relates the sultan’s didactic words to a gathering of
local notables before his departure from Tırnova:

From the saray he looked at them,
And ordered them,
To look after the reaya
And not harm it
To guide it,
To instruct it
From the saray he descends,
And says to all:
Turks of Muslim faith
Christian reaya
I recognize alike
And equal honor give
Both Muslim faith
And Christian
Both Armenian
And Jewish
I recognize alike
And equal honor give.
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Once again, the visual exchange is prominent. It is a key element in the process of
conveying the will of the ruler to his proxies, and ensuring the enforcement of that same
autonomous omniscient will for the benefit of the masses. What is surprising, however,
is the protagonist’s choice to segment this heretofore faceless, malleable “flock (reaya)”
of non-Muslims, based on religious denomination. The text is deliberately repetitive in
listing communities and insisting on their equal rights. It reveals an intense
preoccupation with the Tanzimat’s focus on equality. Since Yoannovich was not only an
author, but also a publisher and a bookseller, what he wrote was more likely than not in
tune with what people thought, felt, wanted to hear/read, and were willing to pay for. In
all likelihood, the act of naming in this excerpt reflects processes of acceleration of
communal events and gradual crystallization of the communal frame of mind twelve
years after the Gülhane Rescript. As the passage immediately following demonstrates,
this choice in no way contradicts the overarching paternalistic role of the sultan in the
familial metaphor of Ottoman society:

In the coach he sat,
To the reaya he turned his eyes,
As a father to [his] children,
That is how he looked,
Outside of town he came,
And told all of them:
I hereby depart,
To God I thee entrust,
To God I thee entrust,
My shadow I leave here,
So you may not be sad
And of me grievous

The last four poetic lines contain references to a universalized God, and just as striking –
the invocation of the shadow of God (zil-i allah), a profoundly Muslim title of the sultan,
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in order to keep his Christian subjects from grieving his departure. One would be hard
pressed to find a passage, which better illustrates the syncretic nature of the integrationist
project and the inclusive notion of faith on which it largely rested. This symbolic
separation of the shadow of the ruler from his body is an early signal for a trajectory of
abstraction in the terms of glorification of the sultan, which would gradually lead to a full
blown personality cult by the end of the nineteenth century under Abdülhamid II.103
Despite the protagonist-sultan’s call, a final segment of the first song, not quoted
here, captures in great detail the shared common sorrow accompanying his departure.
Allegedly, the sultan’s sheer physical presence gave people joy and allowed them to
share their needs with him. Since the same segment also relates factual details of the
sultan’s departure from Tırnova and the people’s return to town after seeing him off, it
cannot be easily dismissed as a figment of Yoannovich’s imagination.
The second song also displays changes along the path of ruler glorification.
Whereas in the 1846 version the sultan, aged 24, is treated lovingly as a youngster, the
1851 version casts the image of the older (aged 28) Abdülmecid with corresponding
respect, in a more mature light. There is no trace of the diminutive form “little tsar
(tsarche),” his mercy is further emphasized (“merciful” becomes “most merciful”) and
the “Christ-like (hrisim)” epithet is replaced by the image of a ruler with some
experience, “a good master (dobar gospodar).” At its end, the second song has two new
lines which serve as a thematic prelude to the entirely new third song.104 The first of
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“May God continue [his] days
And upon us bestow him.”
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these lines replaces an earlier line – “God [gave to] us to lord over.” This change acts to
soften the notion of the sultan’s control over his subjects, as imposed from above (by
God), and instead shifts the emphasis to the theme of the ruler’s reception by the people
as their gift. Therefore, it serves as a perfect transition to the last song dedicated to
Abdülmecid.
The new, third song grabs the reader’s attention from its very title – “Love for the
Sultan by his subjects (Lyubov k sultanu ot poddannicite mu).” It carries in a most overt
and intense form yet the call for individual mobilization in the name of the ruler:

Whoever loves the sultan,
Runs to him,
Loves him from the heart,
Expends labor for him,
Exhausts life,
Does not leave the Tsar,
Does not spare one’s health,
Always praises the Sultan,
For the smallest need
Summons all the strength
Serves him faithfully,
And remembers him.
Prays for the Tsar,
And slaughters kurban,
Rams and rams,
And fattened oxen
So good-loving
He is God-loving,
As he does not reject [the tsar]
So the tsar loves him,
(And) whoever hates the sultan,
He enters into sin
(And) whoever thinks ill of him
May God destroy him.

Unprecedentedly, mobilization unfolds in both prescriptive (“runs to,” “expends labor,”
“exhausts life,” “always praises,” “serves,” “remembers”) and proscriptive (“does not
leave,” “does not spare one’s health”) lines of reasoning. Therefore, it inscribes a
complete moral universe. As before, the individual behavioral model is still based on
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love, though a love which is unequal. Of the five references to love in this segment, four
originate with the individual and flow towards the sultan, and only one proceeds in the
opposite direction. Moreover, the roots for ‘love’ in the original – ‘obich’ and ‘lyub,’ a
duality which the English translation does not reflect, are also employed in an
asymmetric manner. For example, all of the ‘lyub’ forms, the root carrying the more
passionate type of love, are centered on the sultan. However, the most remarkable aspect
of this song is that it goes beyond love. The extreme call of popular duty to the sultan
transforms what would otherwise be irrational behavior into a normal regularity, thus
creating a higher plane of activity (“for the smallest need summons all the strength”).
Here, for the first time, the notion of duty to the ruler, traced above through a series of
texts, enters the territory of sacrifice for the ruler. Once outlined with unusual detail, this
higher plane is then taken a step further into the realm of the divine, which seals its
legitimacy – the good-loving (dobrolyubiv) becomes God-loving (Bogolyubiv). Since
Abdülmecid is both sultan (3) and tsar (3), the two terms being employed here on an
alternating basis, he enters seamlessly into a Christian theological reference frame
regarding the rightful universal ruler.105 Therefore, actions against the tsar-sultan invoke
notions of sin, with the ruler claiming divine protection.
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XI.

The Rumelian Tour’s Ripple Effects and the Beginnings of a Bulgar
‘Feeling’.

Far from being spurious or idiosyncratic, the themes pioneered by people like
Stoyanov and Yoannovich on the micro level drew on parameters set by the macro frame
of the Tanzimat. In fact, at least as far as the Bulgars are concerned, Abdülmecid’s 1846
tour of Rumelia gave the vast majority of such works a jump start.106 The mental
connection of provincial Bulgar populations to the sultan, forged single-handedly and
vividly by the tour was afterwards perpetuated by a nascent Bulgar periodical press.
Barely a month after the tour, a eulogy for the sultan appeared on the pages of the only
Bulgar periodical publication – the monthly magazine Lyuboslovie (“Love for Words”) –
published by Konstantin Fotinov107 in Izmir. It was written by Stefan Izvorski,108 a
teacher in Şumnu (Shumen), a town in the part of Rumelia the sultan had visited. The
poem was dedicated to Abdülmecid “as an eternal proof” of the good will of “the Bulgar
people (Bolgarskiy narod) to their August Master and Benefactor.”109
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Izvorski played a key role in the institutionalization of another of the tour’s
lasting legacies. Two issues later, in August 1846, Lyuboslovie published an account of
the local school examination ceremonies, held on August 11/23 in Şumnu. The event
drew so many spectators that the school building could not contain them and they spilled
out all around it. The article explicitly noted that this was “a custom which has never
been held in their town, nor have their ancestors for so many centuries proved worthy and
able to see [it].”110 The entry into the school building played out as a solemn public
procession of the first order. Archbishop Porfiriy, surrounded by church cantors led the
way, followed by priests, town notables, merchants, artisans and everyone else. The
archbishop performed a sanctification rite and delivered a speech in Ottoman highlighting
the importance of education during the reign of Abdülmecid. Porfiriy reiterated the
uniqueness of this open-door ceremony. His act was followed by a carefully
choreographed song-dialogue between the teacher (Izvorski) and his students. It was a
song of praise and prayer for the sultan, capped with religious formulae – “for ages and
ages (vo veki vekov)” and “amen (amin).” Afterwards, Izvorski, in turn, delivered a
speech of his own, with education yet again as the primary focus. Apparently, this
speech had profound effects on the multitude, causing some to fall into “deep silence,”
giving others “absorbed looks” or “irrepressible tears.” Finally, all students dressed in
white shirts, with little red fezzes, seated in twelve groups of twelve individuals, stood up
and began reciting poems of praise. They proceeded in a strict order, group after group,
with each student uttering four lines. The recital culminated with the turn of a very
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young child with a strong voice, seated in the sixth group amidst all students and
spectators.
In its entirety, this two-part teacher-student performance was more intricate than
anything the sultan witnessed on the tour itself. The theme of education, a central
component of Abdülmecid’s scenario of power, announced with the 1845 ferman and its
accompanying address-commentary, analyzed above, hereby found some of its earliest
grassroots resonance. Rather than an outlier, the Şumnu ceremony is a telling example of
the sort of activities the sultanic tour inspired across Rumelia. Lyuboslovie’s very next
(September) issue contains an account of a strikingly similar ceremony, involving all five
schools of Kotel, a Rumelian town not very far from Şumnu. Moreover, the same
archbishop Porfiriy presided over the event. In this instance, the high cleric’s speech
explicitly acknowledged the importance of the sultan’s “humane” [literally, “peopleloving (chelovekolyubiv)”] wishes with respect to his “flock (stado).” Tsarist references
proliferate yet again throughout this account, becoming ever more firmly embedded into
the contemporary discourse of Ottoman rulership.
In a rare demonstration of the pan-imperial, trans-communal nature of
Abdülmecid’s image making policies, the same page of the June issue of Lyuboslovie on
which Izvorski’s eulogy appeared related the story of a choir of twenty-five (Helleneminded) Rum schoolgirls greeting the sultan with “God Save the Tsar” upon his exit from
Friday prayers in the Bebek neighborhood of Istanbul. The article explicitly
acknowledges the song’s roots – “... and there they sung to the Tsar a song, after an
English Tsarist song, which began as follows: “God save our Tsar Abdul Mecid [sic].”111
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110

Once again, in less than two lines of text, the tsarist reference appears twice with
reference to the sultan. While future research will clarify the exact relationship between
Western and Eastern Christian hymns in informing the origins of such celebratory
practices among Ottoman non-Muslims of the mid-nineteenth century, one thing seems
clear. These practices quickly became an integral component of a wider drive for subject
loyalty consolidation at home as well as recognition by and symbolic reciprocity with the
West.112
With the publication of the first Bulgar newspaper (Tsarigradski Vestnik) in the
Ottoman Empire commencing in 1848, a major new medium compounded the sporadic
decentralized influence of songbooks.113 By bringing to its readers all across the far
flung imperial domains events and high personages from the capital on a weekly basis,
the paper enhanced their awareness of an Ottoman center, personalized by the sultan, his
family and government ministers. A quick review of the contents of various articles over
a period of several months from the year of 1851 provides a sort of cross section of the
ways in which the above analyzed themes defining the ruler-ruled interaction were
further developed and anchored in the public mind. This snapshot reveals both top-down
and bottom-up conceptions of the relationship between the sultan and his subjects. To
begin with, the fatherly metaphor flourished. For example, one finds references to “the
fatherly Sultanic wishes,” as well as to a sultan, “who watches equally over all of his
subjects and cares for all of them as a humane and good-natured father.”114 In a letter
112
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from the Bulgars of Tulcea, a town in present-day Romania, one even finds the image of
a sultan, who “loves (lyubi) his subjects as his own adopted children.”115 This is the
earliest characterization I have encountered of the sultan’s emotional connection to his
subjects, employing the more passionate and intense form of the verb “to love.” It thus
continued the trend whereby the perceived distance between the ruler and the ruled only
got shorter over time.
Education remained ostensibly among Abdülmecid’s topmost priorities in 1851.
There are at least two reported cases of his personal attendance at student exams in this
stretch of time – once at the school (medrese) of the Fatih Mosque, and once at the
Imperial Military School.116 Apparently, the sultan’s initiative made waves across the
domains and inspired local adaptations. A letter from Razgrad (in present-day Bulgaria)
relates the visit of a number of local dignitaries, which included the subdistrict governor
(müdür) Adil Bey, the religious judge (qadi) Mustafa Efendi, and the chief jurist (müfti)
Hüseyin Efendi to a Bulgar school on the sultan’s birthday. Much to the guests’ delight,
upon their entry, the students instantly stood up and sang a hymn, entitled “May God give
Many Years to the Most Peaceful, Most Serene and most Nobly Born Tsar Sultan Abdul
Medzhid [sic].”117 As the article made clear this hymn was at that time sung in schools in
accordance with musical notation on a daily basis. Afterwards, the governor delivered a
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didactic speech to the students. The judge then addressed the town notables with words
of advice and guidance, which included the expression of “the tsar’s burning [literally,
‘hot’] desire for the enlightenment of the peoples in all of His State.” In a sign that such
events did indeed solidify communal consciousness, the article’s author concludes by
saying that “this visit is a sign of the prosperity of our town, and of the Bulgarian kin
(roda Bolgarskago).”
As the Bulgars saw themselves increasingly in terms of belonging to a greater,
supra-regional group, they phrased their gratitude to the sultan for his reform movement
and the functionaries dispatched locally to administer it in broader terms. Thus, if in
1849, in a case outlined above, a group of Bulgar residents of Tırnova had thanked the
sultan on the pages of Tsarigradski Vestnik on behalf of their townspeople, two years
later, a group of merchants from the same town wrote a similar letter in gratitude for “the
people-saving Tanzimat (narodospasaemyiy Tanzimat).”118 Six months earlier, an
identical attitude had already appeared in an editorial piece on the same paper’s cover
page. It praised “the people-saving (narodospasitelnyiy) writ of the Tanzimat.”119
The process of intensifying popular infatuation with the ruler often took on
dimensions which seem, from a present-day vantage point, paradoxical. In this respect,
one of the most fruitful grounds for symbolic syncretism was the realm of regalia. Soon
after the discourse of the sultan as tsar got under way, it became insufficient to refer to
the sultan simply as tsar. Instead, the public imagination was stimulated with regalia-
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driven metonymic referents. Some, such as the ‘throne (prestol)’120 are common to the
Ottoman Muslim and Bulgar Christian symbolic systems alike, but others, such as the
‘scepter (skiptur)’ are Christian only. Yet, time and again, newspaper articles placed a
scepter in the hand of the sultan, thus producing a factually incorrect image but one
which was powerfully resonant with readers. For example, one published text spoke of
“peoples, whom the Lord God has subjected to the Lord-protected scepter of His Majesty
the Sultan;” another asserted that the sultan “has no other goal apart from the prosperity
and tranquility of all people (lyude) who are placed under his most glorious scepter.”121
References such as these made the ruler’s image intelligible and appealing to his nonMuslim subjects in a dual, mutually reinforcing fashion. On the one hand, they invoked
vivid symbols of secular power; on the other, and even more importantly, they often
carried subtle interwoven signs of a corresponding, higher sacred plane the sultan also
inhabited. Examples include the above-mentioned “Lord-protected scepter
(bogohranimyiy skiptr)” as well as the sultan’s “Lord-endowed state (Bogodarovanna
derzhava).”122 They gave the sultan a crucial (universal) divine stamp of approval in the
eyes of his subjects. Consequently, as with the final additions to Yoannovich’s poetic
account of the 1846 encounter between the people and the ruler, sacrality could and did
emanate from the sultan’s persona itself. A speech by the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reshid
Pasha, which appeared on the cover of Tsarigradski Vestnik in 1851, the same year
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Yoannovich’s songbook was published, brought up a term as abstract as “the truthful
Tsarist mind (istinnyiy Tsarskiy razum).” Aiming at a synopsis of the accomplishments
of the sultan’s reign, the speech contains in a remarkably condensed form the motifs of
Abdülmecid’s scenario of power and the interrelation of concepts and symbols central to
his popular appeal:

… [the sultan] then condescended to open an easy road towards the dissemination of the arts and
an education which leads the human being towards prosperity and salvation in this world and the
next (spasenieto na toyze i na onze svet), and teaches everyone their duties (dolzhnosti).
…
Truly prosperous are we … And more fortunate (blagoschastlivi) are our children for, partaking of
such acts of kind goodness (blagosti), they find through the Tsarist grand endowment
(velikodarovanie) and doing good (blagodeyanie) ready, pre-arranged ways to learn, be guided
and improve. May the Lord God give us in alms the beneficent shadow and canopy123 of H. I.
Majesty for many years! Amen.124

These lines paint the sultan’s road to educational reform as the road to personal
“salvation in this world and the next” – the most intense syncretic sacred element yet.
The shift to a forward thrust in the temporal continuum, a novelty in the discourse of the
ruler-ruled relationship, is re-affirmed by a juxtaposition of the lives of the sultan’s
present subjects and their children. Whereas earlier comparisons involved people of the
present (‘we’) and the past (‘our fathers and grandfathers’),125 this is a first encounter
with an image of posterity in a ‘present-future’ comparative setting. Posterity is hereby
placed within a didactic paternalistic scheme (“ready, pre-arranged ways to learn, be
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guided and improve”), which draws attention yet again to the ruler as the fountain of
overwhelming generosity and overarching goodness. The latter attribute of the ruler, in
fact, operates even on a subconscious level as this passage of only three sentences
contains as many as seven words sharing the root ‘good (blago).’
The theme of the ruler as the conduit of goodness from God to the people evolved
further in songs of prayer and praise for the sultan dating from the last years of
Abdülmecid’s reign. An 1857 songbook, published by two Bulgar teachers – Spas
Zafirov and Tsani Zhelev – contains a prayer song for the sultan, which was clearly
composed for the purpose of being performed at Bulgar schools on a daily basis. Two of
its stanzas are worthy of note:

To our Fortunate Tsar,
Our Father, and Lord126
Abdul Mezit [sic], oh Lord,
Extend your Protection
Grant [him] extreme health,
Create [protection] for many years.

…
Oh, you, Tsar of heaven,
Protect our most kind
Tsar Abdul Mezit [sic],
Extend Him many days,
For our prosperity,
And heavenly protection.127

In yet another demonstration of religious syncretism, these lines describe the stages via
which divine blessings reach the people. First, the students implore God to extend his
protection to the sultan-tsar. Second, the latter’s long life and well being in turn
126
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guarantee the people’s own prosperity and celestial protection. In this scheme of events,
the sultan-tsar is an indispensable link in the chain of bounty descending from heaven to
earth. By echoing in period Bulgar eulogistic poetry and polemic prose alike, this notion
became a widely held truism. For example, an 1859 “Prayer-Song for Many Years
(Mnogoletstvie),” allegedly performed “in every Bulgar Church (u seka Bulgarska
Tsurkva)”, commences by urging “our people (nash narod)” to rejoice, glorify God and
thank the tsar for its peaceful life.128 In the same vein of thought, an essay appearing on
the pages of Tsarigradski Vestnik in the same year, appeals to God in the following
terms: “Glory to You God our Lord, who supports on the throne our Autocrat Sultan
ABDUL MEDZHID [sic] and pours through him your mercies on us!”129
The 1850s mark progressively higher points in the popularity of such conceptual
formulations of Ottoman sultanic authority. The main vehicle for their dissemination
remained the songs of praise and prayer. With all of the above analysis in mind, it
becomes easier to situate historically the following statement made by Ivan Vazov, one of
the best known Bulgarian writers, regarded as “the patriarch of Bulgarian literature”: “In
the school of my native town [Sopot] one would glorify Sultan Abdul Medzhid [sic] in
Turkish hymns long before one heard about and glorified the [Bulgarian] Enlighteners
Cyril and Methodius . . .”130 When he said this, Ivan Vazov, who was born in 1850,
probably had in mind the mid- and late 1850s when he himself was a schoolboy. By the
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end of the 1850s, these songs infiltrated a growing number of festive occasions and
cultural settings. For example, they were performed at ceremonies for the completion of
the annual school exams, such as the one in the town of Gabrova in 1859.131 Apparently,
that same year they were also an integral part of a large welcoming ceremony for the
sultan at Saray Burnu in Istanbul. Worthy of note is the fact that “children from the
Muslim, Christian and Jewish schools” all came together to welcome, with their songs
and chants, Abdülmecid back from a sea voyage.132 Extant poetic texts from that year, if
not that particular occasion, confirm the uniformity and stability of some symbolic
perspectives on central authority, analyzed above. Consider the following excerpts from
two eulogies, which appeared in an 1859 Rum publication in Ottoman (written with
Greek letters133):

(A)
God the Protector, let the Sublime Porte shine with the glory of reign!
A thousand years to Our Lord Sultan Abdülmecid, the Refuge of the Universe!
Let his sons, the princes and the light of his eyes, inherit the reign according to God’s will!
Pray cheerfully for him, servants of God all over the universe!
…
(B)
Certainly my sultan knows
How happy all the servants are.
The face of the earth lightens
And the world is devoted to you!
…
You are so beautiful, my Lord,
That the souls sacrifice themselves for your manners!
…
With the scarlet locks of the hyacinth
131
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You are like the red roses in the garden!…134

The metaphor of light (“shine,” “lightens”), the organic metaphor of the rose garden, and
the grand spatial order [“the face of the earth,” “the world,” “the universe” (2),],
combined with the concepts of subject happiness and prayer, devotion and even sacrifice
are eerily reminiscent of the language of Sturdza’s letters of the early 1840s and
Yoannovich’s publications of the turn of the 1850s. They delineate a discourse of
rulership which transcends any particular religio-cultural origins. What is even more
remarkable is the transplantation, within a decade and a half or so, of this discourse from
the elite to the mass level, a move which, needless to say, would open vast opportunities
for popular absorption.

XII.

New Avenues for Macro-Communal Identification and Macro-Territorial
Attachment.

Throughout the 1850s, the Bulgars began to develop a more explicit and elaborate
abstract sense of communal belonging transcending any particular locale, any familiar
zone of microregional real-life habitation. Following in the footsteps of sultanic
celebrations, one of the major mechanisms facilitating this process was the invention and
popularization of a celebration of their own (imagined) community. On the initiative of
Nayden Gerov, the same hostile observer of Abdülmecid’s visit to Rusçuk (Ruse) in
1846, the day of the holy brothers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, was marked on May 11
134
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(O.S.), 1851, for the first time with a secular celebration at the “St. Cyril and St.
Methodius” school in Filibe (Plovdiv), where he taught.135 The date was borrowed from
the Christian feast of the two brothers who created the first Slavic (Glagolithic) script in
the ninth century. In 1856, Yoakim Gruev,136 a teacher, suggested that the day be marked
as a holiday of the Bulgar schoolchildren. The next year, its annual celebration
commenced in Istanbul, Filibe (Plovdiv), Şumnu (Shumen) and Lom.137 The launching
of this holiday was made possible and acceptable by the public prominence of
educational and religious motifs in Abdülmecid’s scenario of power. By establishing a
connection to a mythic distant Slavic and Bulgar past, May 11 stimulated a sense of
cultural specificity in the minds of participants, which would flourish in the 1860s as the
next chapter will demonstrate.
The process of enhanced communal belonging was further aided by the
cultivation of a new and correspondingly abstract territorial attachment. The most
obvious harbinger of this shift was a change in the dominant image of the land itself.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, one’s relationship to the land was overwhelmingly
construed from a local, microregional vantage point. This construction stemmed from
lived realities where property was accumulated and perpetuated through the male line.
So one’s place of birth and the land nearby were overwhelmingly viewed through the
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prism of ‘patrimony (bashtiniya).’ Hence, the term ‘fatherland (otechestvo),’ signifying
above all one’s place of birth, a sense which the 1845 ferman, analyzed above, skillfully
attempted to extend to the macro level of the entire imperial domains on the basis of the
fatherly metaphor of the sultan. By the 1850s, however, both of these versions of
‘fatherland’ began to yield ground to an alternative (abstract, macro-) concept – “the land
of the Bulgars, Bulgaria.” On the surface of it, the name alone did not set a historical
precedent. In the dedication to his 1847 Almanac, mentioned above, Nayden
Yoannovich had already introduced himself to his readers as, among other things “a book
vendor across all of Slavic Bulgaria (Slavenobolgaria).” Moreover, one of his poems in
the Almanac about Abdülmecid’s visit to Tırnova did mention the sultan’s crossing of
Thrace (Trakia) and Bulgaria (Bolgaria) on his way. These terms were both lacking in
substance, however, and they denoted different things. The former was a loose cultural
marker, referring to all the lands where Slavic Bulgar people lived. The latter was a loose
geographical marker, denoting the lands north of the Balkan range (with Thrace lying to
the south, respectively), which clearly contained only a fraction of all Bulgars.138
The new, momentous development in the 1850s was the trend towards the
representation of Bulgaria as ‘mother.’ It strengthened the notion of a blood connection
among the Bulgars, and opened the door to a more intense emotional appeal and group
mobilization via the creation of accompanying images of Bulgaria’s personification and
victimization.139 Needless to say, these novel processes were also inextricably linked
138
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with the rise of axiomatic antagonistic images of ‘the other’ used as rallying points. Once
again, the seeds of these parallel developments were sown by the syncretic discourse and
cyclical popular celebrations of sultanic power, introduced a decade or so earlier. By the
late 1850s, motherly metaphors of the land, with elements indicative of the above
mentioned processes, appeared in polemic articles on the pages of Bulgar newspapers.
Todor Burmov’s 1859 essay, mentioned above, was one of them. Entitled, “The Feelings
of the Orthodox Bulgar in the Days of Sultan Abdul-Medzhid [sic],” it was an address to
God, which laid out the motherly metaphor and its attendant imagery in the following
strikingly dramatic terms:

According to Your holy will our reigning [lit.”reigning as tsar” - tsarstvuyushtiy] Sultan
vouchsafed to have the name of our mother Bulgaria, buried for many centuries, resurrected …
You [Bulgaria], though long held in the black heart of earth, for dead and breathless, at the
slightest move cruelly confined by your spiritual sister torturer, you stayed alive, survived, and
rebelled in order to serve with your typical fidelity the tsar and lord (vlastelin), appointed by God,
under your present name: BULGARIA. We, orphaned children of yours, not without tenderness,
are cordially watching your troubled look; however, cheered by the generosities of our most
merciful Lord, we are fully convinced that you will acquire your typical liveliness and joy, when
you come fully to your senses from the subterranean sufferings, gathering under his monarchic
protection your lawful children as a hen gathers its chicks under its wing (Mathew 23:37)

These lines paint the picture of a harmonious triadic relationship between the Bulgars,
Bulgaria and the sultan. The intensity of Bulgaria’s portrayed victimization is startling
(“buried,” “dead,” “breathless,” “cruelly confined,” “troubled,” etc.). However, so are
the syncretic religious, highly charged terms of the sultan’s own involvement: he is
instrumental in Bulgaria’s resurrection, and is even placed in the same phrase with a
reference to a Gospel of the New Testament! Another section from the same text
captures in a most succinct manner yet the relationship of this Bulgaria to the ruler –
“under [his] protective wing.” This expression, first mentioned in Stoyanov’s 1845
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address-commentary, becomes a catchphrase. It has already appeared under identical
symbolic circumstances in another polemic article several months earlier, entitled
“Which of the Living Tongues to Study.”140 This piece also contains another novel
personification – of the Bulgar people (narod) as a group: “It now resembles a young
human being (chelovek) who for the first time enters the world.” The author, most likely
the newspaper’s editor, Dragan Tsankov,141 firmly insists on the need for education so
this young person can make the right choices. In his effusive enthusiasm, he speaks of
Bulgar letters (knizhnina), even of a Bulgar natural world (priroda). It seems that by the
following year such practices of naming and claiming have already spilled over to the
perennial songbooks. A song in one such publication, penned by another teacher, Nikola
Gerov Belchev142 invokes the image even of “Bulgar forests (dubravi bulgarski).”143
The re-defined close communal relationship of the Bulgars to the monarch, forged
by the 1846 tour, the cultural production and celebratory practices it inspired, and the
abstract communal public space these spawned, only grew stronger over the years. This
relationship gradually became the central legitimating component in an increasingly
politicized process of voicing communal concerns, in the crystallization and
manifestation of communal agendas, and the clash of communal rivalries. In this sense,
140
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the textual evidence drawn from songbooks and other sources points to a direct
proportional relationship between the rise of Bulgar group consciousness and the
emergence and evolution of negative images of “the other,” a vital antithesis solidifying
Bulgar group boundaries.
A quick look at the early sources analyzed in this chapter shows that they contain
few, if any, ‘Bulgar’ and negative ‘other’ references. The few that appear often do so in
titles (Ivan Stoyanov’s 1845 address-commentary), postscripts (the same source), or
accompanying commentaries (Stefan Izvorski’s 1846 poem) rather than in the main body
of the texts.144 The 1849 open letter to the sultan identifies its authors simply as
“Turnovo residents (turnovski zhiteli/Turnovtsi).” Remarkably, despite all the changes
they underwent from 1846 to 1851, Yoannovich’s various texts make no Bulgar
references whatsoever. Instead, the non-Muslim group is invariably referred to, in the
customary Ottoman parlance, as “flock (reaya)”. In fact, following the above-mentioned
title of Stoyanov’s impassioned address, the word “Bulgar” does not appear again in any
of the examined sources until 1857.145 The words denoting an antagonistic ‘other’ appear
more frequently, in the sense of ‘enemy of the sultan,’ which gradually becomes identical
with ‘sinner.’146 Only at the very end of the 1850s, commensurate with the rapid ascent
of the image of a personified and victimized Bulgaria, does a shift in emphasis occur
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as ‘sinner,’ see the last four poetic lines on p. 106.
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away from enemies of the sultan towards enemies of Bulgaria and the Bulgar people.
Hence, the startling image of a “spiritual sister torturer” in Burmov’s 1859 text.147
Dragan Tsankov’s article, analyzed above, contains a passage, which best illustrates the
mutually reinforcing evolution of Bulgar- and antagonistic ‘other’- based terminology
and rhetoric: “… the whole Bulgar people, ten centuries under Phanariot148 yoke, begins
to feel its weight. Let us repeat from the whole heart: what a precious time for the
Bulgar! Our second golden age comes out from the thick darkness as the joyous nature
tears away from the austerity of winter.” This excerpt charts a Bulgar-centered temporal
continuum both backward (“ten centuries”) and forward (“our second golden age”). The
equivalent dichotomies ‘winter-spring (“the joyous nature tears away”)’ and ‘darknesslight (“golden”)’ give additional depth and clarity to the author’s evocative vision.
Finally, the elements of totalization and unity (“the whole Bulgar people,” “the whole
heart”) are integral to the text’s mobilizing message. While present in occasional earlier
texts, usually of limited readership, by the end of Abdülmecid’s reign, these motifs came
to affect, via the songbooks, a much larger audience. The theme of education and the
trope of love by and for the ruler also retained their centrality, while the distance between
ruler and ruled continued to shrink. Even a conservative text such as the popular 1859
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See p. 122. The “spiritual sister torturer” in this case is the Helene-minded Rum community,
whose members dominated the Rum Orthodox church hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, continuously
denying the Bulgars a separate church organization. In 1860, this conflict reached a boiling point when the
Ecumenical Patriarch’s name was not mentioned during Easter services at the St. Stephen Church in
Istanbul, but it would be another ten years before the Bulgars were formally granted the right of a separate
ecclesiastical institution.
148

This is a synonym for the Helene-minded Rum, derived from their powerbase in Istanbul, the
district of Fener.
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“Prayer-Song for Many Years (Mnogoletstvie),” which downplays group identity,149
focusing exclusively on education (three out of six stanzas) and metaphors of light,
breaks new ground in its portrayal of the sultan:

With a strong voice he cries,
In order to fire up a zeal (revnost)
For learning in us
And again to praise us.

This stanza assigns a more active role to the sultan vis-à-vis his Bulgar subjects than ever
before. For a ruler, who until relatively recently had been neither seen nor known, to
engage in this vocal (“with a strong voice he cries”), unprecedentedly reciprocal (“to
praise us”) and highly emotional (“to fire up a zeal”) manner is an unmistakable sign of
rapport with the masses, but also a subtle indication of a loss of status, the mystic aura
detachment confers. What this odd poetic scenario only alluded to – the growing Bulgar
group self-confidence – was fast becoming evident at the grassroots level. Here are the
opening lines of Belchev’s songbook published only a year later:

Sing, oh, Bulgars in consent (suglasno)
Exclaim all of you today vociferously (veleglasno)
Glorify all of you the good Sultan
May he hear this song of praise.

From a position of marginality, the theme of unity suddenly jumps to the center of the
discourse of community. This call enjoins the Bulgars, quite literally, to make

149

This text never calls the Bulgars by name and contains no markers for totalization or unity

whatsoever.
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themselves heard.150 Even more fascinating in its thematic accents and overall symbolic
structure is the final item in this songbook. It reproduces the 1859 Mnogoletstvie, with
the following highly significant additions:

For many peaceful years
To our Strong Master
Sing, oh, brothers little Bulgars (Bulgarcheta)
All of you, all of you in one voice
Long live, long live
Tsar Abdul Medzhid [sic] Sultan
May his high Divan
Shine like the sun
May he live and not spare himself in giving (da sya razdava)
In all of bulgaria today
May the Black Sea, the Danube, the Sava
Jump to the skies
May all countries listen
May it be heard across the world
How our dear tsar father
Is loved and glorified
And you, God! Gentle God
Protect him with invisible shield
And under his feet
All his enemies defeat
And His shining Diadem151
Preserve Glorious and honest
For as long as there are in the world
Sun, moon and stars.
…
May he overwhelm his enemies

This poetic sequence, which did indeed have a lasting impact, as the next chapter will
demonstrate, spans the full spectrum of previously analyzed motifs – the act of naming
oneself and the other, the personification of Bulgaria, the cluster of fatherly tsarist,
150

The next four lines, which complete the stanza, contain two more repetitions of the address
form “all of you (vsi).”
151

A diadem is a piece of Roman (and later, Byzantine Christian) regalia, which had no Ottoman

equivalent.

127

syncretic regalistic (“diadem”), light, love, and cosmic/grand-spatial metaphors. In most
of these aspects, however, this song goes beyond anything previously seen. The new spin
on the blood connection (“brothers”) and the centrality of Bulgar children
(“Bulgarcheta”) at the popular level signals a new level of group solidarity, which
immediately translates into a new level of group mobilization (“in one voice”). Despite
the common endearing diminutive form, “the little bulgars (Bulgarcheta)” (1860) could
not be more different from “the serene little tsar (hrisimo tsarche)” (1846) as the focus of
attention in a eulogy to the (same) sultan.152 The scale of change is further accentuated
by the specific territorial macro-mapping and personification of Bulgaria (“May the
Black Sea, the Danube, the Sava jump to the skies”), accompanied by a parallel
personification of the rest of the world (“May all countries listen”). This unusual
juxtaposition draws, for the first time, attention to the nascent competitiveness of the
‘us’-group (“May it be heard across the world”) and the corresponding self-assured
assertion of its own exceptionalism.
The sultan’s part of the social-pact equation also undergoes substantial alterations.
The old role of the antagonistic ‘other,’ as the sultan’s enemies, is still present, but it no
longer takes center stage despite the inclusion of images of defensive (“shield”) or
aggressive (“under his feet,” “defeat/overwhelm enemies”) militarism. If anything, this
motif of belligerence acts as yet another subtle agent for group mobilization. Not
surprisingly, the sultan’s aura is further diminished by the introduction of the radical
notion of sultanic sacrifice for his subjects [“May he …not spare himself in giving (da
sya razdava)].

152

See p. 100 and footnote 234.
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Finally, all of these developments culminate in the majestic image of a grandspatial order (“the sun;” “sun, moon and stars”), etched into eternity (“for as long as there
are in the world”), of the type first observed in the Sturdza letters about two decades
earlier.153 This cosmic re-enactment, however, takes place with a very different agenda
in the background, namely, with a niche carved out for the Bulgars “under the sun.”

XIII. Conclusion.

From the outset of his reign, Abdülmecid adhered closely to a number of Mahmud
II’s image making policies. First, he perpetuated the ruler’s high direct visibility, making
it palatable to foreign and domestic audiences alike. Second, he regularized the
distribution of medals and orders on sultanic occasions as symbols of prestige in a
burgeoning field of open competition for royal favor. Third, he firmly established the
trope of love for the ruler, broached by his father, as the mainstay of his own scenario of
power. In part, he did so through sultanic tours of the type Mahmud II had embarked on.
Evidence from one of them, the 1846 tour of Rumelia, perhaps the least researched,
demonstrates the avenues for the creation of a lasting image of the ruler in the minds of
multitudes of ordinary people, where, in most cases, none had existed before. Among
them, the songs of praise and prayer, frequently tied to the discourse of Tanzimat reform,
occupied a central place. With their effusive, increasingly complex metaphoric
ornamentation, and standardized, repetitive, incantatory performances, the songs were
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See pp. 78-79.
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converted into a powerful, large-scale medium for letting a heretofore distant ruler into
the hearts and minds of his subjects across the imperial domains.
Over time, the sultan’s image became subject to contradictory influences. On the
one hand, its symbolism and level of abstraction grew in the direction of a personality
cult; on the other, an equally powerful trend of humanizing the ruler and shortening the
vertical distance between him and his subjects was also at work. In this complex
repetitive interplay of image, rhetoric, and practice, a key factor in the creation of a
modern public space, Ottoman subjects developed and reinforced new, more abstract ties
of allegiance and experiences of groupness, both real and imagined. The chapter
illustrated this phenomenon by dwelling on the case of the Bulgars, which is by no means
unique, and the changing lyrics of their songs of praise and prayer for the sultan. It
demonstrated in minute detail the ever so subtle stages of transformation of the notion of
a common Ottoman fatherland, envisioned by the center on the eve of the 1846 tour, into,
in this case, a notion of a common Bulgar motherland, with its attendant images of
personification, victimization, and unification vis-à-vis a negative ‘other.’ This
transformation, the byproduct of a deliberate project of mental and spiritual centralization
around the figure of the sultan, signaled a paradigm shift. This chapter revealed its
opening phase; the next one completes the task. Chapter III culminates in an examination
of the apogee of Bulgar enthusiasm for the sultan in the mid-1860s and the growing
disparity between Bulgar attachments to the ruler, on the one hand, and the macrocommunity, on the other, in the late 1860s and the early 1870s.
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Chapter Three. Further Stimuli for and Patterns of Millet Accentuation and
Differentiation: The Reign of Abdülaziz (1861-1876)

I.

Introduction.

As stated earlier, this chapter will complete the analysis of intended and
unintended modernizing effects of the discourse of reform, in tandem with the older
policy of modern ruler visibility, on the public (esp. non-Muslim) mind, observable from
the peculiar vantage point of royal public ceremony. These effects include the process of
naming (oneself and ‘the other’), motifs of sacred and secular time and space, evolving
notions of a social pact and social (organic and familial) metaphors, innovative concepts
of necessity and duty, as well as the importance of group unity and loyalty. In their
totality, these effects contain the essence of a novel, modernizing project, especially in
the sense of connecting and familiarizing the people (ruled) with the center (ruler), and
establishing a legitimate sphere for mutually beneficial symbolic interaction between the
two, both on the individual and the group level. In this particular period, under the guise
of commemorating the ruler, the celebrations provided even more fertile ground for the
expression of communal interests and the advancement of inter-communal rivalries
leading to gradual group mobilization and resultant hardening of previously porous group
boundaries. In the end, all of these effects inscribed the fields of modern public space
and modern politics in the Ottoman Empire, which the celebrations had forged. In the
reign of Abdülaziz, these effects began to be appropriated, at an accelerating rate, for a
newly realized ethnonational mental universe, which rather than unite, did indeed
splinter, first the imperial public, and then, with a certain, irreducible measure of
historical contingency, the empire itself.
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II.

The accession of Abdülaziz in the Provinces and the Capital.

On June 14/26, 1861 Abdülmecid passed away and his brother Abdülaziz rose to
the Ottoman throne. The accession of Abdülaziz was celebrated on an unprecedented
scale both in the capital and across the empire’s far-flung provinces. A closer look at
some of these celebrations, detailed in archival reports and on the pages of period
newspapers, shows a remarkable degree of continuity from the previous reign. What is
more intriguing and significant is the even higher level of communal engagement in a
ceremony which was more complex and with a correspondingly higher degree of
organization and coordination involved than ever. Here is an example from Sivas, a midsized town in east-central Anatolia where “a welcoming ceremony and stipulations of
honor and respect (merasimi-i istiqbal ve şerayit-i ta’zim ve ibcal),” occasioned by the
accession news, took place. It drew various groups of schoolchildren, both Muslim and
Christian, along with their teachers, to a vast open plane outside of town, called Qabaq
Square.1 The multitude gathered there included everyone from commoners to regional
notables, council members and district heads. Armenian bishops and monks as well as
millet notables (mu’teberan-i millet) and elders could also be seen in the crowd.2 In
addition, mounted police, regular imperial troops and a music band were also present.
The ceremony commenced with much pomp at a carefully chosen auspicious time
and with the district governor (mutasarrıf) at the head. A seat of honor (kürsi) was
1

See A.MKT.UM. 484/63, dated July 16, 1861.

2

One of the peculiar features of this sultan’s reign was the common use, from its very outset, of
the term ‘millet’ (a community of co-religionists) and ‘millet’-based phraseology, such as “for state and
community (din ü devlet içun).” In all likelihood, this novel implementation was a natural consequence of
communal processes discussed in the previous chapter. It seems to have merely acknowledged what was
by this time fast becoming a social reality.
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placed before numerous pitched tents. Above it, the substitute judge (naib efendi),
standing up, read, “in perfect observance of custom (kemal-i adab ile)” the sublime
decree announcing the new accession. The empty seat of honor probably stood for the
absent sultan. As Douglas Brookes has shown, according to Turkic royal mythology, the
throne signified power by way of distinguishing the one sitting on it in a group setting in
which everyone else stood up.3 So this ceremonial element, the only one of its kind I
have so far identified, may point to a higher degree of abstraction in the provincials’
experience of the ruler. In this scheme of events, a simple seat of honor would be enough
for everyone’s imagination to re-create a higher, hypothetical scene in the presence of the
monarch and thus establish a temporary, but vivid connection to the center of power.
Here is an account of the reaction this ceremony elicited from the local Muslim
spiritual leadership:

Present there and listening, with delight and just pride, the eminent ulema and exalted dervishes,
on behalf of the esteemed sheikhs, with conviction and sincerity of heart, God’s omnipotence as
the exalted site of acceptance (of prayers) by the divine consummate greatness, performed a prayer
for the enduring everlasting continuation of the days of life and might of His Majesty the Padishah
…

This passage highlights some continuities between the two reigns in the rhetoric of power
and the acts of popular appeal for divine intercession in its name. About twenty years
after Abdülmecid’s accession and Mikhal Sturdza’s letters, two of the terms of emotional
bonding to the ruler remained the same – ‘sincerity of heart (ikhlas)’ and ‘conviction
(sıdq).’ So did the abstract visualization of “an exalted site of acceptance (of prayers)
3

See Douglas Brookes. “Of Swords and Tombs: Symbolism in the Ottoman Accession Ritual”,
Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, vol. 17, No 2, (Fall 1993), p. 10.
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[berdaşte icabetgah].” Moreover, these terms remained constant irrespective of the
subject-supplicant’s age or religious affiliation. In 1861 Sivas, the Muslim and Christian
schoolchildren had the same ‘sincerity of heart (khulus el-qalb)’ and raised their ‘Amen
(amin)’ to ‘God’s site of acceptance (of prayers) [icabetgah-i khüda].’4 As before, the
object of these popular manifestations of devotion to the ruler was ‘the sublime heart’s
desire (dilkhah–i ali).’5
One of the most obvious novelties, compared to Abdülmecid’s reign, was the
public’s compliance with higher standards of discipline and order in 1861. Not only were
the classes of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects arranged in lines, but public criers
(münadiler), dispersed among them, directed the waves of popular acclamation. In
recognition of the emotional sublimity of this sight, the report’s author compared the
crowds to “the surge of the Assyrian sea (mevc-i derya-i asuri).” This grand-spatial
metaphor also seems to be a novel usage. More remarkable still is the fact that it is
centered on the people, not the ruler or the dynasty. What this metaphor conveys is a
new found wonder at the power to assemble and control the crowds, the power of a
modern state. This power was further manifest, in a military review of the imperial
troops and the music band, which coincided with “a great prayer of ‘Long Live the
Sultan’ (büyük büyük padişahım çok yaşa duası).” Against the background of this
sequence of well-choreographed and well-timed ceremonial motions, the themes of unity
and totality, which first surfaced in Abdülmecid’s latter years, only become more

4

A.MKT.UM. 484/63.

5

Ibid.
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pronounced. The Sivas report emphasized unity in at least two ways. First, it stressed
the synchronous recitation of the prayer for the sultan by adults and children alike,
irrespective of faith. The former did so “from one mouth (bir agızdan),” the latter – “in
one voice (yekzeban).” Second, the report also emphasized the strength of the crowds’
chant. Once again, both adults and children acted alike. As the former uttered the prayer
“with a loud voice (avaz-i belend ile),” so the latter produced their “reverberating Amen
(zemzeme amini).” When everyone present had performed “the obligation of gratitude
(vecibe-i teşekkuri),” all returned to their quarters. That night the candle illuminations
were limited to the imperial barracks and the government building only. This deliberate
separation was probably intended to elevate the status of the military and civilian
administrations as the two main pillars of the Ottoman state. For the following three days
and nights, the entire population of Sivas partook of the candle illuminations. The exact
manner in which the report’s author conveyed the sense of everyone’s involvement is
worth pointing out – “Muslims and non-Muslims, and all the rich and poor, and the other
classes (müslim ve re’aya ve kaffe-i bay u geda ve esnaf-i saire).” Despite the earlier
usage of ‘millet’ with reference to non-Muslims, here the author reverted to the
traditional word for ‘non-Muslims’ – ‘re’aya.’ Quite likely, both were in public use at
this time, perhaps interchangeably. What is also interesting is that this phrase describing
the local Ottoman subjecthood, for the first time totalizes it based on class. Further
analysis of ceremonial settings dating from this period will shed light on the significance
of this novelty.
Apparently, accession celebrations across the Dardanelles, in Rumelia, were no
less impressive. The extant descriptions create the impression of a nascent
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standardization of protocol. For example, a report from Samakov (Samokov in presentday Bulgaria) confirms the enforcement of three-day popular illuminations (only without
setting military and civilian institutions apart).6 A report from Sofya (Sofia in presentday Bulgaria) shows that a public crier (glashatay) announced the accession news there,
thus, drawing all communities – Muslims, Bulgars and Jews – to the main square in town
for the reading of the imperial decree.7 In Sofya, as in Sivas, schoolchildren from all
communities “cried out vociferously (vyikaha gromoglasno)” their ‘Amen’ for the sultan.
In both of these locales, the imperial troops were present and the military bands played.
Garrison cannons across major towns of the empire invariably roared their twenty-onegun salutes. Provincial correspondents of Bulgar newspapers also reflected the emotional
sublimity, felt by their fellow townsmen in similar ways. Compare the following two
excerpts from Sofya and Tırnova reports, respectively:

Bulgar Brothers! Hereby commences an even brighter epoch for the future (budnina) of our people
(narod), because our new tsar-father … will turn his fatherly eye to our dear little kin (rodets) as
well … and will condescend to pour his sublime mercy over us, Bulgars …8

and
Dear Mr. Editor, I cannot describe to you the feeling (chuvstvovanieto) of the gathered people
(narod). It was a true exultation (edno tselo torzhestvo).9

6

Tsarigr. Vestnik, XI, 28, 08/20.07.1861.

7

Dunavski Lebed [The Danubian Swan], I, 40, 04/16.07.1861. Dunavski Lebed was a weekly
newspaper published in Belgrade in both Bulgar and French from 1860 to 1861. Its chief editor, Georgi
Rakovski (1821-1867), was a Bulgar radical thinker and revolutionary.
8

Ibid.

9

Bulgaria, III, 7, 12/24.07.1861.
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These heartfelt addresses clearly inherit many long-standing elements of the
Abdülmecidian discourse of power – the tsarist title, the metaphors of light and
fatherhood, the images of a visual exchange between ruler and ruled (“his fatherly eye”)
and a sultanic outpour of mercy onto the Bulgars. In addition, they absorb some much
more recent innovations, such as the identification of a communal Bulgar ‘feeling’ and
‘brotherhood.’ As a result, these addresses point towards a new conceptual stage. The
ever more frequent transplantation of terms, such as ‘kin (rod)’ and ‘people (narod),’
which until recently only occurred locally, onto an imaginary macro canvass of
Bulgarness, signals the rise of a putative blood connection as the basis for an abstract
macro belonging. Even more fascinating is the practice, evident in the first passage, of
placing one’s imagined macro community within a temporal continuum, which is
sanctified. Unlike the common Bulgar word for ‘future (budeshte),’ the word ‘budnina’
is tinged with a solemn poignancy. It carries the notion of a fateful unfolding and would
best be rendered in English as “times to come.” The use of the word ‘epoch (epoha)’
with its legendary connotations lends further support to such speculations.
Beyond the increasingly standardized protocol and the rhetorical accretions, there
is still room for local variation and improvisation. In Samakov, uninhibited popular
celebrations dominated the scene: “Everywhere bagpipes, rebecs (kemencheta), songs
played, at every bazaar [people] danced the horo.”10 In Tırnova, on the other hand, the
news of Abdülmecid’s death and Abdülaziz’s accession led the Bulgars to “pay their last
respects to their late Tsar and protector.”11 That same day all shops and other

10

Tsarigr. Vestnik, XI, 28, 08/20.07.1861. Horo is a popular Bulgar folk dance.

11

Bulgaria, III, 7, 24.07.1861.
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commercial establishments closed in remembrance of the deceased sultan. In the
evening, the town churches’ clappers12 sounded as they would for a funeral. The
following morning, a special dual, commemorative-cum-congratulatory service was held
in the town church “The Holy Mother of God (Sveta Bogoroditsa)”. The church wardens
along with the entire clergy led holy services. After the Gospel, they announced in a
short speech the reason for this “extraordinary holiday (izvunreden praznik).”
Afterwards, a teacher (I. Shivarov) delivered a speech to the congregation, laced with
startling Christian eschatological motifs:

…let us offer warm prayers to the almighty for the pacification (upokoenie) of the soul of our
venerably passed (blazhenopochivsh) Autocrat in the dwellings of the righteous (zhilishtata na
pravednite), in eternal and unending bliss and let us say: May God pacify [his soul] in the
Tsardom of Heaven (Tsarstvo nebesi).

This is the most remarkable syncretic inclusion of the sultan, a Muslim ruler, into the
moral universe of his devout Bulgar Christian subjects.13 The solemnity of this act is
further underscored by the predominant use of Old Church Slavonic, the sacred language
of Orthodox liturgy. In addition to the higher-register language of this passage, towards
the end, the speech encourages the congregation to pray “so that God may safeguard him
[the sultan] as the apple of one’s eye (yako zenitsu oka).” This is yet another peculiar
reference signifying an intimate embrace of the ruler. The most impressive aspect of the

12

A clapper is a wooden plank or a metal plate, used in lieu of a church bell.

13

Interestingly, the speech commences with the address form – “devout Bulgar brothers
(blagochestivi bratya Bulgari).”
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above passage, however, is the symbolic action it relates – the sultan’s entrance into
Heaven as if he were a veritable Christian tsar.
The latter part of the teacher’s speech turned the audience’s attention to the
accession of Abdülaziz. Shivarov encouraged his fellow townsmen to turn to the new
sultan “unanimously [lit. ‘with one soul’] and with love (edinodushno i s lyubov).” This
expression combined the theme of unity with the trope of love. The latter was instantly
transferred to the new reign and registered as a natural expectation from the new ruler.
Shivarov also invited his listeners to “pin their hopes” on the new ruler “by showing most
clearly [their] zeal (revnost) and devotion to his throne.” What had begun as zeal to
popularize the will of the ruler in 1845 then became zeal for education, pronounced
throughout Abdülmecid’s reign and captured in an 1859 song. Here, in 1861, it was
undergoing another transformation into zeal for the Ottoman state.
The spontaneous Bulgar Christian ceremony of remembrance of the past sultan
and celebration of the new one culminated in a performance of “the song for many years
of the new Tsar Sultan Abdul Aziz” by schoolchildren, lined up on both sides of the
congregation, joined by the priests from the altar. As the report’s author put it, the
Bulgar people did this “out of their own volition, as grateful sons to their father, as
faithful subjects of the state.” As he wrote this, he pointed in passing, not without
satisfaction, that the Bulgars did all this, without having among their ranks a certain
Grigor, “the Phanariot hornet.” This spiteful remark hints at a major theme underwriting
most, if not all of these Bulgar celebrations – the theme of the communal ‘negative
other,’ the Hellenized Rum. It was present in the Sofya report and especially in reports of
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the Bulgar celebration in the imperial capital, where the largest and most vocal Bulgar
community resided.
In Istanbul, the Bulgars took advantage of their church’s favorable location in the
Balat quarter on the Golden Horn. So for the day of Abdülaziz’s sword girding they
prepared a special ceremony to honor the sultan on his passage to Eyüp, further up the
Golden Horn where the investiture ceremony traditionally took place. The church
wardens erected two columns, draped in white cloth, connected by an iron semi-circle on
top, decked with flowers and greenery. These columns supported three marble slates
with Ottoman writing in gold, which read: “May Our Sultan Abdülaziz Live for a
Thousand years!”14 In the shadow of this decorative arch stood the Bulgar clergy in their
Sunday’s best. Lined up on both sides were schoolchildren dressed in white, along with
acolytes. The ceremonial roar of the cannons, announcing Abdülaziz’s departure for
Eyüp, drew the attention of the numerous crowds gathered on the church grounds. Five
minutes later, the sultan was greeted by the navy personnel from the imperial fleet
stationed on the Golden Horn. When the sultan approached the Bulgar church, the
acolytes and the students commenced a song, specially composed for the occasion,
accompanied by the crowds’ loud cheering. While passing, the sultan’s attention was
drawn by this “popular ceremony (narodna tseremoniya),” and he returned the greeting
by ordering his thirteen rowers to hoist momentarily their oars up in the air. The Bulgar
clergy bowed and the people cried out in the midst of the imperial batteries’ continuing
thunderous salvos.
14

“Sultan Abdülaziz Efendimiz yaşa yaşa binler yaşa,” Dunavski Lebed, I, 41, 11/23.07.1861. See
also Tsarigr. Vestnik, XI, 26, 24.06/06.07.1861 and Blugarski Knizhitsi [Bulgar Booklets], IV, 5, June
1861.
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This ceremonial description, distilled from several extant sources, is centered on
an article from the Danubian Swan. Its author, Yosif Daynelov15 interspersed his
narrative with snapshots of the collective communal excitement at the opportunity to
engage, however fleetingly, with the ruler. These range in focus, intensity and scope. In
terms of focus, organic metonymies, such as ‘Bulgar heart(s)’ (4) and ‘Bulgar soul’ (2)
dominate the article. In terms of intensity, one notices the progression from ‘Bulgar
feeling’ (1) to ‘Bulgar joy’ (1) to ‘Bulgar fervor (plamennost)’ (1). In terms of scope, the
gamut runs from ‘extreme Bulgar esteem (pochitanie) for the sultan’ (1) to ‘the wide
horizon of Bulgarness (bulgarshtina)’ (1). In all, there are a total of eighteen such
markers, where none or few appeared in pieces of similar content just a decade earlier.
Scattered throughout the text, are signs of the Bulgars’ emergent communal agenda:

On this important day our people of the one/same kin (ednorodtsi) wished to distinguish
themselves as always by their great devotion to the throne … This [the church’s location] the
Bulgars considered a good fortune for the expression, from close quarters, of their feelings for
their tsar … This very charming decoration was perfect in its execution, and unique in its
existence, since only the Bulgar people resorted to such a beautiful expression of their love for
their master … And let’s be glad that we could pour our devotion before the eyes of our very own
Sultan, and at the same time hope that H.I.M. will not tolerate at all the oppression and
mistreatment of the Bulgar people.

The term ‘ednorodtsi,’ centered on the blood connection, quite common in the private
correspondence of Bulgar intellectuals, captures the communal spirit in a much more
credible fashion here.16 However, this passage goes beyond a single term and provides

15

Yosif Daynelov (1839-1891) was a Bulgar merchant, journalist, and public intellectual.
Although closely associated with Rakovski, for whose “Danubian Swan” he was correspondent, when it
came to the advancement of Bulgar affairs, Daynelov generally adhered to a moderate political line. Later,
he served as a district judge in Bulgaria.
16

On the term’s use among Bulgar intellectuals, see Darin Stephanov “Bulgar Milleti Nedir?
[What is a Bulgar Community of Co-Religionists?] Syncretic Forms of Belonging in Mid-Nineteenth-
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some of the texture of the communal experience as a whole. It allows a rare glimpse into
the mechanism which transformed a sultanic ceremonial occasion into an occasion for
communal self-celebration. Finally, this passage also conveys the workings of
embryonic concepts, which would soon become entrenched as permanent features of the
ethnonational mental universe – the group’s competitive spirit, leading to a sense of
superiority and uniqueness vis-à-vis other groups, and, in a parallel line of thought, the
group’s perception of its own victimization, used as a rallying point. Not surprisingly,
the article’s very next sentence suggests that the Bulgar representatives in Istanbul should
act with “patriotic audacity (patrioticheska derzost).” This is the earliest appearance of
this West-imported word I have come across in a ceremonial setting. A quick look at the
other accounts of the Bulgar celebration in Istanbul reveals that the communal agenda,
analyzed above, was not a mere figment of this particular author’s imagination. One of
them even went a step further and added an element of sacrality by characterizing the
communal celebration as a “sign of the Bulgar awe [lit. ‘awe of God (bogogovenie)’] of
the throne.”17 In addition to the impulsive, short-run effects of ceremonial events
themselves, such strong terms were also made possible by the syncretic long-term thread,
traced in the last two chapters. If the sultan had become ‘tsar’ in the mid-1840s,
gradually acquiring proper Christian (mental, not necessarily real) regalia, as explained
earlier, the rise of Abdülaziz to power in 1861 created perfect conditions for the further
Century Istanbul” in Richard Wittmann and Christoph Herzog (Eds.) ’Istanbul – ‘Kushta’ –
‘Constantinople:’ Diversity of Identities and Personal Narratives in the Ottoman Capital (1830-1900),
Brill, 2011.

.
17

See the article in Bulgarski Knizhitsi, IV, 5, June 1861. Blugarski Knizhitsi was “a journal of
the Bulgar letters (spisanie na Blugarskata knizhnina),” published in Istanbul by Dr. Dimitur Mutev (18181864) from 1858 to 1862.
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enhancement of his portrait in the minds of his Bulgar subjects. In consequence, the
Bulgar press presented his accession as an act of “becoming tsar (vutsariavanie)” and the
Ottoman Muslim investiture ceremony of sword girding as its universal Christian
counterpart, a coronation (koroniasvanie; koronovanie).18 Thus far the practice does not
seem so unusual, given that many Western travelers depicted the sword girding,
otherwise utterly incomprehensible to audiences back home, in identical ways. What is
highly unusual, however, is the creative reconstruction of the extremely private sword
girding ceremony, which appeared in a different issue of the Swan: “… [Sultan
Abdülaziz] who was even solemnly crowned [lit. “married to tsardom”] … at the Eyup
Mosque, in this case girding the sword of Osman, and with the flag of the Prophet in his
left hand swore on the Qu’ran, which was offered him by the Sheyhulislam.19 This
fascinating syncretic excerpt clearly does not describe truthfully what transpired behind
closed doors in Eyüp.20 Abdülaziz did not gird the sword of Osman, but caliph Umar’s;
he did not hold the flag of the Prophet in his left hand, and there was no transaction
between him and the Şeyhülislam, involving the Qu’ran. What the passage successfully
does is explain the sacred procedure to which a mere handful of top-echelon Ottoman
statesmen were privy to a loyal Christian audience eager to know about it, using a
reference frame familiar to them.21 Ironically, this reference frame has contemporary

18

See Dunavski Lebed, I, 41, 11/23.07.1861. See also Bulgarski Knizhitsi, IV, 4, yuni 1861.

19

Dunavski Lebed, I, 39, 27.06./09.07.1861.

20

For some details of the actual proceedings, see Hakan Karateke. Padişahım Çok Yaşa [Long
Live the Sultan!], Istanbul, 2004, p. 70.
21

On the highly restricted access to this ceremony, see Karateke, p. 60.
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Russian tsarist overtones. “A marriage to tsardom (venchanie na tsarstvo),” a concept
entirely absent from the Ottoman symbolic system, was clearly imported from Alexander
II’s coronation in Russia five years earlier, which was copiously reflected in the Bulgar
press as well.22 As for the flag of the Prophet and the Qu’ran, their symbolic function in
this description of an investiture ceremony is identical to that of a flag of a sovereign
Christian state and the Bible. This creative ‘Ottomanization’ of an essentially Western
ritual of public swearing an oath of office still in use today adds new brush strokes to the
picture of changing popular (in this case, non-Muslim) perceptions of central Ottoman
authority pointing to a more informed, expectant public.

III.

The Standardization of Annual Royal Accession and Birthday
Celebrations.

Several months into the new sultan’s reign, the decision to celebrate the royal
accession day and royal birthday on a regular basis as public holidays was announced.23
According to Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, a leading late Ottoman statesman and historian, this
was Fuad Pasha’s decision.24 The goal was to gain ceremonial reciprocity with the West

22
Some Bulgars witnessed the event in Moscow. At least one, Nayden Gerov, even composed an
ode to the Emperor on this occasion. For a coronation description in the Bulgar press, see Tsarigr. Vestnik,
VI, 295, 22.09/04.10.1856.

23

There are scores of archival reports documenting this step at the Turkish Prime Minister’s
Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. For a small sample, see A.MKT.UM 516/61, A.MKT.UM. 521/77, and
A.MKT.UM. 574/85.
24

Proteges of the famous reformer Mustafa Reshid Pasha (1800-1858), Fuad Pasha (1814-1869)
and Ali Pasha (1815-1871), who alternated between the posts of Foreign Minister and Grand Vizier,
dominated Ottoman decision making during the first decade of Abdülaziz’s reign.
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in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire’s inclusion into the Concert of Europe.25 As
Cevdet pointed out, this goal had heretofore eluded the Ottomans, since theirs were
religious holidays.26 What this meant was a difference in calendars – the Western
holidays were fixed to particular solar dates whereas the Ottoman lunar-calendar dates
had solar equivalents which were shifting from year to year, thus making it impossible
for Westerners to relate to. As explained earlier, despite Mahmud II’s best efforts to
implement the solar calendar from the outset of Ottoman annual royal accession and
birthday celebrations in 1836, the undertaking remained a short-lived experiment. For
reasons, which are not entirely clear, Abdülmecid did not achieve this, either. Domestic
resistance must have been strong, since even in 1861, with the lasting regularization of
these holidays, the shift was not complete – it affected the accession, but not the royal
birthday, which continued to be celebrated in the Muslim (lunar) calendar.
Over the course of the next few years, the annual sultanic celebrations grew,
though their timing remained inconsistent. In Halep (Aleppo), the first accession
anniversary was celebrated in much the same way as the accession itself had been in
Sivas.27 The resident troops were drawn at the Imperial Barracks Square to a mixed
crowd of about four or five thousand Muslims and Christians, the standard chant “Long
Live the Sultan” echoed three times, amongst prayers, “in one voice (bir ağızdan)” and

25

This was accomplished with the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the Crimean War (18531856). In this war, the Ottomans sided with England and France against Russia, and emerged victorious.
26

For Ahmet Cevdet’s argument, see his Maruzat, Yusuf Halaçoğlu (Ed.), Istanbul, 1980, p. 41.
For an influential interpretation of it, see Selim Deringil, Well-Protected Domains, London, 1998, p. 172.
27

See A.MKT.UM. 573/88.
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military music. Afterwards, there were mass-scale town decorations and illuminations
for days on end, as well as twenty-one-cannon salvos five times a day. However, these
particular festivities commenced on the Muslim calendar date (17.Zilhicce.1278), which
corresponded to June 3 (O.S.), instead of June 14 (O.S.), the solar date of the accession a
year earlier. Still, this spectacle unfolded before the eyes of most consuls of friendly
states, residing in Halep, an act which clearly reflected its foreign-policy objectives as
well. Regarding the locals, the announcement of “the outward sumptuous marks of
public joy (sürur-i umumiyenin asar-i zahire ve fakhiresini)” was an imperative of the
first order. Based on adaptive expectations from year to year, a preoccupation of this
kind became a major factor driving the cult of personality, as the analysis of subsequent
celebrations will demonstrate.
A second reason for the inconsistent timing of sultanic celebrations had Christian,
not Muslim considerations at its heart, as the 1863 accession festivities in Tırnova
demonstrate.28 In this town, a public crier (telalin) announced on Wed., June 12 (O.S.)
that the accession celebrations would be held on Sunday, June 16 (O.S.). Apparently,
this choice was not based on the Muslim calendar date for that year (June 4), as it had
been in Halep the previous year. Instead, it seems that the solar date (June 14, O.S.) was
pushed back two days so the “dunanma [sic] (‘a public merrymaking with fireworks’)”29
could fall on a Sunday, by far the most significant day in the Christian liturgical week.
This accommodating gesture from the Ottoman authorities to the local Christians is an
28

See Suvetnik [Adviser], I, 15, 1/13.07.1863. This was a weekly Bulgar newspaper published in
Istanbul from 1863 to 1865. Its editors were Todor Burmov and Nikola Mihaylovski. Mihaylovski (18181892) was a lawyer and man of letters. After 1878, he served as the Vice Chairman of the State Council.
29

This definition is based on the entry for donanma in perhaps the most comprehensive
contemporary Bulgarian dictionary, authored by Nayden Gerov. See Nayden Gerov, Rechnik na
Blugarskiy Yazyik [A Dictionary of the Bulgarian Language], Part I, Plovdiv, 1895, p. 334.
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early example of what I call cross-dating – later a widespread practice during the reign of
Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909).30 In this way, the Orthodox Christian Bulgars could
more readily embrace the annual sultanic holiday and its attendant spectacle. Perhaps as
a balancing countermeasure, the first cannon salvos that Sunday roared during the
Muslim morning prayer (sabah namazı).
After the completion of church services, the town notables, along with the
teachers and students from all the schools in town, paid the head district official
(kaymakam) Ali Bey a visit at his summer residence (köşk) on the outskirts of town
where they greeted him on the occasion of the royal accession. The students, lined up
outside, said “their habitual prayer (obyuchnata si molitva).” Afterwards, one of them
recited a poem of praise in Ottoman, followed by the performance (in Bulgar) of “the
song for many years [mnogoletstvenata pesen] for the sultan, the tsar’s ministers
Vyukyulya-Efendilerimis, and, finally H.H., the Kaymakam of Tırnova.”
Several aspects of this ceremony merit further attention. First, in
contradistinction to the above-mentioned example from 1851 Razgrad on the occasion of
Abdülmecid’s birthday (see Ch. II), in 1863 Tırnova, it was the students who visited the
local representative of central Ottoman power to pay their proper homage on the occasion
of Abdülaziz’s accession anniversary. Second, whereas in 1851 Razgrad, several local
dignitaries had visited one school, in Tırnova twelve years later, all teachers and students
visited one local dignitary, the kaymakam. Third, when they sang and prayed, the

30

Later cross-dating refers to the act of combining one ceremonial occasion (such as the
inauguration of a building) with another (such as the royal accession anniversary) on the same day for an
accumulated effect on the public mind. This was a major strategy for autocratic legitimation in many late
empires. For a panoply of such examples, see Chapter IV.
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students in Tırnova did so not only for the monarch, but also for his ministers, coming
finally down to the head district official, the local embodiment of central authority.31
Anagnostopoulou and Kappler mention a similar practice by the Hellene-minded Rum on
the Aegean island of Midilli (Mytilene) during the reign of Abdülaziz. In that case, one
can actually see how the lyrics changed in accordance with the rank of the dignitary
being feted.32 Such songs were performed by students from all communities in their
languages as well as in Ottoman, and their occasions only multiplied. In addition to the
royal accession and birthday anniversaries, they included school exam ceremonies, even
spontaneous, wholly improvised events. Thus, in September of the same year of 1863,
Hellene-minded Rum poets organized a public reading by schoolchildren in honor of the
sultan in Yanya (Ioannina in present-day Greece). The act prompted the Muslim and
Jewish communities in town to follow suit. Apart from Ottoman, the Jewish
schoolchildren sang not in Ladino, the everyday language, but in Hebrew, the higherregister language of prayers and eulogies. Apart from ‘sultan,’ the children hailed
Abdülaziz as their “king (melech).”33
This gradual process of vertical extension of the number of feted celebrities in a
decreasing formal ranking order but in an increasing order of familiarity from the local
perspective illustrates the workings of two opposite processes. On the one hand, it shows
31

As the text shows, there was even a term for this sequence of separate personalized acts of well
wishing by the community, an indication that this was a stable practice. It was called ‘mnogoletstvuvanie
(“a wishing for many years”).’
32

See Anagnostopoulou/Kappler, pp. 66-67.

33

See A.MKT.MHM. 280/86. The document was dated Sept. 24, so far a date of no particular
verifiable significance. I am thankful to Prof. Julia Cohen for looking into the Hebrew texts for me as well
as her illuminating remarks.
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a higher degree of cultural penetration and indoctrination of provincial populations, and
their corresponding activation along lines, acceptable to the center. Simultaneously,
however, such ceremonies create a host of novel opportunities for intra- and intercommunal interaction, (re-)drawing boundaries and clarifying the nature and essence of
group belonging in the process. In this regard, the speech, delivered by one of the
younger students at the 1863 Tırnova festivities provides a fascinating, one-of-a-kind
example, worth quoting at length:

We cannot remain silent about the unremitting labors of H.E. our good-natured Qaymakam. Since
setting foot in our town, he has not ceased caring, day and night, for the observance of the
righteous tsarist laws. And as [a] peace-loving [person] he always declares peace, love and accord
across the district, always labors for the common tranquility of the subdistrict and ponders
everything which is good for our town. Apart from all these [things], H.E., as [a] virtuous
[person] wished to leave behind in our region an eternal trace and an immortal name for himself
with the repair of the roads and the renewal of the town discussions about the cleanliness of the
streets and other such [matters]. Once upon a time His late Deceased Father Suleyman Pasha left
an unforgettable name for himself, through his good works regarding the regional fountains. So
did too H.E. Kaymakam Bey Efendi, who among his other good works, in this year’s dearth of
water in our town, has already taken good measures for the renewal of his father’s abovementioned good works. We therefore hope that our town will receive from H.E. many other acts
of goodness as well for as long as it is the district’s fortune that he should stay here ...

This text demonstrates the high degree of sophistication with which one Bulgar
community played the center at its own game in 1863. It shows how skillfully the frame
of the royal occasion could be used to stretch the canvas of local objectives (street
cleaning, road improvement, water supply, etc.). The method employed is even more
impressive. A closer look reveals that in the symbolic space, projected by this speech,
Tırnova is a microcosm of the empire and the qaymakam has taken over core sultanic
qualities. He labors “night and day.”34 He is good natured, peace loving and virtuous.35
34

Cf. the 1845 ferman (Ch. II). Eighteen years later this metaphor of the constancy of care
survives and ruler proxies fully share it.
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So was, it turns out, his late father. In a bizarre sense, the temporal continuum of the
ruler’s dynasty has thus effectively shrunk to a span of barely two lifetimes – the
kaymakam’s and his father’s. Apart from a vague passing reference to “the righteous
tsarist laws,” the present sultan himself is entirely absent from this long excerpt. This is
not nationalism yet. There are no Bulgar references, apart from two technical ones,
referring to the tongue in which the majority of ceremonies were performed. The
communal references are ‘townsmen (grazhdani),’ ‘(Ottoman) Turkish-speaking
Muslims (turtsi)’36 and ‘Christians (hristiyani).’ As in Sivas two years earlier, the 1863
Tırnova text totalizes the local population’s involvement in the imperial holiday, based
not only on age (“old and young”) but also on class (“from the first to the last”).
The type and content of celebratory proceedings, analyzed above were not unique
to Tırnova. The Ottoman Archives in Istanbul hold a rare cache of song and prayer texts,
penned by a provincial Bulgar teacher by the name of Toma M. Birovski, which sheds
light on similar activities in the towns of Vidin and Lom (in present-day Bulgaria) on the
occasion of the sultan’s birthday that same year of 1863.37 As in Tırnova, the students of
Lom and Vidin paid a visit to the local authorities, this time at the government building
35

This set is Abdülmecid’s legacy. See Ch. II in its entirety.

36

Even though the correct literal translation is “Turks,” it has the potential to create a serious
misunderstanding today. When this article was written, this marker, turtsi, was chosen for its loose religiocultural content in the same way ‘Bulgar’ was deployed, as explained in the previous chapter. It referred to
Ottoman Muslims, whose mother tongue was Ottoman Turkish. This marker made no reference to an
ethnonational group, with a claim to its own state of Turkey, as it does today. In order to forestall the
process (conscious or not) of retroactive nationaliziation in the mind of the reader, and thus avoid a major
historical inaccuracy, I have chosen to render turtsi as ‘(Ottoman) Turkish speaking Muslims.’
37

See I.DH. 504/34313. In Vidin and Lom, festivities apparently followed the Muslim calendar
date of the sultan’s birthday (15.Şa’ban). The texts are dated 22.01.1863 (O.S.), i.e. on the eve of the
Sultan’s birthday of 15.Şa’ban.1279 = 23.01.1863 (O.S.) = 05.02.1863 (N.S.)
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(qonaq) in order to sing their songs and chant their prayers. As it turns out, their song of
praise to the ruler is an exact reproduction (with only the sultan’s name changed) of the
1860 Belchev text, analyzed in the previous chapter, itself a substantially revised version
of the 1859 Mnogoletstvie. This lineage demonstrates the wide scope of contemporary
sultanic song circulation and its lasting capacity to penetrate and shape public
consciousness at different levels. A quick look at the prayer text reveals continuity with
the symbolic headway made by the previous reign, as well as the appearance of further
metaphoric accretions. For example, the theme of education [“science” (3)] and
enlightenment [“the freedom of enlightenment” (2)] dominate the text and by themselves
justify the common call for prayer in the name of the ruler. Variations of the organic and
cosmic metaphors, as well as images of syncretic regalia and sultanic dominance over a
negative ‘other’ are all present. The analogy between the effect of the life-giving sun on
all “earthly products (zemleni proizvedeniya)” and the effect of “the imperial mercy and
compassion” on “the tranquility, prosperity and advancement of the sciences”
exemplifies the former. A reference to Abdülaziz’s “High Prosperous [lit. “subject to
God’s salvation (Bogospasaemyiy)] New Throne”38 and a wish for the sultan to be “an
eternal victor over his enemies” illustrate the latter. The students concluded their prayer
with a joyous triple chant of “Long Live the Sultan!”

38

These capitalizations are in accordance with the original.
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IV.

The Apogee of Bulgar Enthusiasm for the Sultan in the Mid-1860s
and the Gradual Shift towards a Centrality of the Own Group.

As the opportunities for symbolic ruler-ruled interaction multiplied in the mid1860s, the field of learning provided the stage for some of the most evocative expressions
of the changing social pact. A visit of the Ottoman Minister of Education, Edhem Pasha,
to Bulgar schools in Rusçuk (Ruse) in 1864, for example, prompted a teacher’s speech,
which contained the following segment worth quoting at length:

In requital for these tsarist acts of grace (tsarski milosti) what must we presently do? We must
sacrifice ourselves, spilling even the last drop of our blood in his name. Not because H. I. Maj.
will want this now from us, we must sacrifice our hearts and turn our thoughts to him, so we can
better recompense him! Let us show him both with thoughts, and with words, as well as actions
that we are his most faithful subjects attached to his throne. Let us hate (mrazim) everyone, who
may wish (poishte) to insult, with word and action the glory of our tsar! Let us prove with our
deep devotion that there is not [another] tsar so good for us on Earth. Let all of Bulgaria cry out:
Long live! Long live! Our people-loving (narodolyubiviya) tsar Sultan Abdul Azis [sic]! Let him
be glorified immensely [lit. “from the earth to the sky/heaven (nebeto)”]! Let his tsarist throne be
strong and invincible!39

Evidently, this passage, unmatched in its intensity by any of the texts so far analyzed,
employs many symbolic concepts initiated and/or elaborated at various points in time
over the course of the previous two decades. Earlier examples include the organic
metaphor of the heart, the grand-spatial metaphor (“from the earth to the sky/heaven”),
the trope of love (“people-loving”), the syncretic regalistic metonymy of power (“his
tsarist throne”) and the tsarist title itself. Others, such as the military motif (“strong and
invincible”), the inter-group competitiveness (“there is not [another] tsar so good for us
on Earth”) and the principles of totalization, personification and unification (“Let all of
Bulgaria cry”) are more recent developments. However, the most fascinating aspect of

39

See Suvetnik [Adviser], II, 24, 12/26.09.1864.
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this segment lies in the call for sacrifice in the name of the ruler. While by itself the call
is not new, the context of most extreme mobilization in which it is placed, is. Its building
blocks are several. First, the use of novel terms of obligation of the ruled to the ruler –
“requital (vuzdayanie)” and “recompense (vuzblagodarenie)” – seems to frame a highly
skewed relationship between the two parties. Second, a passing reference to “the tsarist
acts of grace”40 is hardly a matching counterweight for a popular self-sacrifice to the last
drop of blood. Third, in a step, reminiscent of the earlier analysis of the third song of
Yoannovich’s 1851 songbook,41 yet even more extreme, the call of popular duty to the
sultan transforms what would otherwise be irrational behavior into an acceptable norm,
thus creating a higher plane of activity (“Not because H. I. Maj. will want this now from
us, we must sacrifice our hearts …”). Fourth, this higher plane interacts for the first time
with the realm of thought (“turn our thoughts to him”; “both with thoughts, and with
words, as well as actions”). Fifth, this unprecedented state of popular euphoria
culminates in a bizarre depiction of a negative ‘other’ and a common call against him/her
– “Let us hate everyone, who may wish to insult…” Herein lies another novel paradox.
Even though this call addresses a hypothetical situation – the triggering cause (an insult
to the ruler) exists only in principle – the response (a popular hatred) is already under
way.

40

The speech’s preceding paragraphs speak of the high visit’s stimulating effects – a gift of
Ottoman books and a map of Europe to the Bulgar schools of Rusçuk as well as a monetary gift of 1,000
quruş. It also alludes to the admission, a few years earlier, of 10 Bulgar students to study in imperial
schools in Istanbul (a fact also corroborated by Stambolski, pp. 45-47).
41

See pp. 106-107 (“for the smallest need, summons all the strength”).

153

A close look at this passage leads to the surprising conclusion that it has more or
less laid out, albeit in disguise, the main coordinate axes of the ethnonational mindset.
The permanent (open-ended) state of popular agitation (“let us prove with our deep
devotion”) is certainly among them. So is the higher level of attempted symbolic
intervention into the lives of ordinary people and control of the popular psyche. The
image of the last drop of blood, which makes a first appearance here, is indicative of a
wider pattern of group emotional self-flagellation without a precedent in the local
tradition. It has long since become self-evident, a modern cliché. One need only switch
the focus of attention from the imperial monarch to the religio-cultural community, in
order to harness these newly realized energies for the cause of nationalism, as they are to
this very day.
As the duties to the ruler increased, so did the duties to the group in the mid1860s. A sifting though ceremonial descriptions of May 11 – the new Bulgar communal
holiday touched upon in the previous chapter – allows for a unique look at the
intersection of the two types of duties. References to “a popular duty (dolzhnost
narodna)” had appeared in the Bulgar periodical press since Abdülaziz’s accession in
1861.42 By 1866, there was already talk of “popular duties (narodni dluzhnosti)” and
accusations of “neglect (nemarenie)” thereof were being levied. In response to the latter,
according to an anonymous provincial correspondent of “Vremia [Time],”43 fellow

42

See Tsar. Vestnik, XI, 25, 16/29.06.1861. In fact, this reference was made on the same cover
page, which announced Abdülmecid’s death and Abdülaziz’s accession.
43

This was a Bulgar weekly newspaper, published in Istanbul by Todor Burmov from 1865 to

1867.
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Bulgar townsmen from Tatar-Pazarcık (the town of Pazardzhik in present-day Bulgaria)
put together their best May 11 celebration to date.44
The portraits of St. Cyril and St. Methodius were hung on a school wall. Church
services were held in their name as well as a holy ceremony of “blessing of the waters
(vodosvet)” at a specially erected stand bearing the saints’ icon in the middle of the local
school yard. The head teacher delivered a speech, which among other things, dispelled
the “deception (zabluzhdenie)” of some fellow townsmen that “only with the Greek
learning and the Greek language could people educate themselves and advance.” Two
(all-boy and all-girl) choirs performed songs which “delighted the devout
(blagochestivoto) and kin-loving (rodolyubivoto) heart.” The letter’s conclusion amounts
to a vehement diatribe against the Hellene-minded Rum. All the while, the anonymous
author maintained that the Bulgars would always remain “devoted to the teachings of the
orthodox Church and faithful subjects of the Sultan.”45 The event’s legitimacy in the
eyes of local Ottoman authorities was further assured by the very visible presence of a
number of symbols of monarch and state. First, a triumphal arch made of pine tree and
decorated with a golden crescent and star was erected in front of the school gate. Second,
a portrait of the sultan, painted by local artists (Stefan and Toma Antonov), and decked
with roses and other flowers, was hung on a wall. Third, the prayer-song “for our
merciful tsar and father the Sultan” was also performed following church services.
Protestations of subject loyalty notwithstanding, this letter contains discreet
indications that the center of popular attention was by this time beginning to shift from

44

See the letter, dated May 17/29, 1866, in Vremia, I, 41, 28.05./09.06.1866.
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Capitalizations are in accordance with the original.
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the monarch to the own group. The ‘heart,’ a symbol long monopolized by the sultantsar was starting to engage in “kin-loving (rodolyubie)” on a wider scale. The
townsmen’s solemn mood that day was indicated by a passing reference to their attire –
“dressed up as they would be on Easter.”46 Moreover, on the wall between the portraits
of the two brothers and Abdülaziz’s image, there was yet another picture – of the baptism
of tsar (and saint) Boris in Preslav.47 With the subtle inclusion into the ceremonial setting
of a medieval tsarist figure the Bulgars could claim as their own, a visual temporal
continuum was being established, which facilitated the advancement of communal
consciousness under the guise of a faith-based holiday.
Other May 11 celebratory accounts from the provinces provide additional details
for a more complex and credible picture of this process of transformation. A letter from
Kotel relates the communal excitement about the May 11 festivities in the following
terms: “As great as the desire for this popular ceremony (narodno turzhestvo) was, with
which the people (narod) burnt, the outcome was even more brilliant (blyaskav).”48 This
sentence reveals changes in other long-standing symbolic motifs. The capacity to ‘burn’
with ‘desire’ hitherto solely attributed to the sultan,49 is hereby given to “the people” and
directed towards a “popular ceremony.” In addition, light, another time honored
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Easter is by far the most significant feast in the Eastern Orthodox liturgical calendar.
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Tsar Boris I converted his subjects to Christianity in the year 863/4 C.E. in Preslav, the then
capital of the kingdom of Bulgaria.
48

This letter, dated May 11/23, 1866 was printed on the same page of Vremia as the Pazarcık
letter. See footnote 332.
49

See the previous chapter – p. 98, with respect to “peace and the good livelihood of his subjects,”
and p. 113, with respect to “the enlightenment of the peoples in all of His State.” Both references date from
1851.
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prerogative of monarch and dynasty, now emanates from this popular ceremony (“the
outcome was even more brilliant”).
In Kotel, May 11 festivities included a large procession of the saints’ icon from
the local church to the school, headed by clergy. The author twice noted the
unprecedented solemnity with which proceedings unfolded. As in Pazarcık, portraits of
the saints and the sultan were on display. Instead of the baptism scene, these were
accompanied by the provincial governor (Midhat Pasha)’s portrait and, notably, the
portraits of (unnamed) Bulgar Metropolitans. Still more remarkable is the fact that the
author chose to refer to the latter figures as “our people’s holy leaders (narodnite ni
sviashtennonachalnitsi).”50 The motif of ‘holiness’ in connection to the people is another
complete novelty for any ceremonial setting so far examined. At first sight, this usage
could be attributed to the peculiar nature of the spiritual realm invoked whenever clergy
were involved. It could therefore be easily dismissed as inconsequential. However,
another ‘holy’ reference, this time quite unambiguous, appears in yet another letter on the
same page of Vremia. Apparently, in Balçık (the town of Balchik in present-day
Bulgaria), due to an altercation with the Hellene-minded Rum, church services could not
be held in Old Church Slavonic on May 11. So the Bulgars stepped out, thereby
remaining without religious service “in this holy (sviat) and great (velik) [for all of them]
day.”51 The event prompted the indignant anonymous author to seek measures to
safeguard “the holy rights of the Bulgar population (sviashtennite pravdini na
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Unless specified otherwise, italics are my own.
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Here is another allusion, conscious or not, to Easter, which in Bulgar(ian) literally means “Great
Day (Velikden).”
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bulgarskoto naselenie).”52 The issue did not leave Vremya’s editor (Todor Burmov)
indifferent, either. He responded underneath by providing practical advice on “solving
the Bulgar question and doing right by the Bulgars (da sya reshi bulgarskiyat vupros i da
sya otdade pravoto na bulgarete).” As the case of the May 11 celebration in Izmir that
year shows, however, there was still room for local accommodation and traces of
syncretism of an inter-communal nature.53 According to another letter on the same page
of Vremia, on the request of the Bulgars living in that town, the Metropolitan of Izmir
and his deacon read prayers and sung chants in Old Church Slavonic, a language which
both knew a little, during services at the church of St. John.54 The Bulgars then treated
the Metropolitan to refreshments in a room set aside for the purpose before taking him to
the Bulgar all-girl school, where an antiphon (tropar)55 to “the Slavic apostles and
teachers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius,” was sung, along with “the song of H. I. M. the
Sultan and another one in Greek.” It seems that with the latter song, the Bulgars returned
the Metropolitan’s favor. That day not a single Bulgar shop opened for business. The
Bulgars were only too eager to explain to the genuinely curious members of other local
communities “this holiday unknown to them.” In the author’s words: “…on May 11, the
memory of the Slavic apostles, earliest teachers (purvouchiteli) and enlighteners, St. Cyril
and St. Methodius, is solemnly celebrated across all of Bulgaria (po vsichka Bulgaria)
52

This letter, dated May 17/29, 1866 was printed on the same page of Vremia as the Pazarcık and
Kotel letters. See footnote 332.
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The large divergence in size between the Hellene-minded Rum and Bulgar communities in
Izmir (in favor of the former) was probably also a major factor behind the engineering of this amiable
compromise. This was certainly not the case in most, if not all, of the other towns involved.
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Ibid. The letter was dated May 19/31, 1866.
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A verse or a series of verses sung as a prelude or conclusion to some part of the holy service.
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and the other Slavic lands.” The introduction of a concept of ‘group memory’ and the
reference to a pan-Slavic connection are fresh indicators of an enhanced communal
consciousness, not to mention the presence of a reified ‘Bulgaria.’ Such motifs would
only become more pronounced in the years to come.
Finally, it is worth looking at 1866 celebrations of the sultan proper in order to
gain a more balanced perspective on the May 11 festivities. A letter about Accession
Day activities in Filibe (Plovdiv), which appeared on the pages of Vremia about a month
later, contains just the right information and level of detail for such a comparative
purpose.56 From the outset, this letter stated, as did virtually all May 11 accounts, that
this Accession Day was celebrated “with a higher solemnity than any other time.”
According to it, the district governor (qaymaqam) of Filibe, Atta Bey, received and shook
hands with officers and representatives “belonging to each people (ot vsiaka
narodnost)”57 from sunrise to sunset. The latter were accompanied by schoolchildren
from their respective community performing songs “for the tsar.” The governor listened
to them with great attention and gave each group 100 qurush for sweets. First were the
Bulgars, followed by the Muslims, Armenians, Hellene Rum and others. As the author
proudly observed, the two songs of the Bulgar students, specially composed in Ottoman,
touched Atta Bey’s heart to such an extent that “his eyes began to fill with tears.” In the
evening, the governor invited all foreign consuls and two or three leading members
“belonging to each people” to a banquet and entertainment in the local government
56

See the letter, dated 24.06/06.07.1866 in Vremia, I, 46, 02/14.07.1866.
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The word narodnost is rendered in English as ‘nationality’ today. However, in the context of
the 1860s, such a translation is, in my view, inappropriate, historically inaccurate. Therefore, I have opted
for a literal translation – “a belonging to a people.”

159

building (qonaq). In the courtyard, a crowd of 5,000-6,000 men, women and children
marveled for many hours at the wonderful illuminations and fireworks, while also
enjoying refreshments of “sweet drinks of various kinds, ice creams and others.”
Apparently, such “common merrymaking (obshto uveselenie)” on Accession Day took
place in Filibe for the first time. In conclusion, the letter complimented Atta Bey for the
cleanliness with which he “made happy (oshtastlivi)” the inhabitants of Filibe. The good
works in question – the elimination of stagnant pools of water along the streets in the
town’s lower quarters, helped eradicate cases of fever. In essence, what the Tırnova
townsmen had hoped for in the 1863 speech analyzed above, the Filibe townsmen
managed to accomplish by 1866.
The juxtaposition of the two types of ceremony shows a remarkable degree of
symbiosis. Each combined motifs of center and community in a free flowing, seamless
manner. Each engaged the popular attention and generated a substantial amount of
genuine fervor.

V.

The Growing Disparity between Bulgar Attachments to the Sultan
and the Macro-Community in the Late 1860s and the Early 1870s.

In 1867, on his return from a trip to Western Europe, the only such sultanic event
in all of Ottoman history, Abdülaziz made a stop in Rusçuk (Ruse), the capital of the
Danubian Province of Ottoman Rumelia. The welcoming ceremony, attended by the top
echelon of Ottoman government, including the Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, the Minister of
War, Mehmed Rushdi Pasha, and the governor of the Danubian Province, Midhat Pasha,
was spectacular. Here is how the official provincial newspaper Tuna/Dunav [The
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Danube], published in both Ottoman and Bulgar, describes the visual exchange between
ruler and ruled from the Bulgar perspective: “The admiration and joy, which showed on
the merry face of the tsar, was indescribable, and satisfied with the unanimous cry of the
people (narod) – ‘Long Live our Tsar!’ – [he] was raising his hand and greeting the
spectators.”58 This is easily the highest point of ruler-ruled public exchange so far
observed, undeniably under the influence of the sultan’s foreign visit, which had ended
barely a few days earlier.59 On his way to the provincial administration building, the
sultan encountered welcoming parties from the local communities in the following order
– Muslims, Bulgars, Armenians and Jews. In the midst of the processionary street, in a
manner reminiscent of the May 11 celebrations in Tatar-Pazarcık a year earlier, the
Bulgars had erected a triumphal gate, decked with flowers, and topped by a crescent. The
triumphal gate also displayed the imperial monogram (tuğra), with slogans in Ottoman
and Bulgar flanking it. Each of them rhymed:

Milleti Bulgar hemişe itmede böyle dua,
devletinle şevketinle padişahım bin yaşa.

and
Slavno-dulgovechno tsarstvo i zhivot,
Za tsaria si moli Bulgarskiy narod.
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Tuna/Dunav, III, 195, 26.07./ 07.08.1867. This official newspaper was edited by Ismail Kemal
Bey (1844-1919), who later became the founder of the modern Albanian state, and Ahmed Midhat Efendi
(1844-1912), a writer, journalist and publisher, in Rusçuk from 1865 to 1877. Its Bulgar translators were
Stefan Popov (1840-1893), a Bulgar teacher and writer, and Ivan Chorapchiev.
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In Pest (the Pest side of present-day Budapest), Abdülaziz boarded a steamboat which took him
to Vidin and then Rusçuk.
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In English, the Bulgar text reads as follows – “The Bulgar people (narod) pray for a
glorious and long-lasting tsardom and life for their tsar.”60 Perhaps the most noteworthy
aspect of these slogans is the act of calling the Bulgars a millet, in black and white, for
the sultan and all else to see. Apparently, less than nine years after its fist alleged use in a
sultanic decree with reference to the Bulgars, the term had gained public currency.61
Within and around the triumphal gate stood Bulgar clerics, “in a most reverent
manner (nay blagogoveyno),” dressed in liturgical attire, with the Gospel and crosses in
hand. Next to them were the town’s most notable Bulgars, followed by Bulgar
schoolboys and schoolgirls, clad in white clothes with narrow bands of red cloth,
especially sewn for the occasion, and flowers in hand. Their teachers stood in front of
them, in five symmetrically arranged groupings. Behind the students, and immediately
preceding the lines of “all the local and outside (vsichkite mestni i vunkashni)” Bulgars,
including women and children, stood 20 Bulgar peasants dressed in their Sunday’s best,
each holding a sheath of wheat from his field. Although precise event planning
information has yet to surface, it is quite probable that the idea to include peasants, a
novel idea at sultanic ceremonies, was quietly borrowed from the coronation procession
of the Russian Emperor Alexander II eleven years earlier, which for the first time in
history featured a peasant elder from each province of the empire.62 As part of the
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There is a slight divergence in meaning between the two slogans. Accepting the Ottoman one as
primary, its more exact rendition would be – “The Bulgar people (millet) always say this prayer – a
thousand years to you, my padishah, and your empire and your imperial majesty.”
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According to Hristo Stambolski’s memoirs, in the spring and summer of 1858, a group of
Bulgar dignitaries petitioned the Grand Vizier to have 15-20 Bulgar students admitted to the Imperial
Medical School in Istanbul. Their request was eventually granted in September of that year.
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multiple coronation activities, these peasant elders also presented Alexander II with bread
and salt, an alleged ancient Slavic tradition.63 The Bulgars instead opted for the sheath of
wheat (July being the harvesting season), a symbol of fertility, as well as their productive
labor and use to the Empire. The important point to take away, as in contemporary
Russia, especially after the Emancipation in 1861, is the trend towards the inclusion of a
wider range of participants in imperial ceremonies.64 Within this study’s conceptual
framework, this is yet another manifestation of the principle of totalization.
Upon his approach, the sultan “raised his eyes” and read the Ottoman slogan with
“a merry face.” When his horse stepped into the triumphal gate, Abdülaziz looked at the
Bulgars “tenderly (umilno).” The latter unanimously cried out ‘Long Live!’ with “an
indescribable enthusiasm (vuztorg).” The sultan then raised his hand and greeted them.
At this time, the students commenced a Bulgar song for him. Surprisingly, a close look
at its text reveals a picture quite different from the above description of an almost ecstatic
interaction between the Bulgars and their ruler. This text contains barely a few of the
symbolic motifs employed earlier – a grand-spatial metaphor (the sun), metaphors of
light (“shine”, “enlighten”), and the principle of totalization (“Let all of us cry out”).
Metaphorically, it is far inferior to most of the earlier songs of this type analyzed above.
Instead, the anonymous poet introduced a frequent repetition of content-poor refrains:
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See Wortman, v. II, p. 39. As noted earlier, many Bulgars traveling to and from the Russian
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Yasha – hello (da zdravey)!
Yasha – long live (da zhivey)!
Yasha-Yasha-Yasha!65 (4)
May God protect
The munificent (blagodaten) guest,
The autocratic (samovlasten) Tsar! (2)
Let all of us cry out:
May God save Sultan Azis! (2)

So the avowed Bulgar enthusiasm for the ruler seems to be more a matter of form than
content. There is evidence to suggest that a leading motif for such extensive ceremonial
preparations for the ruler’s visit was the opportunity to celebrate the community itself.
Moreover, contrary to earlier examples from the 1840s and 1850s, the community in
question consisted in this case not so much of fellow Bulgar-speaking Rusçuk townsmen,
but of Bulgars broadly conceived. This clearly points to the diminution of the local
identity, formerly dominant. Throughout the article, there are no fewer than nine separate
Bulgar group (excluding language) references, but not one distinctly local marker.66 All
of them are capitalized, including the one in the Bulgar-language slogan. If the slogan’s
original text was truthfully reflected in the article, then a truly remarkable situation arises
whereby the reference to Bulgar people (Bulgarskiy narod) is the only capitalized nonopening expression in a slogan, in black and white, which also features the words ‘tsar’
and ‘tsardom.’ Finally, the article’s authors refer to “a popular duty (narodna
dluzhnost)” to their “dear compatriots (mili suotechestvennitsi)” as the driving motivation
to provide detailed descriptions, especially of the climactic encounter between ruler and
ruled at the triumphal gate.
65

This orthography and capitalization is in accordance with the original.
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The two local markers that do appear are tied to the Bulgar designator – “Bulgars of Rusçuk
(Ruschushkite Bulgari).” This brings the total of Bulgar group references to eleven.
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In anticipation of the sultan’s visit to Rumelia, preparations for welcoming
ceremonies were also under way in other towns, in accordance with central directives. In
his memoir, Todor Ikonomov,67 then a teacher in Şumnu (Shumen), mentions in passing
that Muslim and Bulgar students were lined up in exercise at the local government
building (qonaq) and the local governor’s residence (saray).68 Ikonomov was
antagonized by cases of mistreatment of his students at the hands of local Ottoman clerks
during these ceremonial exercises. Some would be pinched, others slapped. In another
memoir, Atanas Iliev,69 then a student in Eski Zağra (the town of Stara Zagora in presentday Bulgaria) reported similar preparations for the sultan’s upcoming visit in greater
detail.70 As in Rusçuk, the Eski Zağra students were expected to wear white clothes. As
in Şumnu, they mixed in with Muslim students – in this case, singing for several days at
the local middle school (rüşdiye) under the guidance of Hoca Hacı Raci Efendi, a popular
and much respected local Muslim teacher. Unlike Rusçuk, these students were learning
an Ottoman song, whose opening words Iliev still remembered. They contain standard
motifs, such as the sultan’s title of “ruler of the world (şah-i cihan)” and his provision of
“justice (adalet).” Much like Ikonomov, Iliev had some unpleasant memories regarding
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Todor Ikonomov (1835-1892) was a Bulgar educator, later a Bulgarian politician and leader of
the Conservative Party.
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Todor Ikonomov, Memoari [Memoirs], Sofia, 1973, p. 98.
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Stara Zagora.
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these activities. He reflected on the overbearing, supercilious manner with which Muslim
students received their “infidel (gyaurski)” counterparts.
In the end, the sultan decided to head straight to Istanbul. From Rusçuk, he took a
train to Varna on the Black Sea where he boarded a ship to the capital. Not all rehearsals
came to nought, however. Some ten days after the projected visit of the sultan to Eski
Zağra, the provincial governor, Hurshid Pasha, arrived instead. On orders of the local
governor, he was received “with honors worthy of a tsar (s tsarski pochesti)” outside of
town by the entire civilian population. So Iliev and the other students, lined up in the
courtyard of the local government building by their teacher, daskal Stoyan, had a chance
to perform the song they had learned after all.
In the following years, a number of factors combined to weaken the Bulgar
loyalty to the sultan and respect for Ottoman authority as a whole, in tandem with the
growth of their own macro-communal consciousness. Among them were
mismanagement of local affairs, intensifying attempts to limit the flow of people and
ideas to and from the Russian Empire, and tightening censorship, to name a few. The
effects of these factors are clearly visible on the ceremonial plane.
In July 1868, the same Hurshid pasha, governor of the province of Edirne
(Adrianople) toured the countryside in the aftermath of a Bulgar rebel incursion from
Wallachia, which was crushed.71 According to Nayden Gerov, a Russian subject and at
that time the Russian consul in Filibe (Plovdiv),72 judging by the governor’s route, his
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This was the detachment (cheta) of rebels, lead by Hadzhi Dimitur (1840-1868) and Stefan
Karadzha (1840-1868), which crossed into the Ottoman Empire in early July 1868.
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probable goal was finding out which way the Bulgar population leaned.73 To this end,
Hurshid Pasha collected “addresses of fidelity and devotion,” a foreign diplomatic tool,
first implemented by Midhat Pasha in Rusçuk the previous year. Along his way, the
governor stayed with both Muslim and non-Muslim hosts in order to demonstrate the
equality of the two collectivities. In Filibe, he stayed with Mihail Gümüşgerdan, a
controversial local (Hellene-minded Bulgar) notable.74 The Slavic-minded Filibe Bulgars
took this as an affront and refused to pay Hurshid Pasha the customary visit at this
address. They did not change their mind even after the governor visited their newly built
school, “St. Cyril and St. Methodius.” Finally, the standoff was resolved a day before the
governor’s imminent departure when the latter made a second concession and invited
them to visit him at the local government building and they did so. According to Gerov,
this persistent position of the Bulgars, “formerly so timid (robkiy) before the Turkish
speaking Muslims (turki),” made a strong impression. The consul also added:

But they recently became so invigorated that, along with this, they refused to submit addresses of
fidelity and devotion, all under the excuse that the governor did greater honor to this notorious
scoundrel and inveterate enemy of their people [lit. “of their belonging to a people (narodnost’)]
than them.

The pages of Gerov’s personal archive are filled with similar instances of defiant Bulgar
communal conduct regarding the addresses of fidelity and devotion, which the Ottoman
authorities apparently continued to solicit until the eve of the Russo-Ottoman War of
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74

Mihail Gümüşgerdan (1800-1881) was a Bulgar merchant and entrepreneur.

167

1877-78.75 By carefully sifting through the Russian consul’s correspondence, one can get
a sense of, on the one side, the increasingly ideological, and on the other, increasingly
reactive nature of the symbolic interaction between the ruled and the ruler in the early
1870s. The resulting perception of public space in those years is one of much more tight
regulation than ever before. A main set of restrictive measures was centered on the
Russian Empire as the source of disruptive pan-Slavist ideas. For example, one of the
things Hurshid Pasha did on his 1868 tour of the countryside was to inquire whether the
Bulgars had local teachers educated in Russia, as he passed through towns and large
settlements. In towns where they did have them, such as Qalufer (the town of Kalofer in
present-day Bulgaria) and Qarlova (the town of Karlovo in present-day Bulgaria), the
locals often gave disingenuous answers.76
In June 1870, the Filibe police confiscated Russian liturgical books from a Bulgar
book vendor (Hristo G. Danov)77 on the grounds that some prayer texts contained in them
mentioned the name of the Russian Emperor. This was the first instance, known to
Gerov, whereby books were taken from the interior of a bookshop rather than simply
being stopped at the customs upon their entry into the Empire. The case was all the more
remarkable since identical literature, only in the name of the Habsburg Emperor, Franz
Joseph II, printed in Vienna by the Patriarch of Karlovac in Old Church Slavonic, was
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Hristo G. Danov (1828-1911) was a Bulgar teacher and man of letters, later the founder of book
publishing in Bulgaria.
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left undisturbed. What is more, during the confiscation, the subprovincial governor
(mutasarrıf), Ali Bey, apparently recommended their use in lieu of the confiscated ones.78
In March 1875, Gerov wrote to his superior, Count Nikolay Ignatiev, the Russian
Ambassador to Istanbul, about another matter concerning Bulgars and the Russian
Empire. The letter detailed an earlier chain of communications between the Ottoman
Consul in Odessa (in present-day Ukraine), Vehbi Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador to
St. Petersburg, Mehmed Kamil Pasha, and the then Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed
Arifi Pasha,79 regarding the studies of up to 30 Bulgar students in Odessa, without
Ottoman permission and the procurement of a proper passport for travel abroad.
According to Gerov, Kamil Pasha’s report to Arifi Pasha in particular expressed concern
that upon return to “their old fatherland,” these young people “devote themselves to panSlavic ideas which disturb the internal peace of the Ottoman Empire and create
disturbances.” In consequence, the report recommended that this flow be stemmed and
young people seeking studies or employment in the Russian Empire dissuaded from
doing so.80 In Gerov’s opinion, provincial authorities already knew well that “the
[Ottoman] Government did not wish for local Christians and Russians to get to know
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each other, and in order to prevent their rapprochement would not have failed to erect a
Chinese wall between them, had it only been possible.”81
Other restrictive measures concerned the content of circulating literature. The
same 1870 government raid on the Bulgar bookshop in Filibe led to the confiscation of a
book, entitled, “A Historical Review of the Bulgar Church” by Marin Drinov.82 The
reason, in Ali Bey’s view, was a particular expression the author made while describing
the appearance of the Ottomans on the political scene in [medieval] Bulgaria (on pp. 10001) – “this terrible adversary (strashen nepriyatel) appeared at a very bad time for
Bulgaria.” Ali Bey’s charge was that instead of the word “adversary (nepriyatel),” its
synonym – “enemy (vrag)” – was employed, which could also mean ‘devil.’ To Gerov,
this was a clear case of nitpicking, especially given the fact that the Ottoman language
also had a word with these identical two meanings.83 The real reason, in the consul’s
mind, was that “the Ottoman government could not have the Bulgars studying their
history prior to their subjugation by the Ottomans.”84
Ali Bey’s concern does not seem misguided. Within the framework of this study,
Drinov’s book certainly allows for the establishment of a temporal continuum back,
whose medieval link could potentially be converted into a sacred mythological kernel and
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communal rallying point much like the figures of St. Cyril and St. Methodius were.
Despite the best of such censoring efforts, however, the image of the sultan continued to
recede. The 1873 celebration of May 11 at Istanbul’s Robert College,85 which had a
large number of Bulgar students, and the 1875 celebration of Accession Day in Rusçuk,
which turned out to be Abdülaziz’s last, provide good examples of this trend. The
account of the former, which appeared on the pages of the Levant Herald, relates the
texts of speeches delivered on the occasion.86 These contain references to ‘memory’ and
‘nation,’ ‘honor,’ ‘right,’ and ‘holy duty.’ What they do not contain is a single mention
of the sultan. In a parallel fashion, they contain multiple references to ‘Bulgaria’ and
‘Bulgarian.’ What they do not contain is a single marker of regional belonging.
Finally, the printed Bulgar account of the 1875 Accession Day in Rusçuk
enthused over the Western-style ball, held by the Governor of the Danubian Province,
Mehmed Asim Pasha, rather than its royal occasion. Whereas the feted monarch was
mentioned only once, in passing, sentence after sentence was devoted to the co-ed
dancing at the ball and the peaking fashion of wearing a red flower on one’s chest.87
The imperial decree for the establishment of the Bulgar Exarchate88 (February 28,
1870) and its subsequent unilateral promulgation (May 11, 1872) in the Bulgar church of
85
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St. Stephen in Istanbul signaled the end of the paradigmatic dominance of (syncretic)
Ottomanism in the life of this non-Muslim imperial community and the beginning of the
rise of the national idea among its members. The shift in the common mood is palpable
in the memoirs of some of the Bulgar leadership in Istanbul. For example, Marko
Balabanov89 spoke of “that common intoxicating wind for political freedom, which was
blowing almost everywhere in our fatherland in the third quarter of the last [19th]
century.”90 The 1870s did indeed witness a rise in Bulgar revolutionary activity ranging
from sporadic rebel incursions of the type touched upon earlier to systematic internal
preparations, such as those led by Vasil Levski and Dimiter Obshti’s Internal
Revolutionary Organization.91 In 1870, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee
was founded in Bucharest for the purpose of uniting various radical groups within and
without Bulgaria. Its goal was the formation of an autonomous or independent state and
a possible federation with Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania. The Committee
organized the abortive Stara Zagora Uprising of 1875 and the April Revolt of 1876.92
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The latter resulted in many thousands of casualties, a fact much publicized in the West
and Russia under the title, “the Bulgarian Massacres,” sparking a public outcry. The
April Revolt thus precipitated the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, which lead directly to
the establishment of modern Bulgaria.

VI.

Conclusion.

This chapter opened with the analysis of a wide range of celebrations of
Abdülaziz’s accession to the throne by both Muslims and non-Muslims in the capital and
the provinces in order to demonstrate the high degree of penetration, organization,
coordination and overall sophistication of such festivities by 1861. This analysis
confirmed, yet again, the remarkable degree of continuity, from reign to reign, of the
principles of staging central Ottoman authority. It also shed light on what amounted to an
increasingly complex apparatus of ruler glorification and subject loyalty creation. The
chapter then drew the reader’s attention to the process of standardization of the sultan’s
accession day as an annual solar secular public holiday a quarter century after its
introduction by Mahmud II. With this background in mind, the focus of attention shifted
back to the Bulgar songs and eulogies of the sultan, whose themes and lyrics in the early
part of Abdülaziz’s reign borrowed heavily from Abdülmecid’s legacy. The chapter then
demonstrated the intricate interweaving of motifs of sultanic and Bulgar communal (self)
celebration as well as the gradual intersection of the more established duties to the ruler
with the newly arising duties to the group. This relationship, for a while mutually
reinforcing, was illustrated via a cross-section of celebrations of May 11, a recently
invented Bulgar communal holiday. The concept of group memory, the discourse of
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communal rights and their sanctification, not to mention the more visible and
commanding presence of a reified ‘Bulgaria,’ were clear indications of a novel, macrocommunal consciousness. Gradually, the stream of popular excitement for the ruler was
diverted towards communal causes, at first slightly and subtly, then more substantially
and assertively. The centrality of the ruler even in core ruler celebrations was at first
dulled, then altogether displaced.
The next chapter constitutes a break with substantial portions of the foregoing
analysis. It details the second shift in modern ruler visibility, under Abdülhamid II, and
the sultan-caliph’s peculiar yet persistent and successful symbolic policies aiming to reenergize the Ottoman monarchy and dynasty in the aftermath of a series of destabilizing
shocks. Consequently, the chapter is centered on a different target audience – the Muslim
imperial populace – which by this time has firmly emerged as the main pillar of the
Ottoman state.
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Chapter Four: The Second Shift in (Modern) Ruler Visibility. The Reign of
Abdülhamid II.

I.

Overview.

Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) had one of the longest and most influential
reigns in all of Ottoman history. He steered the Empire through one of its most
tumultuous and transformative periods. Until very recently, most scholars viewed this
sultan’s reign quite critically, largely in isolation from his predecessors and successors,
almost as an aberration in the general pattern of Ottoman reform and modernization in the
last century of the Empire. This is probably due in part to the Sultan’s autocratic style of
ruling and the loss of much territory and international prestige, which marked both the
outset of his reign and its aftermath.1 Other reasons for such harsh treatment include long
prevailing perceptions of the late Ottoman Empire as a stagnant environment, its
modernization as a strictly secular egalitarian process, and its nationalist movements as
progressive incontrovertible forces. The latter have been substantially revised in the past
two decades, which has prompted a general re-evaluation of this sultan’s legacy as well.
Recent scholarship has restored some balance to his portrayals, by pointing out some of
the positive linkages, through education, correction and other areas of modernization,
between the Abdülhamidian reign, the Young Turk period, and, in some ways even the
early Turkish Republican period.2 Others have improved our understanding of his
accomplishments, by focusing solely on his life, reign and ideology. Among them, by far
1

Of chief relevance in this respect are the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and the disturbances
leading to it, on the one hand, and Italy’s invasion of Libya, the Balkan Wars and World War I, on the
other.
2

See the work of Benjamin Fortna, Hasan Kayalı, Kemal Karpat, and Kent Schull, among others.
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the most influential research came from Selim Deringil.3 This chapter aims to
complement the work of these scholars in several ways.
First, it will relate more systematically Abdülhamid II’s style of ruling and
discourse of power to those of his predecessors, emphasizing both continuities and
discontinuities. This comparison will be organized around the concept of ruler visibility,4
vis-à-vis the folowing binary opposites – target audiences at home and abroad, majority
and minority audiences, and the use of notions of past and future in the molding of the
ruler’s public persona. Second, this chapter will shed light, in chronological order, on the
range and effect of techniques of royal image making, employed by this Sultan in order to
support and perpetuate his personal autocratic regime. As it turns out, this range was
wider, more complex, and more successful than any other Ottoman sultan’s before or
since. Therefore, this chapter will examine types of ruler visibility, created directly –
through staged public appearances or lack thereof – and indirectly, by resorting to
material objects and abstract metaphors as ruler proxies.
The value in studying Abdülhamid II’s propaganda tools lies in gauging not only
their immediate effect, but also their long-term implications, which have been long
ignored. In the final analysis, this chapter will contribute towards our understanding of
the dynamic and eclectic nature of late imperial rulership in the Ottoman Empire and

3

Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains. See also Francois Georgeon, Abdülhamid II.

4

As defined earlier, this is a composite concept, combining projected traits of personal character,
with short-term and long-term imperatives of policy, both domestically and abroad. It incorporates not only
a physical aspect – a monarch’s more active participation in public events and ceremonies – but also the
more frequent occurrence of references to and discussions of his person in the press. In designing this
concept, I was much influenced by Deringil’s work and what he called “vibrations of power without being
seen” (The Well-Protected Domains, p. 18).
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beyond. It will examine the channels through which royal power responded to the rising
legitimacy of the principle of popular sovereignty, deliberately resisting and inadvertently
assisting centrifugal national causes in the process. The ideological underpinnings of this
reign, revealed through the prism of ceremony, can give us fresh insights into the rise of
ethnicity to the realm of conscience and politics, which was rather more tentative and
fitful than is generally assumed. As I hope to demonstrate in this chapter and the rest of
the dissertation, the nationalizing effects of the various ceremonies of the monarch
transcended the boundaries of Turkish-speaking or even Muslim subject populations.
These ceremonies for the first time conditioned various imperial groups for a sort of
collective cult of a national monarch,5 the likes of which flourished long after the
disintegration of the Empire.

II.

Abdülhamid II’s position within the line of his predecessors.

One of the main premises of this dissertation is that the evolution of royal
ceremonies is a barometer for important sociocultural and sociopolitical changes. In the
case of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, this relationship was clearly very strong.
Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) – the two sultans who oversaw
periods of most intense political upheaval, combined with territorial and population loss,
were also the most committed ceremonial innovators. The carefully planned destruction
of the Janissaries in 1826 availed Mahmud II the political opportunity to reform the
Empire and revolutionize his own image in ways, which would have been inconceivable

5

As I will demonstrate shortly, what made Abdülhamid II a national monarch was not the putative
ethnic homogeneity of his subjects, but rather the new principles informing the shaping of his public
persona and, by extension, the new terms of symbolic interaction with his subjects.

177

to his predecessor Selim III (1789-1807). As we saw earlier, this first successful shift in
late Ottoman ruler visibility entailed the initiation of annual royal birthday and accession
day celebrations both at home and abroad.6 The sultan thus reached out, in an
unprecedented manner, to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The terms of glorification of
the ruler, however, were more reserved and less abstract than they would become later,
especially under Abdülhamid II. Nonetheless, Mahmud II did symbolically employ the
past in an attempt to anchor the legitimacy of his autocratic regime and reforms. This
practice of invented traditions would flourish under all subsequent sultans. It was indeed
common to all late empires. Yet the stressed elements of the past, which were integrated
into this Sultan’s mythology of power, were Islamic and not yet dynastic. For example,
he called the new corps of troops, which took the Janissaries’ place “Victorious soldiers
of Muhammad” (Asakir-i Mansure-i Mohamediye).
Under Mahmud II’s sons, Abdülmecid (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876),
the changes in the monarch’s mythology of power were more subtle, but still quite
significant. Following in Mahmud II’s steps, they cast their images in the mold of
Western rulers by making themselves more directly visible than any other Sultan before.7
They accomplished this despite the fact that, unlike their father’s, their reigns were
dominated by powerful bureaucrats, first Mustafa Reşid Pasha, and then the famous Fuad
and Ali Pashas. Excepting his son Murad V’s three-month reign in 1876, Abdülmecid
went further than any other Ottoman Sultan in presenting himself as a benevolent ruler of
6

Mahmud II set up permanent embassies, which held celebrations of him, in the same influential
foreign capitals where Selim III had opened legations before – London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.
7

Abdülmecid toured the imperial domains following his father’s example. Abdülaziz became the
only Sultan to ever visit Europe in 1867. On his way back, he passed through some of the same Ottoman
lands (present-day Northeastern Bulgaria), which Mahmud II and Abdülmecid had visited before him.
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Muslims and non-Muslims alike, thus garnering the latter’s most enthusiastic response.8
Having been spared confinement in the Cage for Ottoman Princes (Kafes), Abdülmecid
treated his relatives with similar leniency after coming to power. For the first time, the
image of the royal family and a gradually accelerating interest in dynastic history came to
the foreground of ceremonial activity. In this respect, Abdülaziz’s reign became a
watershed in Ottoman history. From the outset of his reign, he re-instituted Mahmud II’s
short-lived practice of solar ruler celebrations, this time making it permanent. Thus, he
continued the trend towards a personality cult of the ruler, which Abdülhamid II then
brought to its full extent. Under Abdülaziz, the wave of enthusiasm for all things foreign,
so characteristic of the previous two sultans, began to be tempered by a turn to the native.
Whereas Abdülmecid had chosen to restore Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia), Abdülaziz turned
his attention to ancestral tombs in Söğüt, the cradle of the Ottoman dynasty. His interest
in the past culminated in a veritable Ottoman Renaissance showcased both at home and
abroad – at the Vienna World Fair in 1873, the Ottomans’ first such participation.9
Abdülhamid II maintained the Ottoman presence at such venues, with a preponderance of
historic imperial themes. He continued to draw inspiration for his own projects from
landmark Ottoman monuments, fusing various architectural elements in a style typical of
his own time. Abdülhamid II expanded tremendously his uncle’s tomb restoration work
and became fascinated with the roots of the dynasty more than any other Sultan. He
engaged the names of some dynastic personages of mythic status, beginning with
Ertuğrul, Osman’s father, in an unprecedented range of ceremonial ways. In his tendency
8

For example, he was the only Ottoman sultan to ever attend a Christian wedding.

9

See Ahmet Ersoy. "On the Sources of the "Ottoman Renaissance:" Architectural Revival and Its
Discourse during the Abdülaziz Era (1861-76)" PhD Dissertation, Harvard, 2000.
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to go farther back in time in an attempt to capture his subjects’ fancy and shore up his
legitimacy, Abdülhamid was no different from other late imperial rulers, such as Franz
Joseph or Nicholas II. The role of Ertuğrul was equivalent to that of Rudolf or Michael
Romanov, respectively.
Sultan Abdülhamid II also continued the trend whereby a new Ottoman sultan
would reverse his predecessor’s “scenario of power.”10 In some respects, he fit rather
well the long-term pattern of alternating rigidity and gentleness of character conveyed by
the Ottoman ruler in public throughout the nineteenth century. As I will demonstrate
below, from the outset of his reign, Abdülhamid II’s image was quite aloof, in a way
reminiscent of Mahmud II’s and Abdülaziz’s before him, and quite unlike the intervening
accommodating images of Abdülmecid and Murad V. In one key aspect – ruler visibility
– however, Abdülhamid II orchestrated a radical change, thus breaking away from the
philosophy and practices of all four of his predecessors.
Once he was able to consolidate his power, a few years into his reign,
Abdülhamid II began to deliberately withdraw from public view11 and withhold the
propagation of his portraits. This was a bid not so much for security as for status – both
personal and caliphal. Therefore, a unique split in the Sultan’s mythology of power took
place, which determined how the Sultan interacted with domestic and foreign, Muslim
and Christian parties. With foreign dignitaries he would interact with little restraint on
one usual unspoken condition – that the meeting took place behind closed doors.
Domestic Christians were allowed to celebrate Abdülhamid II as they would a Western

10

I borrow this term from Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power.
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After becoming Sultan, Abdülhamid II never left the capital in his thirty-three-year reign.
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ruler, including the use of his portraits. To Muslims, both at home and abroad, however,
he tacitly but invariably proscribed his likeness, replacing it with non-visual calligraphic
renditions, such as his monogram and the slogan “Long Live the Sultan! (Padişahım Çok
Yaşa!). So in the course of a few years, Abdülhamid II began to phase out his direct
visibility12 in favor of rounds of intensifying indirect (symbolic) visibility.
The direct visibility of the Ottoman royal male line followed the same trajectory
in this period, from a peak in the 1850s and 1860s, with one important exception. The
portraits of the Ottoman princes still circulated freely; clearly, they could not partake in
the Sultan’s new aura. The implications of this overall shift are as significant to the
shaping of the image of the monarch and dynasty as those overseen by Mahmud II more
than half a century earlier. In comparison to his grandfather, however, Abdülhamid II
managed to be more powerful while at the same time being much less visible. What
follows is an inquiry into many of the symbolic channels from which Abdülhamid II’s
autocratic power emanated and defined ties of subject allegiance in the last quarter of the
nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries.

III.

The early reign. The Sultan’s first “look” and acts, and their public
reception.
The year 1876, “the year of the three sultans,”13 which witnessed the bureaucrat-

led depositions of, first, Abdülaziz, and then Murad V over a period of three months,
12

As it was implied earlier, this term includes both a physical appearance in public and a public
dissemination/display of royal portraits.
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See the eponymous chapter in Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876,
Princeton, 1963.
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became one of the most traumatic years in Ottoman history. The fact that the deposition
of the increasingly autocratic Abdülaziz was followed several days later by his death
under mysterious circumstances, added further fuel to the fire. All of these events
profoundly weakened the image of the Ottoman dynasty, which had been remarkably
stable for most of its long history.
Commenting on the late Abdülaziz, a Levant Herald journalist noted that he
“never recognized or returned the salutes of the people on public occasions, following in
this respect, we believe, Court precedent in Turkey…”14 This appraisal of Abdülaziz was
borne out by other sources as well.15 Commenting on the newly enthroned monarch, in a
favorable comparison to his uncle, the same journalist added that “Sultan Murad V acted
like a Western monarch.” For example, on his first Friday prayer procession, “evidently
moved and gratified by the extraordinary heartiness of his reception, [he] repeatedly
bowed his acknowledgements right and left with gracious and appreciative courtesy.”16
This obvious difference marked the transition from one scenario of power to the next.
There are other ways to glean a sultan’s scenario as well.
In matters of faith, the choice of the imperial mosque for the Sultan’s first Friday
prayer and the flow of the Friday prayer procession itself say much about the new ruler’s
intentions regarding his own image. Since he chose to visit Aya Sofya (the former
church of Hagia Sophia) first, Murad V clearly wished to style himself as a ruler of his
father (Abdülmecid)’s type, that is, of Muslims and Christians alike. The public
14
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understanding of this act was reflected in the unprecedented acclaim of twenty thousand
Christians greeting him as he passed by the Galata Bourse on his way back from the
mosque.17 Mainstream Ottoman newspapers also reflected in unusually expressive terms
the enthusiasm of the crowds, both Muslim and non-Muslim, for the new sultan. For
example, Ceride-i Havadis [Journal of Events] wrote on its cover page: “The accession of
His Majesty which occurred by the wish of the people, was announced with complete
delight, and with Muslims and non-Muslims equally conveying their congratulations and
felicitations to His Majesty Sultan Murad Khan.”18 Expressions such as – “according to
the wish of the people,” “readiness to carry out reform”19 and various words for ‘joy’,
permeated the first several columns of this issue.
By contrast, Abdülhamid II chose Eyüp, with its strictly Islamic range of
meanings.20 The choice of Thursday as the day of his sword-girding ceremony (also the
day of his accession to the throne) may have additionally reflected legitimacy concerns.
In a precarious political situation such as this, with two sultanic depositions over the
course of barely three months, it would be all the more important to have the newcomer
to the throne sealed as sultan as soon as possible. The Friday noon prayer sermon across
the imperial domains, with its mention of Abdülhamid II’s name, would certainly
17

Ibid.
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“Müşarileyh Hazretlerinin Cülus-i Hümayunları milletin arzusundan bulunmaqla kemal-i
memnuniyetle ilan olunmuştur müslim ve gayrimüslim Sultan Murad Khan Hazretlerini alettesavi bir
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Eyüp al-Ansari, a Companion of Muhammad who participated in one of the earliest Arab sieges
of Constantinople, was allegedly buried outside the city walls. After the fall of Constantinople, the site
where his remains had been laid to rest became a major funerary complex and one of the holiest Muslim
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accomplish this task. Indeed, Abdülhamid II is the sultan who took the shortest time (one
week) in more than a century to organize his sword girding ceremony.21 This time, again,
the public was quick to grasp the direction of the reign from its very inception – “the
specialty of the vast assemblage was that it was almost exclusively a Turkish crowd.”22
Once again, the tone of Ceride-i Havadis paralleled that of the Levant Herald. The entire
description of Abdülhamid II’s sword girding procession made only this mention of local
non-Muslims: “Students from the various Christian and Muslim peoples were lined up in
procession and arranged with great pomp.23 There is a notable lack of any emotional
terms. The expression ‘with great pomp’ (alay-i vala) is a stock phrase employed on
various ceremonial occasions. It therefore reflects the attitude of mainstream observers,
rather than that of the participants themselves. Instead, the emphasis clearly falls on the
maintenance of proper order.
For his third Friday prayer, Abdülhamid II chose the Fındiklı Mosque, where he
proceeded by water, just as Murad V had done for his last Friday prayer as Sultan.24 The
distance from the Dolmabahçe Palace is quite small (several hundred yards) so the choice
of transport may have been for intended effect on the public witnessing the event. When
Abdülhamid II finally did visit Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia), it was only for Ramazan
afternoon prayer – an act which carried a very different message. Rather than
21
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demonstrate publicly early on a symbolic intention to rule justly over Muslims and
Christians or stress the Ottoman dynasty’s Byzantine legacy (like his father and brother
before him), Abdülhamid II thus staked an ordinary Muslim claim on the monument. His
visit was not widely publicized, did not take place on a Friday, and therefore went almost
unnoticed by the multitude. He visited the shrine not with the pomp of a Sultan going to
an imperial mosque for his Friday noon prayer, but rather as an ordinary pious Muslim
going to mosque during the most significant fast of the Muslim calendar. The Sultan was
accompanied only by his two younger brothers, Reshad and Cemaleddin, and “a small
and unpretending escort.”25
What had remained unchanged, however, since the late reign of Mahmud II was
the projection of a militarized image of the Sultan, both in his first days in power, and
throughout his reign. As it was demonstrated earlier, this tendency affected both the
Sultan’s physical look and the avenues for staging his visibility. If anything, over time,
this ceremonial association with the military only escalated. For example, by the time of
Abdülhamid II’s sword-girding procession, the unranked blue coat, first donned by
Mahmud II, had been replaced with no less than a field marshal’s uniform. Significantly,
Abdülhamid II, much like Abdülaziz, conveyed an air of simplicity, in stark contrast to
his pompous, heavily decorated entourage. Thus, he wore “a plain field-marshal’s
uniform, with the star of the Order of the Osmanie on his breast, but he did not wear the
customary diamond aigrette and plume in front of his fez.”26 This pattern of change in
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the Sultan’s physical appearance throughout the nineteenth-century, away from
expressions of Oriental splendor, was at first a sign of embracing modernity. By the time
of Abdülhamid II, however, it accentuated an austerity and spirituality becoming of a
Caliph, and made him easily stand out in a procession through bare, unassuming
simplicity.
One of the strongest patterns of similarity among late empires, be they Ottoman or
Russian, Habsburg or British, was the ever closer integration of religious and military
motifs in the composition of the ruler’s image, both in first acts and over the long run.
For Murad V’s first Friday prayer procession, “the cadets of the Military School at
Pancaldi, together with cavalry, infantry and artillery . . . were drawn up in order in the
large open square in face of the mosque.” Shortly after the public reading of the
şeyhülislam’s decision (fetva) in favor of his accession to the throne, Abdülhamid II
proceeded to the Ministry of War where he was acclaimed by the troops of the garrison of
the capital.
When it came to the army, Abdülhamid II showed a unique degree of openness
and accessibility in the early days of his reign. Two weeks into his reign, after paying his
first mandatory ceremonial visit to the Mantle of the Prophet (Hırka-i Şerif), he again
proceeded to the Ministry of War. There, in the open square, the Sultan observed a
review of some of the garrison troops. Then he dined at the Ministry with his officers,
sitting at the same table and eating the same bread as them, before returning to the
Dolmabahçe Palace. The Ministry’s building and its tower were illuminated after dusk.

Havadis article about Abdülhamid II’s sword girding contains no information about the Sultan’s
appearance whatsoever. See CH, 28.08.1876.
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Two months later, Abdülhamid II visited a military hospital, remaining “for some time in
the wards speaking words of consolation and encouragement to the men.” Then he
announced the payment of “the whole amount due upon the three ships of war built in
England” out of his own savings, accumulated while still a prince and since assuming the
throne.27
Regular military reviews, initiated by Mahmud II, intensified in the reign of
Abdülaziz. In the early 1870s, they became increasingly associated with religious
occasions, such as Friday prayer processions and Bayram celebrations.28 It is only with
Abdülhamid II, however, that their scheduling became firmly set: they followed Friday
prayer processions, which took place every week, almost without fail. These events
received increasingly detailed descriptions in the press, serving as a stage for diplomatic
exchange as much as public spectacle. Once again, the trend was apparent from the
outset of Abdülhamid II’s reign. For example, on October 13, 1876, a military parade on
Artillery Square (Tophane) followed Friday prayers in the nearby mosque (where the
Sultan again proceeded by water).29 Five days later, the end of the Ramazan fast and the
beginning of the Bayram celebrations were announced with another military parade near
the Sultanahmet Mosque, on the site of the Byzantine Hippodrome.30
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When he came to power, Abdülhamid II faced a set of dire circumstances
remarkably similar to that of Mahmud II when he destroyed the Janissaries fifty years
earlier. In addition to the problems mentioned at the beginning of this section, the
Empire was ravaged by an unprecedented financial crisis, and several military conflicts,
which further threatened the Ottoman dynasty and the Sultan’s own tenure in power. In
his first months on the throne, Abdülhamid II’s direct visibility was absolutely vital for
his survival since it translated into increased legitimacy and made the gradual processes
of power consolidation possible and credible. On the one hand, the new Sultan had to
establish a plane of ceremonial-diplomatic reciprocity with the West; on the other – he
had to appease heightened sensitivities and demands at home from an increasingly
Muslim body of subjects.31 He applied himself to each task from the outset of his reign
and eventually accomplished both in novel ways.
For the foreign dignitaries at his sword girding ceremony, Abdülhamid II
provided two more marquees and a tent (compared to the last such event in 1861),
commanding a good view and supplied with “choice and plentiful refreshments.” Yet
upon passing by them, he did not recognize them directly, but through a special
messenger. The most one could observe regarding the Sultan’s visual acknowledgement
of anyone in the crowd was that “his firm, distinctly marked countenance, occasionally lit
up with animation as he passed along, the troops presenting arms and crying Padishah
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tchok yashah (“Long live the Sultan!”).”32 His recognition of the crowd was so subtle
that it may have only existed in the eye of the beholder.
Even more telling was Abdülhamid II’s policy with regard to the royal image. As
described in Chapter I, Mahmud II had first encouraged the creation and proliferation of
such images in public. By the time of Murad V, the public was apparently fully
accustomed to them. Thus, on the day of Murad V’s accession, the Abdullah Brothers
had “the happy thought of exhibiting to public view, at the entrance of their establishment
a fine large-sized cabinet photograph of his Majesty set in a gold frame.”33 This act,
repeated over many days, lead to the outpour of requests for portraits of the Sultan from
Istanbul, the provinces and abroad. Ultimately, it won the Pera34 brothers a reappointment as “Court photographers to his Majesty the Sultan and the Imperial
Palace.”35 Naturally, they did not hesitate to demonstrate their loyalty to Abdülhamid II
in the same manner immediately after his accession, and, in the meantime, also further
their own business. They did gain his favor in the short run, but four years later, the
brothers were sternly reprimanded for “daring” to reproduce the Sultan’s image “without
any permission whatsoever.” The circular, issued from the Chancellery of the Imperial
Palace (Yıldız), went further and ordered that the unlawful images be speedily collected.
Most remarkably, it declared that the production thereafter of even a single such image be
treated as an “absolute prohibition (memnuiyet-i qatiye).” An infringement of this kind
32
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would call for a “speedy execution of a hefty punishment” (çok cezanın müsaraat-i
icrası).36 Clearly, this was a matter of key concern to the Sultan. We can surmise that by
this time his grip on power had consolidated and his policies were shifting in a way
acceptable solely to him. It may be hardly a coincidence then that around this time,
Abdülhamid II also disposed of his much hated enemy, the deposer of sultans – Midhat
Pasha.37
As Deringil pointed out, Abdülhamid II substituted his portraits with imperial
banners, embroidered with the acclaim ’Long Live the Sultan!’ (Padişahım Çok Yaşa!).38
This was certainly true, but with respect to Muslim target audiences only. There is no
evidence to suggest that the Sultan ever hampered in any way the propagation of his
image abroad. On the contrary, from the start, Western perceptions of him were shaped
with the aid of a slew of lithographs visualizing in elaborate detail the investiture
ceremonies in Istanbul. In France alone, journals such as Le Monde Illustre and
L’Illustration presented vividly Abdülhamid II’s accession, first Friday prayer
procession, and sword girding. They continued to do so in the following years. To the
Sultan, such portrayals were probably acceptable because they gave him a desired
publicity. After all, Western rulers received the same type of coverage. In fact, a portrait
gallery of the reigning European monarchs, entitled “Rulers of the World”, which was
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published in L’Illustration in the 1880s, did not fail to include Abdülhamid II’s image as
well.39
What also went in line with the image of Western rulers of late monarchies was
the ubiquitous military outlook on photographs and lithographs alike. Much like his
predecessors, going back to Mahmud II, Abdülhamid II’s image was unfailingly captured
with him wearing a uniform (plain or parade) and a sword. The Sultan’s sword became a
fixture of his appearances at Friday prayer processions, as did military reviews.40
However, in the Ottoman context, the sword was much more than a military symbol.
Since sword girding was the major investiture ceremony for a Sultan, equivalent to
coronations in the West, the sword’s first and foremost connotation in the short run was
legitimacy to rule. Since Murad V never received a sword girding, he was never fully
confirmed as a ruler during his brief three-month reign. This made his deposition easier
in the eyes of the Ottoman public.41 By looking more closely at Abdülhamid II’s own
speedy sword girding, mentioned above, we can gain yet another vantage point for
analyzing the crisis of the dynasty and the Sultan’s early ceremonial signals in response
to it. For example, Abdülhamid II was the only sultan in the last century of the Empire
who chose to be girded not with one but two swords. In fact, there were only two other
double sword girdings in the entire history of the Ottoman Empire – Murad IV’s in 1623
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and Mahmud II’s in 1808.42 A closer look at each set of circumstances reveals the
probable cause for such a rare ceremonial event. A quick string of depositions preceded
each of these sword girdings, thus producing a dynastic ‘low’ moment in each instance.
It is probably no coincidence that in the aftermath of each such destabilizing episode, the
new sultan chose to be girded with two swords. In the case of Mahmud II, as Hakan
Karateke points out, this meant one sword of Islamic and one of dynastic significance.43
Yet the same is true of the other two double sword girdings as well. The Islamic sword –
Caliph Umar’s – was in fact common to all post-Mahmud II sword girdings.
Here is a hypothesis why Caliph Umar‘s sword became the sword of choice for
Abdülmecid’s sword girding in the summer of 1839 and all subsequent sword girdings in
the last century of the Empire. With the signing of the Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayun (Rose
Chamber Edict) in November 1839, Abdülmecid announced a set of profound imperial
reforms known as the Tanzimat (Reordering) reforms. One of their main explicitly stated
goals was to establish equality between Ottoman Muslims and Christians and guarantee
their lawful co-existence. As Butrus Abu Manneh has convincingly shown, the ideas of
this edict were already in circulation even before the new sultan’s accession to power.44
Could it be that the sword of Caliph Umar was selected with the same symbolic
significance in mind? After all, Caliph Umar, one of the most venerated Caliphs in the
Sunni Muslim tradition45 was and is to this day also remembered for his covenant with
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the Christians of Jerusalem providing justice to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Girding
Abdülmecid with Umar’s sword, on the eve of refoms, would send a poignant message.
This would also explain why this sword became embedded in the late Ottoman
mythology of power.
There is yet another line of reasoning in support of such a hypothesis. Between
1768 and 1774, the Ottomans fought what turned out to be the first in a series of losing
wars (with the sole exception of the Crimean War) against Russia over the course of the
following century. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which concluded this war, humiliated
the Ottomans by forcing them to accept, among other indignities, Russian protectorship
over Ottoman Christians and the effective ceding of the Muslim-populated Crimea to
Russia. In return, the Ottomans received the symbolic compensation of claiming
protectorship over non-Ottoman Muslims. This amounted to a claim to caliphal
authority, which the Ottoman sultans had not asserted, consistently and prominently,
since the mid-sixteenth century, the time of Süleyman the Magnificent (Qanuni
Süleyman) and his chief jurist, Ebu’suud. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca changed this
state of affairs permanently at a time when Catherine II’s designs on Istanbul and the
Straights presented a very credible threat to the Ottomans. In fact, as Stanford Shaw and
others have shown, the relations between Ottoman Christians and the Sultan form a
credible link between most if not all Russo-Ottoman Wars thereafter.46 Could it be that
the symbolic link between the Ottomans and Caliph Umar in the nineteenth century was
45
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related to the above events? According to a popular story, which first appeared in the late
eighteenth century, the last Abbasid Caliph allegedly girded Selim I with Caliph Umar’s
sword at Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) after his conquest of Egypt and the Holy Cities.47 It
remains an open question whether this story had anything to do with the reassertion of
Ottoman caliphal claims in the late eighteenth century after the Treaty of Küçük
Kaynarca. The two are, however, suspiciously close in time and symbolic content.
***
The latter of Abdülhamid II’s swords was announced in the press as the ‘sword of
the sultanate’ (saltanat kılıçı). Its actual identity remains to this day unknown. Karateke
speculates that it was probably Osman Gazi’s.48 If so, with this choice, as with the
choice to have two swords girded, Abdülhamid II followed in the steps of his grandfather.
More importantly, the decision to name it ‘the sword of the sultanate’ – a unique and
mysterious appellation – was probably meant to add much needed institutional legitimacy
to the new sultan’s claim to power.
In comparison with his predecessors and successors in the period from 1808 to
1918, Abdülhamid II staged his sword girding in other unique ways as well. Whereas, all
others had visited one or at most two ancestral tombs after their sword girding on the way
to the old palace of Topkapı, Abdülhamid II attended at least three. The first was Selim
I’s – a unique choice in the nineteenth-century sultanic practice of visiting royal funerary
complexes after the sword girding ceremony. This choice could lend further relevance to
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the above story relating the Sultan to Caliph Umar and thus feeding into an intended
mythology of power. The second tomb was Abdülmecid’s. This choice made
Abdülhamid II one of only two nineteenth-century sultans who visited the tombs of their
fathers (the other one being Abdülaziz, who visited Mahmud II’s tomb). In each case,
this must have been a legitimation move, within the Ottoman rules of royal succession.49
The third tomb was Mehmed II’s, common to all sultans, and clearly signifying the
conquest of Constantinople for Islam. Interestingly, Abdülhamid II visited the same
sacred grounds associated with these three sultans again, barely three weeks later, during
Ramazan. This is further proof of their significance to him and the type of visibility he
wished to create for himself.50
As in Russia, beginning with Nicholas I (1825-1855), so in the Ottoman Empire,
beginning with Abdülmecid (1839-1861), the ruler’s closest relatives became
increasingly engaged with his scenario of power and to some degree, began to share with
the ruler the task of presenting the dynasty favorably. While in Russia, the Decembrist
events of 1825 precipitated this trend, in the Ottoman Empire, the initial impetus
probably came directly from the West and led to attempts to emulate the image of
Western noble houses.
At sultanic accessions, accession anniversaries and major religious holidays from
the mid-nineteenth century on, a review of the imperial family appeared in the press, both
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domestically and abroad, with the chief purpose of drawing parallels and locating the new
monarch within the line of his ancestors.51 For example, Murad V’s rise to the throne
evoked a comparison with the accomplishments of the previous four Murads, each of
whom “has decorated Ottoman History with great victories, reforms and acts of
justice.”52 Abdülhamid II’s accession, more than any other, provoked a myriad of
comparisons – to his brother, father and even grandfather. Like Murad V, he was
“learned, serene and versed in state government.” Moreover, Abdülhamid II “exchanged
ideas for the saving of the fatherland [otechestvo]” with his brother and “resembled his
father in every respect.”53 Most surprisingly, Abdülhamid II was immediately juxtaposed
with his grandfather, Mahmud II, a parallel which, ironically, escapes most historians of
his reign even today – “of sober habits and energetic disposition, Abdul Hamid possesses
many of the sterner virtues of his grandfather.”54 In 1886, on the occasion of a major
religious holiday (Ramazan), Abdülhamid II’s accomplishments in his ten-year reign
were even compared to Süleyman I’s.55
The practice of bringing up royal ancestors gradually became internalized and
created a novel sense of a temporal continuity between the Ottoman rulers in the public
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mind.56 Over time, the family image became more pronounced and its horizon extended
ever farther back in time, binding together the living and the dead family members, and
strengthening, by way of historicization, the image and sovereignty of the present ruler.
The presentation of a united family front to the outside world at every succession became
a tacitly understood public imperative of the first order. This was one of the factors
causing a shift in the relations between the living members of the dynasty.
Before the nineteenth century, few princes could evade the rigid constraints of the
Cage (Kafes). Some exceptions include Mustafa II and Selim III.57 With the relaxation
of the Cage rules in the second quarter of the nineteenth century,58 the princes gained an
unprecedented freedom of movement, socialization and knowledge. Abdülaziz gave
Murad Efendi59 unprecedented rights – to have his own house outside the palace and to
be able to see and correspond with Europeans. Murad even became a Freemason.60
Abdülhamid Efendi received a similarly lenient treatment and much direct visibility in
the capital in the 1850s during his father’s reign. Both he and Murad accompanied then
their uncle Abdülaziz on his trip to Europe in 1867.
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The tide turned sharply during Abdülhamid II’s first days in power and the
princes did not even share in the Sultan’s initial run of extreme direct visibility. Even
though, with the exception of Murad Efendi, they remained in close proximity to the
ruler, they were rarely exposed to the public gaze. Thus, on the sea journey to Eyüp for
Abdülhamid II’s sword girding ceremony, the state boat conveying the princes
immediately followed the Sultan’s boat. He met them privately in the Topkapı Palace at
the end of the day, but at no point during the land procession itself did they appear in
public next to him.61 Instead, the members of the Imperial Household (both male and
female) observed the procession from the building of the Ministry of Finance,
overlooking the route.62
As the princes had previously enjoyed the public attention, and had therefore
become more susceptible to foreign and domestic influences, their allegiance to the
throne had to be somehow formally renewed. Thus, on the day following Abdülhamid
II’s accession to power, his cousins, Prince Youssouf Izzedin and Prince Mahmud
Celaleddin, sons of Sultan Abdülaziz, presented their respects to him. Abdülhamid II
was said to have “very cordially” received them.63 Thereafter, the princes’ visibility
reflected the ruler’s own more closely than ever before. When the princes did appear in
public, it was usually during Friday prayer processions, overwhelmingly by the side of
the ruler. For example, Abdülhamid II’s two younger brothers, Mehmed Reşad Efendi
and Ahmed Kemaleddin Efendi accompanied him on the above mentioned visit to Aya
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Sofya early in his reign. By the 1890s, upon Abdülhamid II’s return from Friday prayers,
male members of the dynasty led the way in the procession behind the royal carriage.64
No one was more affected by this turn of policy than Abdülhamid II’s elder brother,
Murad Efendi, who was effectively under house arrest in the Çırağan Palace for the
remainder of his life.
***
A discussion of Abdülhamid II’s early policies regarding his own visibility would
be incomplete without an example of the very real constraints on the new Sultan, placed
by the very powerful bureaucrats who brought him to power. Karateke described just
such an instance.
For his public oath taking ceremony (biat) upon coming to power, Abdülhamid II
apparently wished to place the throne in the audience chamber of the old imperial palace
(Topkapı)’s third court. This would turn the whole event essentially into a private
ceremony. According to Karateke, the Sultan took this approach “out of groundless fears
(vehme kapılarak).”65 Security issues notwithstanding, there is an alternative and perhaps
more realistic interpretation – this may have been intended as a conscious return to the
past, the times when the Sultan received ambassadors in the Audience Room of the Third
Court. If it had gone through, a staging such as this would have instantly stricken a chord
with the mainstream Ottoman public. In a slightly different sense, this may be construed
as an early attempt to regain a measure of invisibility, and by extension, inviolability for
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the ruler and the dynasty lost through overexposure during the previous fifty years. What
better proof of the loss of the Ottomans’ veneration for their sultans than the two
depositions earlier in the same year?
When the much more powerful Grand Vizier denied the Sultan this wish,
Abdülhamid II went to the opposite extreme and made this biat the most cosmopolitan
accession oath ever.66 He extended the scope of the ceremony, which started in the
Topkapı Palace and continued in the Dolmabahçe Palace. For the first time, Abdülhamid
II brought in the leaders of the non-Muslim communities, as well as the leading bankers
of Istanbul, both Ottoman and foreign. That he chose to do so is, in my view, a testament
to the Sultan’s urgent need to rally support from all quarters and garner sympathies
abroad. The new Sultan probably grasped that, in the aftermath of Abdülaziz’s
deposition, openness was the order of the day. Given the circumstances of his coming to
power, Abdülhamid II needed to make his mark on the public conscience and do so
quickly, if he was to stay in power.
The unusually high number of exceptions to previous and subsequent ceremonial
practices in the early days of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s reign justify suggestions of
deliberate design and strategy. When forced to accept extreme visibility in some respects
in the short run, the Sultan tried to benefit the most from it. Through some other acts and
stagings, however, he was already hinting at his own invisibility preferences. The latter
only gained momentum throughout the rest of his long reign.
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IV.

The Sultan’s Mid-Reign. Dynastic Pantheon and Ceremonial Ingenuity.
Accentuation of the Split in Ruler Visibility.

Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, as Abdülhamid II sought to strengthen the
Ottoman imperial position abroad, he oversaw two concomitant processes which were
also taking place in other contemporaneous monarchies – the further extension and
complication of what may be called a dynastic pantheon and the ceremonial immersion
of foreign dignitaries into this pantheon during state visits. Dynastic pantheon refers to a
set of signifiers, ranging from physical objects such as tombs, shrines, and flags to
abstract concepts such as music, colors, monograms and mottos. Its purpose was to
convey a positive image of a monarch and his/her dynasty, stressing their legacy,
stability, and grandeur. Curiously, a similar term did have a contemporary usage – a
book published in Russia in 1850 (permitted by the censor in 1846) was entitled
“Pantheon of the Fatherland (Otechestvennyiy Panteon), or the Life of Grand Dukes,
Tsars and Emperors.”67 As the latter part of the title suggests, the pantheon in question
was really that of the dynasties, ruling Russia over the centuries beginning with Ryurik.
At the time of this book’s publication, the Ottomans had already embarked on a quest for
ceremonial reciprocity with the West. Facilitated greatly by the events of the Crimean
War, this goal was largely completed by the late 1860s, with the visit of Abdülaziz to
Europe and of the French Empress Eugenie and the Habsburg Emperor Franz Joseph to
Istanbul. By the 1880s and 1890s, as each empire turned inwards in search of sources
and models of renewal, the interaction of the type mentioned above began to take place.
67
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It is interesting to observe in some detail what constituted a dynastic pantheon during
these encounters, but even more so to examine the instances of sharing of sacred space
and meaning between royal host and royal visitor, especially when they espoused
different faiths.
An example from the Russian Empire can best illustrate the inter-imperial nature
of this phenomenon and serve as an introduction to the Ottoman equivalent. The object
of interest is the Persian Shah’s visit to St. Petersburg in 1889. Perhaps not
coincidentally, it fell on the Russian Emperor’s coronation anniversary. The Shah of
Persia visited Alexander II’s tomb in the Cathedral of Peter and Paul. Here is a
description of his reverent conduct there. First, he took off his shoes at the church’s door.
Then, at the tomb itself, the Shah placed his hands on his chest in prayer and obeisance.
This was followed by the placement of “a gigantic wreath, made from magnificently
executed porcelain flowers, decorated with small diamonds” on top of the tomb. As it
turned out, this was just one of a whole array of finely crafted and jewel-studded wreaths
laid at Alexander II’s grave and arranged in the manner of museum exhibits. The Shah
paused again to pray before Empress Maria Aleksandrovna’s tomb before visiting Peter
the Great’s tomb.68 He was shown the imperial regalia (scepter, crown and orb), and
allegedly, “long marveled at the massive diamonds, with which they were decorated.”
Then the Shah visited the site of Alexander II’s assassination where once again he
prayed. That same day the Shah observed the construction of the Holy Resurrection
Church. Earlier, while still in Moscow, he had been presented with an album of
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watercolor drawings of Mikhail Romanov’s coronation by the Director of the Moscow
State Archive.69
In short, on his brief visit, the Shah was brought into some form of contact with at
least four deceased Romanov rulers – the former royal couple, Peter the Great and
Mikhail Romanov, the dynasty’s founder. The Shia Muslim Shah, head of a sovereign
state, prayed for these former Orthodox Christian rulers on three occasions and was even
present at a church construction site. Other state leaders, visiting St. Petersburg in
following years went through the same routine – a mandatory visit to the royal burial
complex of St. Peter and Paul, and to Alexander II’s assassination grounds on the
Ekaterininskiy Canal. The list of visitors included the French President, the Habsburg
Emperor and even the Siamese King. Even though they exhibited varying degrees of
exuberance in their demonstrations of faith and ceremonial cooptation at these sacred
sites, all heads of state played the roles seemingly expected of them.70 It must be that
faith, projected onto a dynastic pantheon, was becoming a universalized tool of
monarchy, a vital first ceremonial line of defense in the late nineteenth century, and no
divide was too wide to be bridged. Needless to say, such inter-faith ceremonialdiplomatic gestures of inclusion are unthinkable in the world we live in today.
The Ottomans exhibited signs of the same trend, except much more cautiously
and subtly, which probably stemmed from a weaker position of relative power. The most
complex instances of such symbolic interaction and the corresponding visibility
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implications can be seen in the German Kaiser’s second visit to the Ottoman Empire in
1898. In order to map the changes and get a better perspective on the overall process, it
is worth starting with the Kaiser’s first visit.
In 1889, a year after his ascent to power, on his way back to Germany after
attending his sister’s wedding in Greece, the Kaiser passed through Istanbul. The visit
lasted only four days and was restricted to the capital alone. During this visit, the
Emperor lavished his attention on sites related to the German colony and Byzantine
landmarks. Thus, he visited the German school, the Embassy, the Protestant church and
the Moltke monument, then under construction. He also inspected the ancient walls of
Constantinople, from Yedikule71 to Eyüp. Neither the former, nor the latter, however,
seems to have received any attention at all, despite the fact that both were important
Ottoman dynastic markers. The only site of key Ottoman significance the Kaiser visited
was the Topkapı Palace, but there he only saw the Treasury, which could be easily
construed as a simple museum visit, deprived of any spiritual dynastic meaning.72
The second visit was much longer, and included not only Istanbul, but also
Jerusalem and Syria. As he had done before, the Kaiser visited the ancient walls, among
other Byzantine relics. This time, however, he proceeded in a traditional Ottoman state
boat with fourteen rowers directly to the quay of Eyüp, which had been specially
renovated.73 As in 1889, commemorative medals were issued, with the Ottoman coat of
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arms (arma-i osmani) and the Muslim calendar date (Cemaziülahir 1, 1316) on one side
and the German eagle and inscription on the other.74 In addition, silver vases were cast
and decorated once again with the German Eagle and the Ottoman coat of arms. They
were presented to the Emperor by the town Payables Office “in the name of the people of
Istanbul (Istanbul ahalisi namına).”75 The German imperial standard appeared on the
cover page of Servet-i Fünun [The Wealth of Sciences], an Ottoman illustrated journal, in
black and red. The fact that color (moreover, red, the color of the Sultanate and Ottoman
flags) was used in the domestic press, with reference to a royalty other than the Sultan in
a flag of another state, may be a subtle indication of the extraordinary welcome extended
the Kaiser.76 On the cover of the next issue, the black German Eagle was displayed
gently embracing the Ottoman imperial standard with its right wing.77 On the royal
couple’s visit to the imperial factory at Hareke, three girls presented them with bouquets.
Their names must have been a factor in their selection – Ümme (community of the
faithful), Münevver (enlightened, also a popular epithet for Medina) and Binaz(ir)
(matcheless, unequalled). Once again, a fourteen-oared state boat conveyed the Kaiser to
his ship upon departure.78 In the meantime, the local Ottoman press was framing the
Kaiser’s visit in sacred, unusually embracing terms as well. According to the newspaper
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Sabah [Morning], “the devout prayer of the Ottoman nation is that it may please
Providence long to preserve the Emperor...“ Ikdam [Advance] spoke of “the consecration
of the friendship” between the two peoples.79 The intimate terms of contact between the
two monarchs, dynasties and states reveal a novel symbolic strategy of inter-imperial
legitimation, unprecedented both in its creativity and in its level of abstraction.
The most interesting part of the Kaiser’s visit to the Ottoman Empire was yet to
come – his trip to Jerusalem and Syria, under the pretext of inaugurating a new Protestant
church there. For the Kaiser’s comfort, a gorgeous tent was “purposely (makhsusan)”
sent to Jerusalem by the “Holy Personage (Taraf-i Eşref)” of the Sultan. Equipped with
latticed windows and topped by an Ottoman sun, the tent was executed with Oriental
splendor becoming of an Ottoman sultan from bygone times.80 For the Kaiser’s entry to
Jerusalem, a triumphal arch stood in honor of him near the Yafe Gate (Bab-i Khalil).
This in itself was not unusual. During his previous visit, the Kaiser had passed through
several such structures in Istanbul, beginning with the one at the quay of Scutari
(Üsküdar) placed precisely at the spot where he would first step on Asian soil. The
design of the latest triumphal arch in Jerusalem, however, was highly syncretic and
painstakingly elaborate. Its two polygonal bases were shaped as minarets, equipped with
galleries, and topped with domes, which bore a striking resemblance to the Hohenzollern
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crown.81 The minaret walls had painted black motifs resembling keyholes. It seemed as
if the city was offering its keys to the Kaiser.82
In Jerusalem, the Kaiser visited “the Mussulman cemetery and historic tombs, the
mosque of Umar.”83 He entered Harem-üş Şerif (literally, “the Sacred Noble Sanctuary,”
also known as the Temple Mount) through the famous Golden Gate. The latter had two
vaulted halls which lead to the ‘Door of Mercy’ (Bab ül-Rahme), and the ‘Door of
Repentance’ (Bab ül-Tevbe). Even though to the Emperor, the importance of entering
through the Golden Gate must have been paramount, the photograph which appeared in
Servet-i Fünun only showed him emerging on the other side. The accompanying text
identified the passage with the ‘Door of Repentance.’ Apparently, there were limits to
the very generous terms of the Kaiser’s incorporation into Ottoman Muslim symbology
and some lines and sensitivities simply could not be crossed. A photograph in the
Ottoman press of the Kaiser’s entry through the Golden Gate could be easily construed as
an act of Christian conquest, offensive to many. The need to accommodate both the
august visitor and the domestic public required such subtle maneuvers, and even led to
bizarre extremes. For example, a specially made breach in the city walls next to the
famous Bab-I Khalil allowed the Kaiser to enter Jerusalem on horse, but apparently did
not disturb the Ottoman Muslim opinion. Had he entered on horse through the gate itself,
81
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things might have stood very differently. Still, the Emperor and Empress did enter not
only the Temple Mount, as another photograph clearly showed, but also the ‘Dome of the
Rock’ (Sakhret-i Allah) itself. A third photograph in the same issue captured their exit
through the mosque’s southern door, oriented towards Mecca.84
In Damascus, some of the most intriguing episodes of sharing of sacred space and
prayer between the German and Ottoman monarchs took place. A picture of the Kaiser
and his wife visiting the Umayyad Grand Mosque shows two German imperial standards
hanging over them. One resembles the Emperor’s, and the other may possibly be the
Crown Prince’s. At least three court ladies, in the Empress’ escort, were permitted to
enter the sacred grounds of the mosque as well.85 Much like the Persian Shah in St.
Petersburg nine years earlier, the Kaiser visited a royal tomb and laid a wreath on the
greatest Ayyubid ruler’s grave. He praised Saladin as the exemplary knight and even
donated a marble sarcophagus for him.86 Then, in a speech, the Kaiser even uttered a
prayer for the Sultan – “It is my earnest hope that the respect and veneration of his
subjects and of the 300 millions of Muslims existing on earth may always centre upon his
Majesty Sultan Abdul-Hamid II . . . May Almighty God grant long life and health to the
Sultan.”87
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Finally, the drive for dynastic memorialization the two monarchs shared found
one more expression. On the way back to Beirut, at the site of the ancient Heliopolis
ruins near Baalbeck, a plate commemorating the Kaiser’s visit was inaugurated with a
special ceremony in his presence. A photograph of it in Servet-i Fünun featured the
German Eagle next to the Sultan’s monogram (tuğra), over inscriptions in German and
Ottoman, respectively. The intended message was conveyed by various sources with
only minor differences – a “souvenir (yadıgar olmak üzere),” a “striking token of the
solid friendship between the two Empires,” and “[a symbol of] the reciprocal and
unalterable friendship.”88
The Kaiser’s two visits, related in minute detail on the pages of the Levant
Herald, can also provide a vivid illustration of the split in the terms of Abdülhamid II’s
ceremonial engagement with his royal peers on the one hand, and his domestic public, on
the other. To the former the Sultan remained accessible, but their association was usually
not directly visible; to the latter, the Sultan was both less accessible and less visible. For
the purpose of gaining a larger perspective on this issue, it is necessary to briefly examine
some elements of protocol from two earlier state visits to Istanbul.
In 1869, when the French Empress Eugenie visited the Ottoman capital on her
way to the opening of the Suez Canal, Sultan Abdülaziz embarked on a state barge and
proceeded to the Empress’ ship in order to welcome her. Then they disembarked, in
plain view, arm in arm. Such proximity and intimate terms of contact between the two,
according to Hristo Stambolski, a long-term Bulgar resident of Istanbul, had a mixed
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effect upon the public, raising curiosity as well as resentment. The latter was couched in
orthodox Muslim terms. Both men and women found that the Sultan, a married Muslim,
should not mix so freely with another woman, be it an Empress. He was thereby setting
an inappropriate model of family life for the young. The latter, especially women, were
curious and open to the innovation.89 Mary Patrick, a long-term American resident of
Istanbul, however, viewed the event entirely from a Western perspective. To her, the
Sultan “played the part of royal host with great distinction.”90 When Emperor Franz
Joseph, also en route to Egypt, visited Istanbul two weeks later, Abdülaziz was once
again so courteous as to pay him a similar visit, this time in the Palace of Beylerbeyi.91
Abdülhamid II avoided any such controversy altogether. Even though he was just
as civil and polite to his guests, he staged their encounter in such a way that few were
able to observe it with their own eyes. Contrary to Abdülaziz’s practice, each time the
Kaiser’s ship approached the shores of Istanbul, it was high Ottoman dignitaries who
actually went aboard to welcome him. The Sultan remained at the Dolmabahçe Palace.
On both visits, the Sultan gave his arm to the Empress on many occasions, helping her
ashore, as well as in and out of carriages. All of this, however, occurred away from the
public, at Dolmabahçe’s private quay where few could witness them, only from the sea,
or in the secluded palatial complex of Yıldız. The fact that the Sultan did not accompany
the German royal couple on any of their many day trips around Istanbul is one of the
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strongest indications of his agenda with respect to his own subjects. He clearly did not
wish to be seen. Instead, the Sultan would be telegraphed by the Kaiser, on more than
one occasion, even from a distance of only a few miles.92 Such conduct was in unison
with Abdülhamid II’s long-standing and remarkably consistent policy of making himself
unavailable to the public eye. It enhanced his mystic status in the eyes of the Ottoman
(especially, Muslim) public.
In public, Abdülhamid II preferred to communicate to his royal peers by way of
messengers, as it was mentioned above in the context of his sword girding procession.
The following procedure was kept during Friday prayer processions throughout his reign
– a messenger conveyed greetings to the foreign dignitaries on the Sultan’s way out of
the Hamidiye Mosque, followed by an audience only later, invariably behind closed
doors. I have come across only one exception to this rule, at a Friday prayer procession
during the Kaiser’s second visit – “in passing in front of the pavilion [erected for the
Kaiser] the Sultan saluted his Imperial guests who stood at one of the windows.”93 This
seems to be a singular gesture of good will towards the Kaiser.
It was the spectacle of the Friday prayer procession that brought foreigners,
natives and the monarch together and at this regularized juncture the contrast between the
two types of ruler visibility seems most jarring. Surprisingly, the Sultan would be
equally at ease providing money for Hajj pilgrims from Central Asia as champagne for
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foreign tourists from The Lusitania.94 Distinguished foreigners would be invited to
special kiosks for privileged viewing while local bystanders would be hard pressed to
catch a single glimpse of the caliph whose passage was routinely obscured by a double
line of soldiers on each side.95
***
The process of Ottoman inclusion into the Western system of signs and symbols,
initiated daringly by Mahmud II, had by Abdülaziz’s time inspired attempts to do the
exact opposite – bring the Westerners back into the Ottoman fold, in large part by feeding
their fantasies of the Orient. Abdülhamid II’s reign witnessed a full-scale turn towards
indigenous authenticity due to a number of factors. One of them was the same desire to
be accepted as an indelible part of the international order, which prompted imitation of
the West in the first place. By the late nineteenth century, however, this cultural turn
relied on the understanding that a well articulated difference based on alleged indigenous
roots was a new and strong legitimating factor. This new direction in the field of
ceremonial stemmed from harder realities and fashions of the day, from imperial thinking
and state-making as much as from a growing sense of the value of self-determination.
This is why the Ottomans were happy to play the Oriental card sometimes – at World
Fairs or during foreign royal visits to Istanbul – along with the Western one, as long as
they could control the symbolic message of each. After all, an Orient which could be
civilized without losing its dignity was worthy of existence.
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This auto-Orientalist mode of thought, which permeated the dynastic pantheon
discussed above, was most frequently visible at Friday prayer processions. For example,
for his Friday prayer attendance on Sept. 1, 1888, the Duke of Edinburgh was
accommodated with “a spacious tent, specially provided and richly ornamented with
Oriental carpets and tapestry.”96 An equally effective way for ceremonial incorporation
of Westerners involved the review of elite military units in their splendid exotic uniforms.
Abdülhamid II maintained the traditional imperial guard of halberdiers (baltacı)
in their archaic scarlet uniforms, and he brought back other elite regiments, founded by
his predecessors, under Western influence. These included the Lancers (Mızraklı), a
concept Mahmud II borrowed from the British and the Zouave97 (Zühaf), a French (North
African) invention, first observed by Abdülmecid during the Crimean War and eventually
introduced domestically by Abdülaziz. At the same time, Abdülhamid II invented his
own section of the Imperial Guard, which ultimately formed its core – the Ertuğrul
regiment. Its ranks consisted of tall handsome Turks from Söğüt, the Anatolian
birthplace of the dynasty.98 The point was to demonstrate the extent of the empire and
the various, increasingly ethnic pillars of monarchic support. An American eyewitness of
Friday prayer processions perceptively observed: “today a regiment from the Soudan,
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tomorrow a battalion from Albania.” … “Every part of the dominion is represented by the
troops.”99 This was also a conscious return to Oriental splendor, on a scale unknown
since the destruction of the Janissaries. After all, what had been, from a Western
perspective, a marker of Oriental indulgence at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
became an acceptable marker of otherness by its end. Reined in by the Western format of
the military review, the Oriental content fulfilled contemporary validating functions.
With the approach of a foreign dignitary’s visit to Istanbul, military reviews grew
exponentially in size. For example, on October 11, 1889, two regiments (the Ertuğrul
and infantry of the line), with their respective bands playing, marched past after Friday
prayer. A week later, more than six units (troops of the line, a battalion of marines, some
regiments of artillery, the Ertuğrul, Zühaf and Mızraklı regiments) participated. The
following week a review of more than fifteen battalions of infantry and four regiments of
cavalry took place, with four bands playing in turn. Finally, on Nov. 3, 1889 (Sat.),
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Sultan witnessed from the specially erected pavilion a march
past of eighteen battalions of infantry, including the troops of the line and the Zühaf, four
regiments of cavalry and four batteries of artillery. As Western practice dictated,
Ottoman honorary aides-de-camp100 were assigned to the Kaiser. The review lasted more
than an hour.101
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All of these units projected a conservative Muslim image of a ruler, steeped in
both recent and ancient dynastic traditions (or rather, their credible fabrication). In this,
as in everything else, Abdülhamid II came through as a complete antithesis of his elder
brother Murad, whose brief reign witnessed the unprecedented introduction of squadrons
of various Christian volunteers (mukhtelif gönüllü Hıristiyan taburu).102 To date, this
very brief but fascinating page of Ottoman military history has not received the scholarly
attention it deserves.103 Perhaps the most striking aspect of this troop was its flag – a red
banner, with a crescent and cross of equal size and (pale green) color!104 In my view, it
captures best the syncretic, and with hindsight, hard-to-believe nature of the late imperial
project.
In non-military matters, however, Abdülhamid II could be quite accommodating
to the Empire’s Christians. When it came to the celebration of the sultan’s accession
anniversary in 1888 in Izmir (Smyrna), a town with a large non-Muslim (esp. Greekspeaking) population and a very important Western consular presence, the use of royal
portraits was once again unabashed: “Everywhere the portrait of His Majesty, surrounded
by flowers or surmounted by a crescent of gas jets was conspicuous.”105 The Sultan’s

102

See Stambolski, pp. 655-57. He witnessed the arrival of these units in the town of Nish in the
summer of 1876 during the Ottoman war with Serbia.
103

On the topic of Jewish volunteers, see Julia Cohen’s Fashioning Imperial Citizens: Sephardi
Jews and the Ottoman State, 1856-1912, PhD Dissertation, Stanford, 2008, pp. 63-69 (“Defending the
Empire, Defending the Nation”).
104

See the weekly newspaper Zornitsa [Dawn], 02.07., 09.07.1876 as well as Stambolski, pp. 65557. Zornitsa was an organ of the American Evangelical Society published in Istanbul from 1876 to 1878.
105

LH, 04.09.1888.

215

portrait also took center stage at the top of one of the most ornate triumphal arches ever
designed in honor of Abdülhamid II. The structure was erected on the occasion of the
Sultan’s accession anniversary in Hanya (Chania), administrative capital of the island of
Crete, in 1894.106 In both cases, the use of royal portraits was probably condoned
because of the fact that the Sultan was in direct competition for subject loyalty with the
sovereign of Greece, who certainly had no qualms about exhibiting his likeness in public.
Thus, in 1889, the same Greek-speaking population in Izmir celebrated the wedding of
the Greek Crown Prince in the following manner – “... the shops looked quite unusually
brilliant, decorated with flags, Chinese lanterns, illuminated portraits of the Prince and
his fiancée.” The Levant Herald correspondent felt obliged to add that “the Smyrna
Greeks are very loyal, and would not let the marriage of their Prince pass without some
demonstration.”107
Despite the Sultan’s openness to foreign dignitaries, and the flurry of his images
in the foreign press, he did not endorse the production and dissemination of memorabilia
bearing his likeness, even for restricted private consumption. Thus, he discontinued the
policy, which dated back to Selim III, of exchanging royal memento portraits (Tasvir-i
Hümayun) with foreign heads of state and awarding these domestically. To my
knowledge, the last such act took place in 1872 when Abdülaziz awarded his portrait to
the outgoing Grand Vizier, Mahmud Nedim Paşa.108
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Clearly, Abdülhamid II could not respond in kind to the profusion of image-based
gifts the Kaiser distributed all around him on his second visit. These gifts ranged from
cigarette-holders and snuff-boxes with portraits engraved on them to framed, diamond
studded portraits to the marble busts of the Kaiser and Kaiserin, reserved for the Sultan
himself. Instead, Abdülhamid II opted for the following replacements of his own visage
on the lid and case of a snuff-box for the Kaiser – “a Turkish warrior, holding a rifle with
bayonet, to the point of which is attached a crescent in brilliants” and the Sultan’s
monogram, respectively.109 This is not to say that the Sultan did not appreciate
photography. In fact, such a statement could not be farther from the truth. For each of
the Kaiser’s two visits, Abdülhamid II had photographers assigned. They recorded
events from beginning to end, that is, from the Kaiser’s meeting with the Ottoman fleet in
the Dardanelles in 1889 to the Kaiser’s departure from the Holy Lands in 1898.110
Moreover, the Sultan sent large and elaborately detailed photographic albums containing
a carefully staged and highly presentable version of the life and accomplishments of the
Empire to the United States and Britain in the early 1890s.111 At least on one occasion,
the twenty-fifth accession anniversary, he used full-length photographs in deciding which
prisoners would benefit from a royal amnesty. Finally, when the Sultan was deposed in
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1909 even a small photographic atelier belonging to him was discovered on the grounds
of the Yıldız Palace.112
Interestingly, during the Kaiser’s second visit, members of the Ottoman dynasty
were allowed unprecedented degree of ceremonial involvement and direct visibility. In
some cases, this occurred “at the request of the Emperor and Empress;”113 in others, it
was probably by domestic design, in accordance with perceived standards for
contemporary royal houses. Thus, Abdülhamid II’s sons, sons-in-law, and brothers-inlaw could be often seen by the Sultan’s side in a carriage or in command of their
respective squadrons during military reviews. Even a six-year-old daughter, Refie
Sultan, had a role to play – she was sent to the guest residence in Yıldız to deliver a
bouquet to the Empress on the occasion of her birthday. These innovations may have at
least in part stemmed from Abdülhamid II’s need to counteract accusations of Oriental
despotism, which were by this time mounting in the Western press. Still, all interactions
of the Ottoman Princes with the German guests took place behind closed doors.

V.

The Sultan’s Late Reign. Cult of Personality.

This section will explore the topic of the ruler’s increasingly sacred aura in the
late period through several themes – acts of charity and generosity, trends in period
monumental architecture, the myth of naming, and the concept of cross-dating.114 In
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reality, these themes were closely interwoven and will appear accordingly in this section.
In the process, special attention will be paid to the ways in which the language of official
documents and newspapers deliberately projected a specific, carefully designed image of
the monarch onto the field of public consciousness. The main difference from the past
was in the degree of monarchic usurpation of ceremonial space, with more celebrations
being tied back to the ruler than ever before, resulting in a nascent cult of personality.
In the Ottoman Empire’s late period, mercy seems to have been the chief
prerogative of the male ruler, predictable in its cyclicality and widening both in its impact
across the domains and in its press coverage. Reasserted norms of faith-based moral
propriety, after a period of relatively more relaxed social rules in the middle decades of
the nineteenth century, demanded yet again that female members of the dynasty be kept
largely outside the public eye. Rules of succession and the troubling events of 1876
translated into a long shadow cast over the ruler’s male relatives. Therefore, on his
accession anniversaries, the Sultan was the prime object of attention. There was one
major obstacle, however. Abdülhamid II’s self-imposed withdrawal from society meant
that, unlike his Western counterparts, he had many fewer opportunities to preside over
the process of his own image making in public. So the acts of mercy had to speak louder
– the posting of commemorative plaques on buildings certainly helped in this respect, as
did the widespread publication of their photographs in the press, along with the flowery
formulaic language glorifying the monarch.
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Among the institutions Abdülhamid II founded, which attested to his piety,
hospitals were a prominent group. Judging by announcements in the periodical press,
within this group, the lion’s share went to institutions targeting the poor, children
(especially, orphans), refugees and strangers, social outcasts and, increasingly, religious
minorities.115 Thus, hospitals for the poor (gureba hastahanesi) opened in all corners of
the Ottoman Empire, from Yanya (Ioannina) in the Balkans through Çankırı in Anatolia
to Sana’a116 in the Yemen. The target patients included ever more narrowly defined and
often socially marginalized segments of the population, not because the monarch so
desperately needed their loyalty, but because he rather wished to present himself as an
all-encompassing, all-merciful figure, both at home and abroad. Thus, a “Special
Hospital for Poor Men and Women” opened in Konya, as well as a poorhouse in Istanbul
with separate quarters for Muslims and Christians.117
The overwhelming majority of these inaugurations took place on or around the
Sultan’s accession anniversary or his birthday, and, just as importantly, usually carried
the name of their august patron -- Hamidiye. Across the empire, roadhouses for travelers
(misafirhane) opened, such as in Dedeağaç on the Sultan’s birthday.118 Houses for
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Muslim refugees (muhacirin-i islamiye) were also erected, such as in the Haşine119 and
Hamdani120 villages in Syria, again on the Sultan’s birthday.
Sometimes local residents would take up the Sultan’s cues themselves, as it
occurred in the town of Karahisar-i Sahib (Afyonkarahisar) where on Accession Day
there took place “an official ceremony of laying the foundation of houses, a school and a
holy mosque expressly for the settlement of Muslim refugees, as it was agreed upon.”121
Moreover, completely new settlements, alternatively called Hamidiye or Osmaniye, would
thus be founded. Such were the cases with Al-Hamidiyah (Hamidiye) in Syria,
established for Cretan immigrants after the war of 1897, and a certain Osmaniye in the
Aydın province (vilayet), near Efes, newly founded for recent immigrants in 1906.122
Many of the Hamidian establishments would then add their own ceremonial input
into official celebrations, thus causing ripple effects of the original foundational act over
time. For example, the management of the Poor Asylum in the Şişli district of Istanbul
issued an illustrated pamphlet in 1906, on the occasion of Accession Day, about the
twenty-four-year history of the institution.123 The pamphlet contained some curious
statistics on the ethno-religious background of the asylum’s students – 595 Muslim, 116
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Greek, 53 Armenian, 5 Armenian-Catholic and 26 Jewish.124 This list reveals a clear
discrepancy between, on the one hand, the high sensitivity in cataloging minorities,
including awareness of Armenian Catholics and, on the other hand, the undiscriminating
fashion whereby all Muslims were lumped together in the same category. The intended
message of this data manipulation may not be so complex after all – a tolerance and care
for non-Muslims and an unquestioned, undivided authority over co-religionists. Both
were traits of a good caliph. Not surprisingly, this spiritual title, in various derivative
forms and combination flourished in the late Ottoman Empire. In fact, it accompanied
most of Abdülhamid II’s charitable acts. For example, the picture of a new hospital,
published in Malumat [Knowledge], an illustrated contemporary Ottoman journal, carried
the following title: “The sublime Hamidiye Children’s Hospital – a testament to His
Majesty the Caliph’s scattered acts of mercy.”125
I have come across more than a dozen formulaic ways to introduce ceremonies of
laying the foundation or building inaugurations (of the type – “under the … auspices of
His Majesty ...”). Three are of explicitly religious nature. In addition, “His Majesty the
Caliph” was used as a pointer to some particularly pious acts. Over time, both the
ingenuity behind some of these terms and their intensity only grew. Thus, on the twentyseventh royal accession anniversary, the text, accompanying the inauguration photograph
of a hospital for the poor in Kavala contained the following phrase – a synonym for the
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festive day – ruz-i feyz-i efruzende, that is, “the day of bright spiritual enlightenment
[emanating from the person of the ruler].”126
Another uplifting quality of the Sultan, which radiated out towards the domains,
and was emphasized time and again, was his extraordinary ability to “make happy.” To
be sure this was no novelty for the Ottomans – felicity (saadet) had been emanating from
the ruler and, by extension, his proxies, such as the Third Gate of the Topkapı Palace
(Babüssaadet, the Gate of Felicity) or Istanbul itself (Dersaadet, The Abode of Felicity)
for centuries. However, in the late period the same glow issued forth from new, recently
introduced and essentially secular holidays, such as the sultan’s birthday. In 1901, the
teachers and students of the senior high school in Lefkoşa (Nicosia), Cyprus posed for a
photograph in front of the ‘Zaman’[Time] printing press “on the superior birthday of
felicity, the prosperous and felicitous day of His Majesty the Sultan.”127 The same
merrymaking capacity belonged to the Russian royals, except it was shared by the
extended family as well.128
The patriotic motif and the story of its weaving, at first almost imperceptibly, but
over time ever more visibly, into the fabric of Ottoman society provides one of the most
fruitful ways of exploring and explaining late empire. It is all the more pertinent to the
subject of this section because of its varied avenues of association with mercy and
religiosity in this period.
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Here is a snapshot of the foundations of loyalty to the Sultan – a picture of the
students of the Hamidiye School for the Deaf and Mute, founded by Abdülhamid II in the
1880s,129 which was published on Accession Day in 1893 (see Fig. 4-1). On it, the
students (all male) congratulated the Sultan with the older ones showing a letter each,
using silent language, of the “Long Live the Sultan (padişahım çok yaşa)” slogan, while
the youngsters held their hands out in a prayer position. As the text underneath indicated,
this prayer for the Sultan’s health was “[a duty] necessary to be discharged (dua-yi
vacibüleda). In the background, overlooking the whole group was the framed, glasscovered royal monogram, brought out and set up especially for the occasion of this
outdoor photo session. The accompanying article called these students etfal-i vatan, that
is, “children of the fatherland.”130

Fig. 4-1. The Hamidiye School for the Deaf and Mute. Servet-i Fünun, 1309, Ağustos 19 (Aug.
31, 1893).
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The Sultan’s example of patriotic mercy must have proved contagious to the
general population of co-religionists. Eight years later, on the cover page of the same
journal there is evidence of a broader charitable-cum-patriotic zeal in yet another school
picture. It portrayed students (both male and female) in a recently founded Muslim
school in Vidin, Bulgaria (see Fig. 4-2). The heading underneath clarified a key point,
namely, that these were “children of the poor dressed by patriotic people (ahali-yi
hamiyetmendan tarafından elbas edilmiş fukara etfalı).”131

Fig. 4-2: Students of the Muslim school in Vidin. Servet-i Fünun, Mart 1, 1317 (March 14, 1901).

Since Bulgaria was already a separate, albeit still vassal, entity at that time, the
patria in question must have been faith-based, that is, geographically unbounded. The
photograph’s publication date was once again significant – March 1, 1317 [Rumi
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(Muslim solar) calendar] – the first day of the New Year. What better way for an
Ottoman journal to start the New Year than with a cover-page picture of Muslim
students, all in neat uniforms (each girl wearing a head scarf; each boy – a sort of fez),
sitting around a tablet with the Muslim calendar date, propped up against a model of the
globe?
Many such pictures would appear in the press on the occasion of the Sultan’s
accession and birthday anniversaries. The regions depicted in them would range from
previously held and still, at least ceremonially, contested territories, such as the Crimea
and the Caucasus, to Muslim areas where no Ottoman political sovereignty was ever
established, such as India and Singapore. In a powerful display of religious allegiance
transcending any viable political claims, the sons of notables from faraway, Dutch-held
Batavya (Jakarta) were admitted to the Tribal School (aşiret mektebi) in Istanbul – a
prestigious school for the sons of Ottoman provincial notables. Not surprisingly, they
too, were included in the ceremonial show of support for Abdülhamid II: a photograph
depicted them in prayer for the Sultan on Accession Day in 1899 (see Fig. 4-3).
Apparently, distance did not matter much so long as they were “Muslim people (ahali-i
islamiye).”132
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M, 1315, Eylül 2 (Sept. 14, 1899).
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Fig. 4-3: Tribal School Students from Batavya (Jakarta). Malumat, 1315, Eylül 2 (Sept. 14, 1899).

Abdülhamid II’s twenty-fifth anniversary on the throne at the turn of the twentieth
century was remarkable for the scale of provincial celebratory activity it provoked. It is
all the more impressive considering the fact that, as Deringil pointed out, there was no
religious importance to the number twenty-five, nor an Ottoman precedent. Judging by
the enormous amount of reports the Ottomans kept on various foreign twenty-fifth
anniversary celebrations, from their embassies all over the world, they must have
borrowed this number from the West in an attempt to present the Ottoman monarch as
equal to all the rest. Among the various types of buildings, dedicated to the sultan on this
day, the most numerous and least explored are the public fountains. In terms of tracing a
ruler’s mythology of power visually, fountains may be the closest Ottoman equivalent to
Western royal statues. Both their structural variety and their stylistic diversity are
staggering.
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As with contemporary church architecture in Russia, Abdülhamidian fountains
combined a vast and often overly ornate array of motifs, both domestic and foreign, from
a number of different historical periods. Moreover, as the Sultan’s reign progressed, the
sources of architectural inspiration were sought further back in time. For example, in
1893, less than a month before the accession anniversary, a free-standing fountain
pavilion (çeşme) was inaugurated at Kağıthane (Istanbul) (see Fig. 4-4).133

Fig. 4-4: The Kağıthane Fountain in Istanbul. Servet-i Fünun, Temmuz 22, 1309 (03.08.1893).

Both the cartouche and the shell-shaped voussoirs on top of it displayed a strong Rococo
influence. The same picture of the Kağıthane fountain would be published seven years
later on the pages of the same journal in connection to the Sultan’s twenty-fifth accession
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SF, Temmuz 22, 1309 (03.08.1893).
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anniversary.134 Apparently, the readers had to be reminded that this was one “from
among the multitude of the Caliph’s pious deeds (cümle-yi khayrat-i Hazret-i
Khilafetpenahiden olarak)” as the heading of the first picture had said. This phrase, in
reference to a fountain, seems to be a throwback to elements of seventeenth-century
epigraphic rhetoric – “the pious deed” and “benevolent act” (khayr ü hasenat; ihsan) of a
fountain’s patron (sahib-ül khayrat) in those times.135
Two years later, on the twenty-seventh royal accession anniversary, the newly
inaugurated Tophane fountain in Istanbul displayed a mixture of Rococo (cartouche) and
Baroque (undulating eaves) motifs (see Fig. 4-5).136

Fig. 4-5: Abdülhamid II's Tophane Fountain in Istanbul. Malumat 1318, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1902).
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Ibid, Ağustos 19, 1316 (01.09.1900).
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For a very insightful discussion of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman fountains, see
Shirine Hamadeh. “Splash and Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul” in
Muqarnas, v. 19, 2002, pp. 123-148.
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M, 1318, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1902).
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It thus went back in time to the second quarter of the eighteenth century – the reigns of
Ahmet III and Mahmud I. Moreover, the new fountain was located in the vicinity of one
of its models – Mahmud I’s Tophane Fountain (1732) (see Fig. 4-6).137

Fig. 4-6: Fountain of Mahmud I at Tophane in Istanbul (1732). Shirine Hamadeh. “Splash and
Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul” in Muqarnas, v. 19,
2002, 139.

In addition, two wall fountains (see Figs. 4-7 and 4-8) were inaugurated in the Taksim
and Nişantaşı quarters of Istanbul. In the press, it was proudly announced that all three
drew their waters from Kağıthane.138
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Hamadeh, 139.
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M, 1318, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1902).
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Fig. 4-7: The Taksim Fountain in Istanbul. Malumat, 1318, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1902).

Fig. 4-8: The Nişantaşı Fountain in Istanbul. Malumat, 1318, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1902).
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Such association placed the Sultan in line with many of his ancestors since Kağıthane had
been for many generations a preferred locale for elite promenades and outdoor
entertainment.
Yet the vast majority of fountains in honor of Abdülhamid II were erected in the
provinces.139 Contrary to the early eighteenth century when the passion for fountains
focused mainly on the capital,140 the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
witnessed a wave of fountain construction throughout the provinces. This wave
penetrated the imperial domains in all directions in a credible effort to make the Sultan’s
symbolic imprint felt even on the outmost periphery. While it is hard to estimate the
exact number of fountains erected throughout the empire and the degree of the Sultan’s
personal involvement in the process, it is clear that the vast majority of them were
invariably inaugurated on one of the Sultan’s anniversaries. In this way, at least, they
marked a symbolic connection with the center. If the fountains constructed in the capital
can provide a measure to go by, then the rate of construction seems to have more than
doubled in the last decade of Abdülhamid II’s reign, compared to the previous two
decades.141 In 1900 alone, sketches were drawn, and foundation or inauguration
139

The emphasis seems to have fallen on Anatolia, which was by this time turning from an
imperial backwater into the heartland of the Empire in the public mind (after the mounting losses of
European territory). For more information on this gradual process, see David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish
Nationalism, 1876-1908, London, 1977.
140

According to Hamadeh, this trend marked a symbolic effort to reclaim the capital after the
Sultan had resided in Edirne, the old capital, for a number of years and “the image of imperial sovereignty
… had fallen to an all-time low in the last decades of the seventeenth century.” See Hamadeh, p. 143.
141

According to Nuran Pilehvarian, Nur Urfalıoğlu and Lütfi Yazıcıoğlu, in the period from 1877
to 1899, 19 fountains were constructed in Istanbul, three of them by the Sultan. By contrast, in the period
from 1900 to 1908, 16 fountains were constructed, four of them by the Sultan. See Nuran Pilehvarian,
Fountains in Ottoman Istanbul. Istanbul, 2000, pp. 142-44, 198-99.

232

ceremonies were held in places ranging from Sakız (Chios) to Adana and Diyarbakır,
from Kastamonu and Yozgat to Beirut and Quds (Jerusalem).142 Most of the fountains
were named Hamidiye. Some common structural elements of curious provenance
incorporated in them included the obelisk and the Choragic monument of Lysicrates.
Examples of the obelisk range from 1892 (the Hamidiye Fountain in Selanik) (see
Fig. 4-9)143 to at least 1900 (the Kastamonu Fountain) (see Fig. 4-10).144
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In Jerusalem alone, at least two fountains were built.
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For an unrealized 1840 sketch of an obelisk-shaped Hatt-I Şerif monument in Istanbul by
Gaspare Fossati, see Klaus Kreiser, “Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916” in Muqarnas, v.
14, (1997), p. 103.
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SF, Teşrin-i Evvel 5, 1316 (18.10.1900).
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Fig. 4-9: The Hamidiye Fountain in Selanik. Servet-i Fünun, Mayıs 28, 1308 (09.06.1892).

Fig. 4-10: The Kastamonu Fountain. SF, Teşrin-i Evvel 5, 1316 (18.10.1900).
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Not surprisingly, an image of the Selanik Fountain reappeared in the press on the
twenty-fifth anniversary (1900), as yet another memento of the reign’s
accomplishments.145 In the meantime, Istanbul’s obelisks had featured prominently in
the photographic albums, sent by Abdülhamid II as gifts to London and Washington, DC
in the 1890s, showcasing the Ottoman Empire’s historical legacy and present state. The
Ottoman Pavilion of the Chicago World Exhibition in 1893 also included an obelisk,
adjacent to a mosque (see Fig. 4-11).146

Fig. 4-11: The 1893 Chicago Fair Obelisk. SF, 1309, Teşrin-i Evvel 7 (19.10.1893).
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Ibid, 1316, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1900).
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Ibid, 1309, Teşrin-i Evvel 7 (19.10.1893).
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As Kreiser points out, Raimondo D’Aronco, Abdülhamid II’s palace architect,
sketched a bold design for a monumental fountain (the Telegraph Monument in
Damascus, Fig. 4-12) whose top in the shape of an obelisk sat on a Baroque (meydan
fountain) base. Unfortunately, the project was not realized.147

Fig. 4-12: Sketch of the Telegraph Monument in Damascus by Raimondo d'Aronco. Klaus
Kreiser. “Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916” in Muqarnas, v. 14, (1997).

147

Kreiser, p. 111.
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Finally, one of the multiple gifts the Sultan received for his twenty-fifth
anniversary in 1900 was an artistic model of a monument in his honor from the Muslims
of Bulgaria (see Fig. 4-13). The monument resembled a massive pavilion (not unlike a
mausoleum), which had a square base with four staircases leading up to the respective
entrances, protected from the elements by four broad semi-circular eaves. Its equally
massive onion dome, becoming a mosque, had a base reminiscent once again of Mahmud
I’s Tophane fountain, mentioned above. The most curious component of the model,
however, was a group of four obelisks, placed at the corners of the base and rising up as
minarets – an impression made all the stronger by the long, pointed tip, protruding from
each pyramidal end, parallel to that of the dome itself.148

148

M, 1316, Ağustos 24 (06.09.1900).
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Fig. 4-13: A Gift to Abdülhamid II from Bulgarian Muslims. M, 1316, Ağustos 24 (06.09.1900).

Was the sudden widespread use of obelisks in this period an Ottoman way of
sharing in a contemporary international passion for them or was it an authentic claim to
ancient roots by way of the Byzantine and Egyptian past? Perhaps it was a bit of both.
Even more startling was the use of architectural motifs clearly borrowed from the
Choragic monument of Lysicrates . It dated back to the fourth century B.C.E. and had
become an icon of the Greek Revival architectural movement in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. Restored between 1876 and 1887, under the auspices of the French
government, the monument was widely influential in Europe and the United States at the
turn of the century. A prominent contemporary example of it can be seen in the masonry
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counterweights of the “Alexander III Bridge” in Paris, completed in 1900. That same
year, on the occasion of Abdülhamid II’s twenty-fifth anniversary, a marble tripod-based
column fountain was inaugurated in Beirut (see Fig. 4-14). Its top alluded, in miniature,
to the Choragic monument, with several columns closely spaced, supporting an oval
entablature.149

Fig. 4-14: The Beyrut Fountain. M, 1316, Eylül 7 (20.09.1900).

149

Ibid. 1316, Eylül 7 (20.09.1900).
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Barely a few months later, the picture of another fountain, inaugurated on the
same occasion in Sakız (Chios), appeared in the press (Fig. 4-15).150

Fig. 4-15. The Sakız Fountain. SF, 1316, Kanun-i Sani 4 (17.01.1901).

Its lower portion was in the shape of a cross, with four faucets and water basins, nestled
inside each right angle. Its upper portion, however, represented a full-blown version of
the Choragic monument – four engaged fluted columns, with Corinthian capitals,
supporting an oval entablature. As in the Beirut fountain, the topmost section was

150

SF, 1316, Kanun-i Sani 4 (17.01.1901).
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typically Ottoman – a stylized sun and crescent, respectively, each resting on an onionshaped block.
The choice of the Choragic monument may have been justified by more than
contemporary international fashions, of which the late Ottomans were fully aware and
only too eager to partake. Since Beirut had a substantial Greek population and Sakız –
a Greek majority – the use of such a potent Greek symbol could be viewed as an
accommodationist strategy, a device to strike up a chord with the locals on a conscious or
subconscious level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it could be a thinly veiled
statement of imperialist domination since each fountain ultimately celebrated the
Ottoman Sultan and stood for the Ottoman state.151 In fact, the Sakız fountain was
partially executed in red marble, a rare and expensive material, whose color also
happened to be the color of Ottoman imperial flags, a color generally signifying the
Ottoman sultanate. Beatrice St. Laurent and Andras Riedlmayer have pointed to a
similarly symbolic contemporary Ottoman use of materials – the construction of a clock
tower in Jerusalem (near the Yafe Gate) in 1907 from white stone which came from a
cave important to the city’s Jewish architectural tradition.152
A localizing architectural approach of a slightly different kind can be seen in one
of the two Quds (Jerusalem) fountains, inaugurated on the occasion of the twenty-fifth
anniversary in 1900 (see Fig. 4-16). It adjoined the ancient city walls in the same area of
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As with many other fountains, a guard on duty stands in the background of each of these two
fountains, perhaps to prevent attempts at defamation.
152

Beatrice St. Laurent and Andras Riedlmayer. “Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the
Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537 – 1928” in Muqarnas, v. 10, Essays in Honor of Oleg Grabar
(1993), p. 82.
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the Yafe Gate, and in an attempt to blend in, it also closely imitated the pattern of their
masonry (golden Jerusalem stone), both in the execution of the fountain’s cylindrical
body and in its spherical dome.153

Fig. 4-16: The Quds Fountain. SF, 1316, Eylül 14 (27.09.1900) and M, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 12
(25.10.1900).

Such ‘non-intrusive’ architecture appeared with the same connection to the monarch at
the same time in Sana’a (Yemen) where a hospital for the poor was built in the local,
highly distinctive style of public buildings (as were the local government building and the

153

SF, 1316, Eylül 14 (27.09.1900) and M, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 12 (25.10.1900). According to
St. Laurent and Riedlmayer, the fountain was destroyed in 1918 by the British, with the cooperation of the
Supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem.
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imperial barracks, for example).154 Far from being solely attuned to priorities of the
immediate political moment, this approach was reflective of a long-standing Ottoman
state-making philosophy and practice. This was certainly not true of the state-making
mission of Russian religious architecture in the late period. As Wortman has shown, it
rudely imposed itself on the local landscape, with Orthodox shrines physically
dominating and esthetically disturbing Catholic environments in Poland or Protestant
ones in some Baltic regions. Even in the capital, Alexander III did not hesitate to erect
the seventeenth-century-style church of “Christ on the Blood” commemorating
Alexander II’s assassination, much to the esthetic detriment of its surrounding eighteenthcentury Western architecture.155
Other fountains, dedicated to the Sultan, toyed with the design of clock towers,
such as the three-frontal meydan fountain in Adana (Fig. 4-17),156 or actually fulfilled the
role, such as the structure, adjoining the Hamidiye School of Arts and Crafts in
Diyarbakır (Figs. 4-18 and 4-19). The latter also had a full-blown imperial coat of arms
(arma-i osmani) on prominent display.157

154

SF, 1316, Ağustos 19 (01.09.1900).
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See Wortman’s Scenarios of Power.
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M, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 5 (18.10.1900), and SF, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 26 (08.11.1900).
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Both Servet-I Fünun and Malumat published photographs of this fountain on the same day –
1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 12 (25.10.1900).
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Fig. 4-17. The Adana Fountain. M, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 5 (18.10.1900), and SF, 1316, Teşrin-i
Evvel 26 (08.11.1900).
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Figs. 4-18. The Diyarbakır Fountain I. M, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 12 (25.10.1900).
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Fig. 4-19. The Diyarbakır Fountain II. SF, 1316, Teşrin-i Evvel 12 (25.10.1900).

By the end of Abdülhamid II’s reign, there were few limits to what could be done, as
long as it spoke well of the monarch, as the Giresun fountain (Fig. 4-20) illustrates. Built
deep in the provinces, in a small town on the Anatolian Black Sea coast, the structure
nonetheless resembled an Empire-style triumphal arch, supported by two Corinthian
columns, with a fountain on each side.158
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M, 1318, Eylül 12 (25.09.1902).
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Fig. 4-20. The Giresun Fountain. M, 1318, Eylül 12 (25.09.1902).

Such was the passion for fountains at the time that even the German Kaiser’s
second visit to the Ottoman Empire in 1898 was commemorated with a special gazebo
fountain – the prominent Alman Çeşmesi (the German Fountain), located on the site of
the Byzantine Hippodrome in the heart of Istanbul. Curiously, it was the Kaiser’s own
idea and he provided the sketch for it during his second visit in 1898.159 While the model
and its inscriptions were first introduced by the press in the summer of 1900 (Fig. 421),160 the fountain’s inauguration was planned to coincide with the Sultan’s twenty-fifth
159

LH, 24.10.1898. The announcement points out that the fountain’s site is “to be designated by

the Sultan.”
160

M, 1316, Haziran 8 (21.06.1900).
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anniversary. In yet another example of cross-dating, it ultimately took place on the
Kaiser’s birthday early the following year.161

161

Jak Deleon. Anıtsal Đstanbul (Gezgin Rehberi) [Monumental Istanbul (A Traveler’s Guide)]
Istanbul, 2001, p. 197.
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Fig. 4-21: The Kaiser's Fountain. M, 1316, Haziran 8 (21.06.1900).

249

Rendered in the neo-Byzantine style, the fountain was constructed with an octagonal
dome, supported by eight marble columns, and four staircases leading up to the four
respective entries.
Interestingly, in the Turkish Prime Minister’s Ottoman archives in Istanbul, I
came across plans and sketches for a strikingly similar gazebo fountain, dated less than
six months after the inauguration of the German fountain (see Figs. 4-22 and 4-23). It
was meant to be constructed in honor of the Sultan’s twenty-fifth anniversary in
London.162

162

Y.PRK.BŞK. 66/53. The actual date is 17.07.1901. The plans and sketches bear the signature
of the Ottoman Ambassador to London. The document’s brief description in the archival catalogue refers to
plans for an identical fountain in Berlin. Unfortunately, I was not able to find any further information
about it.
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Fig. 4-22. Fountain to the Beloved I. Y.PRK.BŞK. 66/53.
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Fig. 4-23. Fountain to the Beloved II. Y.PRK.BŞK. 66/53.

The name of this fountain is very intriguing – “A Fountain to the Beloved
(Çeşme-i Dilara).” The ‘beloved’ is a concept, which belongs to Ottoman Divan
literature of earlier centuries. Here is how Walter Andrews and Irene Markoff define it:
“The beloved is the power-holder and is associated metaphorically with both the temporal
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ruler and the Divine . . . the emotional content and interpretation of group activities are
defined and ordered by relation to the beloved.”163 This Ottoman concept originated in
the secluded setting of a small elite group of friends, sharing esoteric knowledge and
interests and gathering occasionally for poetry and music. In this context, the poetic
pairing ‘beloved-lover’ stood for the political – ‘patron-client.’ Each pairing reflected, to
use the same authors’ term – a compartmentalized view of society at that time – that is, a
compendium of nested (autonomous) circles that a pre-modern society was. Even though
the Sultan employed the same term, he probably had very different domestic social
implications in mind. Rather than accentuate a putative social fragmentation,
Abdülhamid II probably aimed to evoke beautiful poetic-cum-political imagery from the
Ottoman “classical age” only to employ it in the service of a modern autocratic
totalization of society. The beloved’s ‘group’ would thus be extended to include every
member of late Ottoman society. Clearly, in some form or other, the trope of love for the
Sultan, analyzed earlier, carried on.164
The Ottoman inscription regarding the fountain’s purpose – “as a token of
remembrance (tezkir zımnında),” is very similar in phrasing to the actual German
inscription on Alman Çeşmesi – “in grateful remembrance (in Dankbarer Erinnerung).”
Perhaps emboldened by the Kaiser’s visit and gesture, Abdülhamid II finally intended to
take the ‘memory’ message of fountains, centered on himself, beyond his imperial
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Walter Andrews and Irene Markoff. “Poetry, the Arts, and Group Ethos in the Ideology of the
Ottoman Empire” in Edebiyat, v. I, N. 1, 1987, pp. 34, 39.
164

See Chapters II and III.
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domains in an attempt to achieve a measure of dynastic acceptance and reciprocity
abroad.165
Even if the “Fountain to the Beloved” did not materialize, a similar fountain did.
On October 18th of that same remarkable year of 1900, the cover of Servet-i Fünun
featured a hexagonal gazebo fountain erected next to the Mosul branch of the
“Department of Imperial Lands (Emlak-i Hümayun Dairesi)” on the occasion of the
Sultan’s twenty-fifth anniversary on the throne (Fig. 4-24).166

Fig. 4-24. The Mosul Fountain. SF, Teşrin-i Evvel 5, 1316 (18.10.1900).

165

The albums sent to Britain and the United States in the early 1890s depicted no fountains
personally dedicated to Abdülhamid II.
166

SF, Teşrin-i Evvel 5, 1316 (18.10.1900).
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This appears to be the only gazebo fountain actually built and dedicated to the Sultan. Its
shape aside, the fountain’s design seems to be strongly influenced by the ones discussed
above. For these reasons, it would be interesting to find out more about this structure’s
pre-history, inauguration circumstances and subsequent fate.
The theme, struck by the Kaiser’s favorite phrase – “in grateful remembrance,”
echoed in the Istanbul press far beyond his visit.167 An exact Ottoman rendition –
khatıra-i şükrgüzarisi olmak üzere – was used in reference to another monument,
dedicated to the Sultan’s twenty-fifth anniversary. This was “a pillar of solid marble,
with the height of ten farmers, built in grateful remembrance of the wharf, erected by the
Bandırma Municipality on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary….”168 One can
only marvel at the ‘ripple effects’ of munificence and the degree of abstract ceremonial
imagination the Sultan’s anniversary inspired by this time throughout the domains.
Situated at the port of Bandırma on the Marmara coast of Anatolia, the marble column
left no doubt about the imperial constituency it represented – both the side of the column
and its top were graced by crescents. Not to be outdone, in honor of the same jubilee, the
residents of the district capital of Balıkesir erected a Hamidiye clock tower, which was 25
meters tall.169
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See LH, 31.10.1898, for a more elaborate version – 12.11.1898, and, in a slightly different
wording – 08.11.1898.
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“Yirmi beşinci sene-i devriye-i cülus-i meymenet-i menus-i hümayun-i şerifine Bandırma
daire-i belediyesi tarafından yapılan rıkhtımın khatıra-i şükrgüzarisi olmak üzere on zerra irtifanda som
mermerden inşa olunan sutun.” M, Ağustos 31, 1316 (13.09.1900).
169

Ibid. Photographs of the two monuments appeared on the same page.
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At least in one respect, late nineteenth-century fountains resembled their
seventeenth-century counterparts. They both sought to focus the attention of the beholder
not so much on themselves as on their virtuous patron. Unlike his seventeenth-century
ancestors, however, Abdülhamid II outdistanced all competition for fountain patronage in
the late nineteenth century while the rhetoric accompanying it became progressively
more intense, laced with richer and ever more inventive religious references.
To be sure, some older expressions survived. Thus, the sketch of a yet another
Hicaz Railway Fountain was introduced to the public with the words that it was “an
increment to the pious deeds and good works of His Majesty the Caliph (zamime-i
khayrat ve meberrat-i Hazret-i Khilafetpenahi).” The sketch displayed a very
imaginative design of a namazgah fountain with a meydan fountain base and a clocktower top (Fig. 4-25).170
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M, 1316, Temmuz 13 (26.07.1900). As their name implies, namazgah fountains were designed
in the open air at a place suitable for prayer.
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Fig. 4-25. The Namazgah Fountain. M, 1316, Temmuz 13 (26.07.1900).

Over time, direct references to Abdülhamid II’s holiness (qudsiyet) became more
frequent and vivid, with the rhetoric spilling over to other, less numerous types of public
monuments as well. In the inscription of the “Fountain to the Beloved,” it was merely the
twenty-fifth anniversary that was “holy.”171 The realized Telegraph Monument in
Damascus was “decreed as a gift and an act of grace by the Holiest Personage of His
Majesty the Caliph (taraf-i eşref-i Cenab-i Khilafetpenahiden inayet ve ihsan
buyurulup).”172 The sketches and plans for a clock tower in Beirut in commemoration of
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“devr-i senevi-yi qudsi”

172

SF, 1316, Temmuz 13 (26.07.1900).
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the twenty-fifth anniversary reveal an inscription of a rarely intense kind – “in reverence
and remembrance of the revered twenty-fifth anniversary of His Majesty the Caliph …the
matchless Caliph Sultan Abdülhamid Khan…”173 Here, the words “caliph” (2),
“revered” (2), “matchless” (1) and “remembrance” (1) appeared in only three lines of
text.174 Until the very end of Abdülhamid II’s reign, fountains dedicated to him, served
as “an eternal material mark of devotion to God with faith and obedience.”175

VI.

The New (Modern) Realm of Negative Symbolic Encounters.

The personality cult of the ruler, successful as it was, also invited a broad range of
symbolic challenges, both on the individual and group levels. The purpose of this section
is twofold – first, to illustrate, based on archival evidence, the broad range of negative
symbolic encounters, and second, to shed light, whenever possible, on their
circumstances and implications for the various parties involved, as well as the public
sphere as a whole. Naturally, among the most common sites of symbolic contestation
were the sultanic celebrations themselves. The most obvious possibilities included
malevolent words about or actions against the sultan, whether at home or abroad. On the
first count, a partially ciphered telegram to the province (vilayet) of Aydin, on a last-
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“Khalife-i bimüdani Sultan Abdülhamid Khan . . . Hazret-i Khilafetpenahinin yirmi beşinci
sene-i devriye-i mübeccelesini tezkaren ve ta’zimen . . .”
174

Y.MTV. 206/127 – Temmuz 25, 1316 (07.08.1900).
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“ila al-abd mücessem bir nişane-i ubudiyetgarane olmak.” M, Eylül 28, 1316 (11.10.1900).
The expression refers to the Yozgat Fountain, whose foundation was also laid on the twenty-fifth
anniversary.
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minute signal by the Ottoman Embassy in London, instructed the local authorities not to
allow entry to “harmful materials (evraq-i muzırre)” printed in Egypt and sent by mail in
order to be distributed on Accession Day in Istanbul. The telegram is dated August 27,
1901 (N.S.), i.e. barely five days before the target date of September 1, 1901 (N.S.).176
Three years later, another report reflected the fact that among the phrases of prayer the
official journal of the provincial subdivision (sancak) of Mt. Lebanon published on the
occasion of Accession Day, were words “causing doubt/exciting suspicion (ihamli).” Its
conclusion was that “the time has come not to have such things written (bu gibi şeyler
yazılmaması için vaqit olunmuş).177
The most extreme actions against the sultan were attempts at armed provocations
on Accession Day. In late August 1903, in the midst of a major Bulgar revolt in Ottoman
Macedonia,178 a letter from the chief imperial secretary to the commander of the Ninth
Division of the Third Imperial Army, Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, warned him that “Bulgar
disturbers of the peace (Bulgar müfsidleri)” would “try to cause an agitation (bir
qarışıqlıq çıqarmağa çalışacaqları)” in Serres (Siroz), Razlog (Razlıq), Salonica
(Selanik) and other places.179 The letter advised the commander to adopt timely measures
for counteracting such “men of sedition (erbab-i fesad).”180 A day before the eve of the
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See Y.EE.KP. 14/1310.
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anniversary, another letter this time from the Grand Vizier himself (Mehmed Ferid Paşa),
on a tip from a coded telegram of the Rumelian Inspectorate (Rumeli Müfettişliği),
discussed potential serious trouble brewing in Bitola (Manastır). According to it, on the
day and night of the accession anniversary, rebels (qomita) would attempt “to stir up an
insurrection with the detonation of a bomb (bomba endakhtıyla iqa’ iğtişaş etmek
üzere).”181 The letter went on to recommend that the state take measures “against
impropriety (uygunsuzluğa qarşı).”182
These examples illustrate the authorities’ legitimate concern in extreme cases,
which left little doubt about the perpetrators’ motifs. In reality, however, motifs were far
from always as clear; instead, there was a wide gray area within which most negative
symbolic incidents fell or were thought to have fallen. The sometimes wide disparity
between central objectives and provincial vigilance, and the murky nature of the
symbolic terrain itself created much room for mistakes and second-guessing. At times,
even eulogies could get one into trouble. For example, the celebrations of the sultan’s
twenty-fifth accession anniversary183 in the Orthodox church on the Aegean island of
Kalymnos (Kalimnoz) which included “speeches containing the sacred qualities
belonging to his imperial majesty … and a reciprocal speech by the head district official
180
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bomb (see Deringil, p. 22). The sultan survived and his courageous conduct only strengthened his image.
182

See Y.A.HUS. 455/133 (30.08.1903).

183
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(qaymaqam) who repeatedly invoked benediction prayers for his Majesty,”184 caused a
local uproar. According to a certain Hasa Ağa, a captain of the local militia, and
someone identified as “the clerk of the Chios Officer Battalion” the papers containing
these speeches should be “counted as harmful papers (evraq-ı muzırre addederek),”
treated as insults (tahqirat), and subject to seizure (zabt). After the incident reached the
center, however, a completely opposite statement was issued. It treated such eulogies as
expressions of “perfect loyalty and devotion (kemal-i sadaqat ve ubudiyet), and,
doubtless to the local enforcers’ dismay, reprimanded “ignorant opinions (efkar-i
cahilaneleri).”185
Quite likely the militia captain and the battalion clerk were triggered into action
by religious motifs. To have the caliph’s sacred qualities listed and prayers for his health
read in a church must have seemed a blasphemy to them. Perhaps then this ironic
incident demonstrates how the syncretism which should have worked from the central
perspective was beginning to fail locally, a failure driven, among other things, by a
zealous over-subscription to a new, fewer-dimensional image of the sultan in
consequence of a quarter century of relentless caliphal propaganda. One way or another,
by the turn of the twentieth century, such a purist attitude would not have been unique to
these particular characters. For a number of reasons, starting with the sheer imperial
demographics in the aftermath of a series of Russo-Ottoman wars leading to Balkan state
formations, the tsarist title was quickly receding in the background.
184

“evsaf-i qudsiyatittisaf-i cenab-i mulukaneyi mutazzamın nutuqlar … ve qaymaqam canibinden
dakhi muqabele nutuq iradiyla ediye-yi khayriye-i hazret-i şahinşahi tekrar ve yad edildiği.”
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The exponential metaphoric growth, centralization and proliferation of the
sultanic image during the reign of Abdülhamid II led to a state of unprecedented
symbolic saturation of public space, which validated and perpetuated the sultan’s
authoritarian regime. Paradoxically, as the image supremacy became more pronounced,
potential challenges to it stood to gain more by attempting to disrupt and subvert it in the
eyes of an ever more interconnected and informed public. This was due to a number of
factors, including the perception that the weight of monarchic-dynastic legitimacy and
sovereignty increasingly rested on ethereal rather than material grounds, and the nature of
symbolic power itself, which required that it be complete (undented) in order to properly
fulfill its function. As a result, Ottoman central authorities became less and less tolerant
of celebrations of the sultan, which were less than perfect in their execution. In this
regard, they developed an acute (hyper) sensitivity towards potential sources of
malevolent intention, be they foreign or domestic. The fact that the reign of Abdülhamid
II abounded with accounts and investigations of ceremonial contestations, attests as much
to the accelerating imperial trend towards a new, modern, total sense of sovereignty and
legitimacy as to the sultan’s alleged paranoia per se.
One of the rare, pre-Abdülhamidian accounts of symbolic offence taken outside
the realm of maritime ceremonial cannon salvos, a topic worth its own study,186 comes
from the same report about the 1863 accession festivities in Halep, which was analyzed
above. This report also included an observation to the effect that the French consul had
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For one such attempt, see Darin Stephanov, “Cannon Salvos for the Monarch. Notes on the
Ceremonial Usage of Artillery at Nineteenth-Century Ottoman and Russian Accession, Coronation and
Other Public Dynastic Festivities,” an unpublished paper presented at Bosphorus University’s Ottoman
Material Culture Workshop, Istanbul, 2006.

262

stood alone in neither attending festivities, nor sending a representative, in neither
sending a letter, nor congratulating in any other way the Ottoman sovereign on his
official day.187 Foreign diplomatic affronts to Ottoman self-esteem were not always so
obvious, yet by the turn of the century, the Ottoman authorities were even keener on
detecting them. For example, a report from a certain Celal Bey, dated on the morrow of
Accession Day, made note of the fact that the French consul, alone among the consuls of
friendly states, had not lit up lanterns in honor of the sultan in Çanakkale (Qal’a-yi
Sultaniye).188 Similarly, when the Russian consul in Jedda (Cidde) did not receive the
provincial and district governors on the sultan’s accession day and birthday anniversaries
in 1905, the Ottomans saw his excuse of being sick as a mere pretext.189
This hyper-sensitivity towards foreign recognition of Ottoman sovereignty on
Ottoman soil carried over to areas, which were still at least nominally Ottoman (Egypt) or
which were only recently lost to the Empire (Bosnia and Herzegovina).190 In this ‘near’
or ‘new’ abroad, the sultanic festivities served as a platform for rallying support for the
Ottoman sultan among a local (Muslim) population, which could easily be swayed
against its new (in both cases, Christian) imperial masters (the British Empire and
187
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By a decision of the Congress of Berlin, which concluded the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War,
Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina on July 13, 1878. The Habsburgs officially annexed
the region on October 7, 1908 and administered it until the end of World War I.
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Austria-Hungary, respectively). Thus, in 1897, the celebration of Accession Day in
Egypt led to major disturbances, including cases of stone throwing at the British in the
name of the sultan. The incidents prompted the authorities to dispatch a cavalry squadron
from Cairo (Kahire) and Alexandria (Iskenderiyye) to Tanta and Al-Mansura (Mensure),
and led to a number of arrests.191 Similarly, when a letter appeared on the pages of a
Budapest newspaper stating that the Muslim population of Bosnia (Bosna) and
Herzegovina (Hersek) was prevented from participating in the illuminations for the
sultan’s twenty-fifth accession anniversary in Travnik and Sarajevo (Saraybosna), the
Ottomans were moved to action. The incident drew the attention of the Ottoman
Embassy in Vienna, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and even the Grand Vizier, prompting
a detailed inquiry.192
If the top echelon of Ottoman government followed sultanic celebrations abroad
so closely then the concealment of transgressions at their domestic counterparts would be
practically impossible. Even the outmost periphery of the Empire was not beyond reach
for Istanbul’s watchful eye, as the following incident shows.
In 1905, a certain Şakir Pasha duly reported to the center that the celebrations of
Accession Day, “the holy and revered day (yevm-i muqaddes ve mübeccel),” at AlHudaydah (Hüdeyde) in Ottoman Yemen had included a performance of the (Egyptian)
Khedive’s March (Khıdiviye Marşı). Şakir Pasha also observed that the deputy governor
(vali muavini) had come late to the official reception. With the insertion of a
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communication (ikhbar) that “this behavior resulted from a service of the treacherous
thought of Arab union (şu halın ittihad-i araban-i fikr-i khainanesine hizmetten münbais
bulunduğu),” the Pasha called for a meticulous investigation of all aspects of the incident.
In the meantime, the notated music was seized so that neither the Khedive’s March nor
any other Egyptian tune whatsoever could be played. According to preliminary findings,
Ahmed Pasha, Commander of the Fourteenth Division, was responsible for the Khidiviye
March rendition; “however, there was no evidence [lit. “foundation”] for such a bad
thought and intention (maamafih bunun bir sev-i fikir ve maqsada mebna olmadığı).”
Finally, the letter recorded the fact that the fourteen pages worth of musical notation
played had been torn out of the notebook and enclosed, adding that, upon arrival in
Istanbul, they would be presented to the Minister of War (serasker).193
There are a number of ways to read this letter, which are not mutually exclusive.
One is to interpret it as an insinuating account of one disgruntled official, seeking to
ingratiate himself to the center at the expense of another. This may have indeed been the
case here.194 If so, it could have been summarily dismissed. But it was not. It was taken
very seriously. Ahmed Pasha was arrested, sent to Istanbul and tried. In the meantime, a
certain Bakhtiyar Pasha, probably his replacement, prohibited performances of the
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I have not been able to verify with complete certainty this letter’s author’s identity yet. There
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installed (as of August 1905) Governor of Yemen (Ahmed Fevzi Pasa) by including the remark about his
deputy’s conduct. On this governor’s identity and tenure in office, see Kuneralp, p.43.
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Egyptian march. In the end, more than seven months after the incident, Ahmed Pasha
was acquitted and restored to his previous rank.195
That Şakir Pasha’s report should have had repercussions on such a scale attests to
the enormous importance attached to cyclical ceremonies and their constituent
symbology by the turn of the century. Even music had by this time become a site
conducive to the clash of conflicting allegiances, and a medium for drawing new
boundaries where none or few had existed before. The cyclical ceremonies had thus
come to increasingly and credibly define the parameters of state belonging and state
loyalty, not only in the eyes of the monarch, but also of his proxies and on to ever wider
circles of subjects, Christian and Muslim alike. Among the ceremonies, centered on the
sultan-caliph, none cut more directly to the core of his legitimacy and sovereignty, nor
occurred more frequently than the Friday noon prayer culminating in a sermon in the
ruler’s name (khutbe). Therefore, it should come as little surprise that this recurring
religious practice too provided a platform for individual protest, on the one hand, and
constant vigilance, on the other.
In 1888, multiple allegations of preacher misdemeanor were brought to the
attention of the deputy judge of canon law (naib-i şer’iye) in Erzurum (Anatolia). The
allegations stated that prayers for the health of the ruler at the end of the Friday sermon
were deliberately read too slowly or in a lower, unintelligible voice. Though
unsubstantiated, they were treated seriously and corresponding recommendations were
issued locally. News of the incidents reached the office of the Şeyhulislam.196
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For the account of his trial, see Y.MTV. 285/177 (21.04.1906).

196

See Y.MTV. 31/88 (10.04.1888) and Y.MTV. 32/5 (01.03.1888).
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Reports of inquiries about and violations of khutbe kept coming in all throughout
the rest of Abdülhamid II’s reign. The gamut ran from general issues of purely
theological nature, such as the propriety of “the congregation’s voicing of its agreement
during prayer (dua ettiği vaqitte cemaatın cehren amin demeleri)”197 to concrete,
eyebrow-raising incidents such as “the special expressions (cümel-i makhsuse)” a certain
Hafız198 Kemal delivered in Arabic during the sermon itself.199
Some cases in this category were handled with astonishing speed. A question
about the khutbe (of undisclosed exact content) a student at the Imperial School of Civil
Service (mekteb-i mülkiye-yi şahane) asked, reached the sultan’s ear almost immediately.
The sultan wrote to the Minister of Education (Maarif Nazırı), who assured him in
writing that “an investigation has at once commenced today (tahqiqat hemen bugün
ibtidar olunduğu). All of this took place on the same day – January 27, 1892 (Wed.). In
the same letter, the Education Minister notified the sultan that the results would be
brought in person and presented to the Imperial Chambers (mabeyn-i hümayun) by the
school’s deputy director, along with all teachers, on Saturday morning.200 The incident’s
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point of origin and its proximity to the center of power surely helped turn it into such a
top-priority matter.
Most reports sought to assist central authorities by exposing a suspected
subversive activity whether out of genuine concern, a desire for individual gain, or both.
When the official preacher (khatib) of the principal mosque in Biga (Anatolia) mentioned
the name of the previous sultan (Murad V) in the midst of reading the Friday noon
sermon from a piece of paper, “possessed by an evil spirit (cinniden [sic] çıqardığı),” as
the report said, the ensuing investigation uncovered a mini-conspiracy. A search of the
preacher’s home yielded the sermon’s draft, torn to pieces, yet still legible upon realignment, which clearly showed a text prepared in the name of the previous sultan.
Therefore both the preacher and his accomplice, who handed him the piece of paper, one
Plevneli Nalband (blacksmith) Ahmed, were arrested.201
Far from all cases were so swiftly and decisively resolved. Some ended in a
draw. In 1898, the former regional governor of Al-Diwaniyah (Divaniye) in present-day
Iraq, Ibrahim Haqqı, reported that in the sermon read by the preacher from the pulpit
following the morning “Feast of the Sacrifice (Qurban Bayram)” prayer at the local
government mosque, neither the holy name of the caliph was mentioned, nor the
obligatory prayer for him was performed. He added that in the presence of the Governor
of Bagdad (Bağdad), Ataullah Pasha, everyone “remained silent (sükut ettikleri).” To
Ibrahim Haqqı, this was a demonstration of trickery (müstefenn).202
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The governor’s response to Istanbul in the form of a coded telegram is an exercise
in rhetorical evasion. First, he denied that anything of this sort had taken place at the
government mosque service on that religious holiday. According to him, “the holiest
imperial name was mentioned with the customary proper and excellent honors and
reverence, and the obligatory prayers for His Majesty the Caliph were chanted aloud.”203
Moreover, he assured the center that “a perfect degree of serious attention and care is
given to the incumbent duty (zimmet) of devotion and loyalty to this holy sacred duty
(feriza) in all public holy mosques of the province’s interior.”204 This stylistic circle of
symbolic submission was followed by the governor’s admission that an incident did
indeed take place in his presence only at the mosque across the street from the
government building. With reference to the prayer and caliphal name mention, Ataullah
Pasha noted the official preacher’s “leaving of such a holy sacred duty undone.”205
Taking for granted the impossibility (farz-i muhal olaraq) that he might have done so out
of forgetfulness (zühul), something “inconceivable and impossible (tasavvur ve imkan
kharicinde),” the governor did not immediately see to the necessary measures. Instead,
Ataullah Pasha would opt for a face-to-face encounter with the preacher, according to
“his finding [this sacred duty] to be an article of faith (mu’taqad bulunduğumu).”
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“mu’tad olan ta’zimat ve tekrimat-i layıqa ve faiqa ile nam-i aqdes-i hümayun yad ve de’vat-i
mefruze-yi cenab-i khilafetpenahiyi tilavet eyledi”
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ubudiyet ve sadaqat olduğu üzere kemal-i mertebe-i diqqat ve itina edilmekte”
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Therefore the governor concluded that “the denunciations were a mere lie (ihbaratın kizbi mahz olduğunu).”206
Clearly, the governor of Bagdad had to go out of his way to allay any doubts the
center might have. He did so by resorting to loops of repetitive, effusive language.
Judging by word choices alone, he certainly outdid his accuser. Whereas Ibrahim Haqqı
had called the sultan’s name ‘holy (muqaddes),’ Ataullah Pasha called it ‘holiest
(aqdes)’; whereas the former explicitly referred to ‘duty’ only once, the latter brought it
up four times.207 In the end, it seems that the governor’s eloquence paid off. Instead of
being summarily dismissed, Mehmed Ataullah Ibrahim Pasha retained his office for
another eight months following the date of his telegram to Istanbul (June 4, 1898). He
served a total of two and a half years as governor of Bagdad, quick turnover being a longstanding Ottoman administrative norm.208
A final example of the hyper-sensitivity with which the late Ottoman authorities
guarded the Ottoman monopoly of sovereignty on Ottoman soil concerns the Maronite
(Maruni) Christians of Mount Lebanon (Cebel-i Lübnan).209 In 1897, the governor of
Beyrut, Reşid Bey, stated in a letter to Istanbul that in most districts of his province fires
had been lit for an illumination the previous Sunday. The alleged purpose was the
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expression of gratitude for the bestowal of “sublime decorative orders (nişan-i aliye)” to
the Maronite Patriarch and bishops. However, he astutely observed that this illumination
took place fifteen days after the event itself and that it also happened to fall on the
Russian Emperor’s “special day (yevm-i makhsus).”210 Therefore, Reşid Bey thought that
this coincidence should “in any case be seen with appropriate attention (her halde şayan
diqqat gorünmekle).”211 The center’s reaction remains unknown. Nonetheless, the
governor’s vigilance must have played a part in his long tenure in office.212
In their totality, the negative symbolic encounters illustrate well the
interventionist nature of the modern state, whose instrumentarium for symbolic control
was all but installed by the end of Abdülhamid II’s reign. They delineate an imperial
public sphere, quite removed from its immediate antecedents, and strongly resembling
the one still in place today. Some of its modern dimensions include the tight-fitted
marriage of territory and sovereignty, the intended and increasingly enforceable
standardization and totalization of loyalty, and the rising number and inflexible nature of
demands levied on the individual as a prerequisite for an abstract form of belonging.
This imperial public sphere witnessed the first bouts of modern symbolic warfare, which
raised the value of symbolic action and counter-action, of information and
disinformation. Much has been written about Abdülhamid II’s regime of surveillance
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and censorship. More often than not it has been traced to the sultan’s personal
idiosyncrasies. When seen against the back foil of long-term modernizing processes,
however, an alternative explanation emerges, which is of a systemic rather than personal
nature. Therefore, it may be more historically accurate and useful to speak of the
inception of a (modern) culture of surveillance in the turn-of the-century Ottoman
Empire. What the negative symbolic encounters also point to, in a cause-and-effect
fashion, are the beginnings of a shift from top-down censorship and symbolic policing to
individual auto-censorship (self-policing), another thoroughly modern phenomenon very
much active to this day. With all of these considerations in mind, the next step, to the
symbolic dictatorship of the nation-state and its attendant mythology may be much
smaller than currently thought.

VII.

Conclusion.

This chapter attempted to chart chronologically Sultan Abdülhamid II’s multilayered and constantly evolving policies regarding his own image. This was
accomplished through the analysis of a broad spectrum of evidence and the use of key
concepts, some employed earlier, others newly introduced, such as ruler visibility, target
audiences, dynastic pantheon, auto-Orientalism, cross-dating, personality cult and
negative symbolic encounters. The main argument consisted of several parts. First, far
from being an anomaly, this Sultan’s long reign exhibited trends, which had long been
under way. Second, far from being a close-minded Oriental despot, Abdülhamid II was
acutely aware of and skillfully exploited contemporary international shifts in the
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discourse of royal power in order to strengthen his personal regime. Third, in the
process, the Sultan acted very much like a contemporary imperial-cum-national monarch,
both in terms of the mixed, re-constituted sources of his legitimacy and sovereignty and
in terms of the direct bonds of subject loyalty he sought to create. Fourth, in an effort to
appeal to a number of divergent and increasingly conflicting group sensitivities,
Abdülhamid II caused a unique split, along faith-based lines, of Mahmud II’s longstanding mythology of royal power. Fifth, this split lead to a pronounced shift from a
direct to an indirect form of ruler visibility. Over time, in an attempt to always stay
ahead of subject expectations, the Sultan encouraged a multiplicity of escalating forms of
ruler glorification, which amounted to a personality cult. Sixth, the analysis of a variety
of symbolic challenges to the sultan’s tightly regulated public image adds additional
modernizing features to the portrait of the late imperial public sphere.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought an end to Abdülhamid II’s
authoritarian regime. Even though he did not abdicate until a year later, in the aftermath
of a failed counter-revolution, his effective power had been much curtailed and his
monopoly on public space had been instantly removed. Moreover, the sultanic
celebrations were swiftly downgraded to a bare minimum of popular recognition. So, in
a very palpable way, even before Abdülhamid’s exit from the political scene, his own
‘sacred aura,’ as well as the public image of the monarch’s office in general, had been
irreparably damaged.213 None of his two younger brothers – Mehmed Reşad and
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Vahideddin – who successively rose to the throne before the empire finally crumbled
held personal sway over their subjects even remotely approximating Abdülhamid’s.
To judge the success of this sultan’s endeavor by his eventual deposition and the
Empire’s ultimate demise is to write history backwards. Instead, as this chapter
demonstrated, there are a number of alternative indicators which can serve as benchmarks
for late imperial rulership. By delving deeper into matters of protocol and cyclical
celebration, which have been until recently dismissed as trivial or irrelevant, it is possible
to first, reconstruct power projections in the proper context of their times and second,
evaluate the nature and degree of their impact on the popular mind.
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Conclusion.

In terms of the social collective, the earlier Ottoman Empire had functioned as a
highly restricted central sphere with a multiplicity of local units, regardless of the term
one chooses to deploy – fragmented, compartmentalized, autonomous, nested, or
decentralized. The annual secular Ottoman royal public celebrations in the capital, the
provinces and abroad, initiated by Mahmud II in 1836 and perpetuated in an increasingly
standardized and escalating manner by his successors – Abdülmecid, Abdülaziz, and
Abdülhamid II – permanently altered this social picture in the nineteenth century.
Although shaped by opposite shifts in ruler visibility, first under Mahmud II, with nonMuslims in mind, and then by Abdülhamid II, with Muslims in mind, these sultanic
festivities achieved the central goal of broadening and homogenizing the notion of a
public in the Ottoman Empire, whose ties of allegiance to sultan and dynasty would cut
across religious, cultural, and class lines.
This dissertation offers a continuous historical account, based on a common
framework, which traces long-term symbolic trends and interactions between the top and
bottom, core and periphery of Ottoman society. It argues that the process began earlier,
was more consistent from reign to reign, and more multi-faceted over time, than is
currently thought. By analyzing (both unique and cyclical) ceremonial events in their
proper historical context, this dissertation constructs a composite long-term view of
policies and practices of staging and receiving Ottoman rulership. The argument is
founded on a detailed re-constitution of the notion of Ottoman rulership in the late period,
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its shifts, attuned to particular target audiences and key segments of the imperial
populace, and the growing personality cult of the ruler.
The dissertation demonstrates that the close, state-approved engagement of
provincial populations in the sultanic celebrations raised communal consciousness along
religio-linguistic lines and ultimately placed it onto a qualitatively new, distinctly modern
trajectory. Although this consciousness began as a highly localized phenomenon, drawing
on pre-existing microregional (town or village and vicinity) attachments,1 over time, it
evolved into an inferred macrocommunal ethos for which no historical precedent had
ever existed. Thus, in a very real sense, these cyclical escalating ceremonies created
‘groups,’ along the lines of the Western ‘nationality’ category. As this dissertation
shows, the sultanic celebrations pre-dated the domestic use of the term ‘millet’ with
reference to non-Muslims, and were instrumental in gradually forging its reality and
metamorphoses. One of its goals is to make evident the limits of this term’s legitimate
use by historians today, and the outright inadequacy of its continuing use in constructing
primordial narratives. Another, closely related, is to piece together a long missing story
of the rise of ethnonationalism in the Ottoman Empire by designing a project of mental
archaeology, which contains less of the contamination of our own times and assumptions,
and consequently, does its historical subjects better justice. In accordance with these
goals, this study reveals a fundamental, yet so far historiographically absent episode of
the formation of group consciousness, namely, as a byproduct of consistent long-term
Ottoman policies.
1

See Darin Stephanov, “Patriotism in the Transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Nation. The
Thought of Butrus al-Bustani, Mehmed Said Pasha and Ziya Gokalp.” MA Thesis, Central European
University, Budapest, Hungary, 2000, pp. 3-10.
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This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the beginnings and nature
of national society. It argues that by adopting and adapting the Western notion of a
national monarch in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman imperial regime also partially
and inadvertently contributed to the fragmentation of its own imperial subjecthood over
time. So the transition from empire to nation was much more subtle and gradual than the
study of purely political history would suggest.
The personality cult, spun around the Ottoman monarch in the second half of the
nineteenth century set a regional precedent for the use of techniques for mass appeal
(today known as PR), which have since been repeatedly employed and are largely still
with us today. It also conditioned various groups, increasingly perceiving themselves in
ethnic terms, to a type of monarchic national mindset and society, which they replicated
immediately after gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, analysis
of this nature is also indispensable to a comprehensive understanding of the history of
national consciousness in Ottoman successor states, an issue which has been completely
ignored or denied by the respective national historiographies.
The subject of this study is an important, and very real, if much overlooked,
avenue for the spread of nationalism. The ultimate demise of the imperial system and its
supplanting with the nation-state lead to powerful processes of national re-writing of
history and nationalization of public memory, which still underwrite prevailing
conceptions of (individual and group) identity. It is against such narratives that this
project takes a stand. By weaving together elements of micro and macro history,
subaltern studies and elite history, this project also argues against the need for pendulum-
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like paradigm shifts in the social sciences, a frequent occurrence in the past several
decades.
As the sultanic ceremonies came to affect and involve ever larger segments of the
Ottoman population, the range of symbolic possibilities shrank and came under ever
stricter control whereas the emotional intensity and abstraction from reality of the
reference terms increased. This trend mirrored contemporary European and global
processes of redefinition of monarchic sovereignty. Taken a step further, this study also
establishes some tentative, but highly suggestive links between the personality cult of the
late Ottoman Sultan and the personality cults of later twentieth-century (national
authoritarian/totalitarian) regimes, including the effects of symbolic over-extension.2
In short, this dissertation provides a blueprint for mapping the complex syncretic
modernities of late imperial regimes and a framework for designing comparative imperial
studies across the nineteenth-century world and beyond. These empires engaged in
fascinating acts of ceremonial experimentation, but also exhibited many ominous sides of
the looming modern state, with its unparalleled abilities to censor, discipline and control.
By looking at the symbolic ways through which the center came into cyclical contact
with the individual, and repeatedly attempted to cajole, coerce and co-opt him/her, we
can study some of the first abstract lessons in modernity that were taught and learned by
each side. As a result, we can better understand the emergence of the end product, both
across space and over time.
2

By symbolic over-extension, I mean the process whereby ever escalating terms of glorification of
the monarch (or state/party leader) made him appear superhuman, an intended consequence, but also, by
extension, made his image much vaguer and not so emotionally binding on ordinary people, clearly an
unintended consequence. For a similar phenomenon in the case of Franz Joseph II, see Brigitte Hamann,
“Der Wiener Hof und die Hofgesellschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Karl Möckl, Ed.
Hof und Hofgesellschaft in den deutschen Staaten im 19 und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert. Boppard am
Rhein, 1990, p. 66 and Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism, p. 112.
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